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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Upstream – Federal
Fifth Circuit
Claimant ID 100236236 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 16-30521, 2017 WL
2791395 (5th Cir. June 27, 2017).
Property Owner filed a Business Economic Loss claim in July 2013, under
the Deepwater Horizon Economic & Property Damages Settlement
Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”). To recover under the Settlement
Agreement, Property Owner must have been an entity doing business or
operating in the Gulf Coast areas between April 20, 2010, and April 16,
2012. Property Owner’s last commercial lease ended in August 2008.
Property Owner then employed a broker until September 2009, to find
someone to lease the property. Although, Property Owner alleges that the
broker continued to search for tenants that could rent the property, up until
the time of the oil spill, and claims that there were serious offers to rent the
property at the time of the spill. Property Owner’s first claim was denied in
November 2014. Claims Administrator stated that Property Owner was not
doing business in the designated areas at the time of the spill, because he
received no revenues during the designated time-period. In October 2015,
Property Owner filed a notice of appeal. The Appeal Panel affirmed the
denial. Property Owner appealed to the district court, and it refused to
review his appeal. Property Owner appealed that decision. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
choosing not to review Property Owner’s claim because it did not involve a
question on how to interpret or implement the Settlement Agreement.
Therefore, because the district court’s decision to not review was not an
abuse of discretion, the denial was affirmed. This is an unpublished opinion
of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing
the case as precedent.
Claimant ID 100128765 v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., No. 16-31087, 2017 WL
4310087 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2017).
A Louisiana Real-Estate-Appraisal Company (“Company”) negatively
affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was required to show causation
to recover losses in a class-action settlement against Producer. To recover
losses, Company was required to establish causation through one of various
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tests, one of which was the “Decline Only” test. This test contained the
following three subparts: (1) The decline in percentage of revenue over
three consecutive post-Spill months in 2010 compared to the same months
in the Benchmark period; (2) specific documentation that identifies factors
outside the control of the claimant that prevented the recovery of revenues
in 2011; and (3) the Customer Mix Test. The prong at issue was the second
prong which lists six possible factors, one of which must be supported by
documentation for Company’s claim to be upheld. Company submitted two
articles explaining the struggles of appraisal companies in 2011 because of
the passage of the Dodd—Frank Wall Street Reform Act. The claims
administrator denied Company’s “Business Economic Loss” claim because
the documents submitted were not “sufficient to establish that [its] lost
revenue occurred as a result of the Spill.” The appeal panel upheld the
denial of Company’s claim, the district court then denied discretionary
review, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Company’s petition for discretionary
review. It reasoned that Company did not satisfy its requirement to provide
specific documentation addressing one of the second-prong enumerated
factors of the “Decline Only” test.
D. North Dakota
Raaum Estates v. Murex Petroleum Corp., Case No. 4:14-cv-024, 2017 WL
2870070 (D.N.D. July 5, 2017).
Operator is the successor-in-interest to an oil and gas lease granted by
Lessors. Operator created a saltwater disposal system that piped saltwater
from a well on Lessors’ surface estate to be injected into the subsurface of
an adjacent estate. Operator obtained a right-of-way grant to construct
pipelines for the system and an access road consent to haul saltwater from
Lessors. After construction, Operator used the system to dispose of
saltwater from on-lease, off-lease, and third-party wells. Lessors noticed a
substantial increase in truck traffic due to the increase in disposals and
spoke with Operator about additional compensation. Negotiations between
Operator and Lessors broke down when the parties could not come to an
agreement. Lessors then brought several claims against Operator. The
district court found that: (1) neither of the two agreements between
Operator and Lessors, nor the original lease, gave Operator right to dispose
of off-lease and third-party saltwater; (2) Operator’s use of the property for
off-lease saltwater disposal was civil trespass; (3) Operator was
permanently enjoined from using property for off-lease saltwater disposal
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unless agreement was made with Lessor to allow; and (4) Lessor was
entitled to damages plus interest for the past trespasses of Operator.
E.D. Arkansas
JS Interests, Inc. v. Hafner & Assoc., CASE NO. 4:16CV00586 BSM, 2017
WL 3612857 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2017).
Oil and gas production company (“Company”) and Landowner entered into
oil and gas leases (“Leases”) giving Landowner working interest in the oil,
gas, and other minerals sold by Company. Leases were governed by joint
operating agreements (“JOAs”). Landowner assigned royalty interests in its
Leases with Company to Third Parties giving them a small percentage of
profits acquired by Landowner. After the death of Landowner, Third Parties
had not received royalty interest payments owed to them and sued for
breach of contract and willful withholding of overriding interest payments.
Company cross claimed, asserting that Landowner’s estate must indemnify
Company for any judgment Third Parties receive against Company.
Company moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court:
(1) denied Company’s motion for summary judgment on Third Parties’
breach of contract claim because they were third-party beneficiaries of the
JOAs between Company and Landowner; (2) denied Company’s motion for
summary judgment on its claim for indemnification from Landowner’s
estate because there was a material issue of fact as to whether Company’s
failure to pay Landowner’s estate under the JOAs’ terms was a material
breach relieving Landowner’s estate of its obligation to indemnify
Company; and (3) granted summary judgment against Third Parties’ claim
to an Arkansas statutory penalty because Third Parties failed to provide
notice to Company of their claims. Accordingly, the court denied in part
and granted in part Companies summary judgement motion.
Lipsey v. SEECO, Inc., No. 4:16CV00149 JLH, 2017 WL 2662977 (E.D.
Ark. June 20, 2017).
Lessor commenced action against Companies alleging they failed to pay
him the full amount of royalties owed to him under his lease. Lessor sued
under the theories of: (1) conversion; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) violation of
state oil and gas royalties code; and (4) violation of the Arkansas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”). Companies moved for summary judgment
on all four counts, and Lessor conceded his claims to count three. Lessor
removed case to federal court on the theory of diversity jurisdiction.
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However, the federal district court held that there was no diversity
jurisdiction because it demonstrated, to a legal certainty, that the amount in
controversy would not meet the minimum monetary requirement. However,
subject-matter jurisdiction was obtained under the Class Action Fairness
Act (“CAFA”) because it was likely the amount in controversy would be
met with the number of class members. The court granted summary
judgment for Companies for several reasons. First, Lessor failed to establish
a claim for conversion because Companies had the right to possess the gas,
because they had a lease with Lessor. Second, Lessor cannot assert unjust
enrichment because unjust enrichment does not apply when an express
contract exists, except in special circumstances. Lessor did not argue those
special circumstances, so the court did not do it for him. Third, Lessor
cannot sue under the ADTPA because its “safe harbor” provision does not
allow for a private right of action.
E.D. Kentucky
EQT Prod. Co. v. Magnum Hunter Prod. Co., 5:16-CV-150-JMH, 2017
WL 3052979 (E.D. Ky. July 19, 2017).
Lessor sued Operator alleging a variety of breach of contract claims
stemming from Operator’s: (1) failure to pay unremitted shut-in fees,
royalties, overriding royalties; (2) underpayment for the sale of natural gas;
and (3) improper post-production deductions from royalties. The claim
arose from eleven Farmout Agreements (“FOA”) that allowed Operator to
drill wells on Lessor’s land in exchange for royalties. The FOAs provided
for the deduction of Lessor’s proportionate share of applicable severance
tax, transportation, and processing costs before determining the adjusted
basis for the Lessor’s royalty payments. Because the FOAs, does not
explicitly define “oil and/or gas”, the court analyzes the FOAs under
subsets based on whether: (1) the respective FOAs incorporate a defining
Model Form Operating Agreement; (2) the FOAs themselves define “oil
well” and “gas well”; or (3) the FOAs fail to define the relevant language.
The court held that the FOA’s “gas well” language does not contemplate
produced NGL from subject wells since NGLs are liquid in form and, thus,
excluded in FOAs using the term “gas”. The court accordingly granted each
parties motions in part and denied in part.
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N.D. West Virginia
JJK Mineral Co. v. Noble Energy, Inc., Civ. Action No. 5:16CV112, 2017
WL 2662196 (N.D. W. Va. June 20, 2017).
Sublessees asked Lessor to amend an oil and gas lease (“Lease”) to include
pooling rights. Lessor subsequently executed an amendment and
supplement. Sublessees later notified Lessor that they refused to execute the
terms but nevertheless drilled wells on the Lease units to produce natural
gas. Lessor filed a civil action against Sublessees alleging: (1) willful
breach of the Lease; (2) breach of good faith and fair dealing under the
Lease; (3) the amendment and supplement were invalid; (4) Sublessees did
not have pooling rights; (5) Sublessees owe royalties; and (6) the Lease had
been rescinded by Sublessees’ willful breach. In response, Sublessees filed
motions for partial dismissal. The court found that willful breach of the
Lease was a “duplicative breach of contract claim.” Accordingly, it granted
Sublessees’ motions for dismissal of the breach of good faith and fair
dealing count. Regarding rescission by willful breach, the court found that
equitable forfeiture or partial rescission may be an appropriate remedy, and
Lessor had sufficiently alleged facts to establish that damages alone would
not remedy the breach. The court made no conclusions regarding the
appropriateness of forfeiture or partial rescission as a remedy or whether
damages would be sufficient to remedy any breach. Thus, the court denied
Sublessees’ motions as to rescission by willful breach.
Mountaineer Minerals, LLC v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:16CV28 2017,
2017 WL 3446529 (N.D. W. Va., August 10, 2017).
Company sued Corporation claiming that Corporation was not a bona fide
purchaser of mineral rights arising out of an oil and gas lease (“Lease”).
This dispute follows a chain of assignments of the Lease, and Company
claimed that it lawfully acquired the mineral rights from the last entity to be
assigned the Lease. This court granted Company’s motion for summary
judgment and denied Corporation’s motion for summary judgment for one
primary reason. Despite Corporation’s contention that it conducted due
diligence to assess all property interests and that Company failed to inform
Corporation that the assignment at issue was recorded in a different county
than the other Lease assignments, Corporation was on inquiry notice of a
competing claim. Inquiry notice of a competing claim was found even
though the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has before deemed a party a
bona fide purchaser despite “non-specific references to contractual
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obligations,” but that is not the case here. In this case, during the two-yearlong negotiation between Company and Corporation, Corporation was
obligated to investigate competing claims when its legal manager was sent
an email which implied a third party’s interest and concern in the mineral
rights and Lease. Moreover, an ownership report given to Corporation
before purchase listed a third person as the owner of the mineral rights.
Therefore, even though Corporation claims to have made a purchase with a
clean chain of title, other circumstances put it on inquiry notice of a third
party’s interest. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision
from the higher court as of publication.
Bankruptcy
In re Samson Res. Corp., 569 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).
Heirs sought royalties from an oil and gas lease. Heirs dispute whether the
lease was valid and the amount of the royalties owed therefrom. Heirs had
the burden of proving the validity of their claims by a preponderance of the
evidence. Heirs asserted four primary arguments: (1) the lease terminated
and is not a valid lease; (2) Debtor underpaid Heirs on their royalty
interests; (3) Heirs own an interest in the sixty-nine-acre tract; and (4) Heirs
believe their claim should be classified as a secured claim, priority claim, or
an administrative claim. Debtor argued: (1) the lease was valid; (2) Heirs
received all of their royalty interests in the twenty-five-acre tract; and (3)
Heirs could not prove any valid interest in the sixty-nine-acre tract.
Therefore, Debtor did not believe Heirs’ claims were valid. The court found
that the lease remained in effect because a well which was drilled within the
primary period of the lease continues to produce. The court also found that
Heirs did not prove their ownership of any royalty interests in the sixtynine-acre tract. Finally, the court found Debtor did not owe Heirs a larger
royalty payment because the effective lease had been perpetuated by
production. There was a final issue regarding the legitimacy of the transfer
of one-half of one of the Heirs’ interest to National Locater and the
payments from Debtor for that transfer, and the court found that the
particular Heir transferred one-half of his royalty interests to National
Locater and that Debtor complied with the terms of the transfer. The court
sustained the Second Omnibus Objection, in part, and disallowed Heirs’
claims in their entirety. The Claims Reserve Motion was found to be moot
regarding Heirs’ claims.
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Upstream – State
Colorado
Kinder Morgan CO2 Co., v. Montezuma Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2017 CO 72.
Taxpayer appealed decision regarding action challenging the retroactive tax
assessment on oil and gas leaseholds. The amount taxed is based on
“quantity and value” of the tapped resource, but this value is based on
Taxpayer’s assessment of value given in its produced annual statement.
This assessed amount is based on the price “at the wellhead,” but the value
is not assessed there, requiring Taxpayer to speculate the proper amount.
This estimate includes an evaluation of how much it can deduct for
processing. Here, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that Taxpayer
deducted more than it should have for production costs because it was
dealing with a related company, while taking the higher deduction allowed
in using an unrelated company. The court was tasked with determining
whether it was acceptable to retroactively assess a tax when only the
estimated price from the wellhead was inaccurate or underreported. Also,
the court determined whether the calculations were wrong because
Taxpayer was dealing with a related party, or whether that designation was
inaccurate. For both questions, the court determined that the Board of
Assessment Appeals got it right in its decisions. First, the court found that
underreported value is considered “omitted property” judging from the
legislative history of the applicable statutory scheme, and so should be
subject to the tax. Also, the court offers that audit procedures are in place,
that would be irrelevant if there was no related authority to impose remedial
retroactive assessments. The court also agreed that the companies were
related because of a substantial partnership interest, so Taxpayer estimated
the incorrect amount of deduction. Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court’s decision that this retroactive tax assessment
was acceptable.
Kansas
In re Matter of Protest of Barker, 398 P.3d 870 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
Landowners operated an oil lease in Kansas. The Board of Tax Appeals
(“BOTA”) found the lease but not the equipment used to produce oil and
gas on said lease to be tax-exempt under state law as a “low-production oil
lease.” Landowner appealed that decision, arguing that the definition of “oil
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lease” in the exemption statute included the equipment used to produce the
oil. By considering the statute’s plain language and other relevant statutory
provisions the Kansas Court of Appeals first noted that tax exemption
statutes are construed in favor of imposing the tax. Second, the court found
relevant a provision in the state appraisal guide which states that
“production equipment [does] not qualify for the exemption.” Third, the
court disagreed with Landowners main argument—that the words “together
with” in the statutory phrase “oil and gas leases and all oil and gas well . . .
together with all casing . . . and all other equipment” is an inclusive phrase
which expands the exemption to include the equipment. Instead, the court
held that “together with” was a distinguishing phrase, which separated the
equipment from the oil lease itself. The court therefore concluded that
equipment is not exempted under the statute and affirmed the decision from
BOTA.
Lewis v. Kan. Prod. Co., 401 P.3d 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
Landowners property was subject to an oil and gas lease (“Lease”) dating
back to 1972 which granted the right to explore for and produce oil on a
160-acre tract. Assignor acquired the lease and in 1994, assigned his
interest to Assignee who then partially assigned his interest to his
Production Company. Assignor retained the upper strata and continued to
produce oil from them. Production Company never produced oil or gas
from the deeper strata. In response to a 2004 lawsuit that sought to
terminate Production Company’s Lease, Production Company drilled a
well, and the court declined to terminate the lease. After several years of no
exploring or developing, Landowners sued to terminate Production
Company’s Lease. The district court found Production Company had
breached an express provision of the lease by never producing oil or gas
and had also breached a statutorily implied covenant to explore and develop
in the Deep Horizons Act (“Act”) and terminated Production Company’s
Lease. The appellate court affirmed part of the ruling finding Production
Company breached the Act’s implied covenant to explore; however, the
express terms of the Lease were not breached, because habendum clause
does not apply to each leasehold interest when a portion of an oil and gas
lease is assigned. Furthermore, the habendum clause was satisfied by
Assignor’s production of oil in producing quantities; the demand letter sent
by Landowners’ attorney did not waive any breach; and the time between
the district court’s order from an earlier suit, July 2009, and the time
Landowners sued in November 2013 was the appropriate time-period for
measuring a breach of the implied covenant. This is an unpublished opinion
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of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing
the case as precedent.
Louisiana
Glassell Producing Co. v. Naquin, 16-0549 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/5/17); 224
So. 3d 56.
Current Operator impleaded Buyer of royalty interests and Sellers of
royalty interests in inherited land to determine which party was entitled to
current royalty payments. Subsequent to a lease in 1947 to Previous
Operator, Sellers sold their royalty interests at the rate established in the
1947 lease to Buyer in 1993. In 1998, the lease to Previous Operator was
released and surrendered, so Buyer leased the land to Current Operator.
Sellers contended that the 1993 deeds only conveyed the royalty interests
under the previous lease, and the royalty interests reverted to Sellers once
the lease terminated. The lower court found that the deeds conveyed all of
Sellers’ royalty interests in the land, and that Sellers were not entitled to
royalty payments under the new lease. The appellate court reversed and
held that the 1993 deeds conveyed only the royalty interests that were
attached to the lease at the time it was executed, and that the general royalty
interests reverted to Sellers once the previous lease was terminated.
Gloria’s Ranch, L.L.C. v. Tauren Expl., Inc., 51-077 (La. App. 2 Cir.
6/2/17); 223 So.3d 1202.
Lessor granted a mineral lease to Lessee, granting exclusive right to
produce minerals from any depth under the land. Lessee then assigned an
undivided forty-nine percent interest to Assignee. Lessee and Assignee both
obtained individual mortgages from Bank. Lessee contracted with an oil
and gas company to drill on the property of the lease. Lessor notified
Lessee that lease had expired in part or in whole due to lack of production
in paying quantities. Lessee did not release the lease. Lessor brought action
against Lessee and Assignee alleging that they failed to produce a
recordable act showing continuation of lease, that not releasing the lease
prevented Lessor from releasing the interest, and that Lessee and Assignee
failed to pay royalties A bench trial declared the lease expired due to lack of
drilling and no production. Lessee appealed. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court holding it correctly awarded unpaid royalties and damages for
the unpaid royalties because it may do so when the lack of payment was
fraudulent, willful, or without reasonable grounds.
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North Dakota
Abell v. GADECO, LLC, 2017 ND 163, 897 N.W.2d 914.
Producer entered into a contract with Landowner for the mineral rights to
her property. The contract posited that Producer had the right to develop the
mineral interests on the property for a primary term of five years,
terminating on January 9, 2017. Producer entered into discussions with
Landowner concerning surveying and staking areas for well locations
multiple times throughout the primary term. Landowner gave permission to
survey and stake one area and then told Producer that it must move
somewhere else on the property which it did. Upon receiving a well permit
from the Industrial Commission to drill, the primary term had passed and
Landowner sued seeking costs and attorney fees for violating a terminated
lease while Producer brought a counterclaim for breach of contract and
damages. The trial court granted Landowner summary judgment declaring
the lease had terminated and awarded Landowner costs and attorney fees.
Producer appealed. The Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment finding the lease had
terminated because there were genuine issues of fact concerning the
preparatory activities. The court said that the trial court’s language in
determining summary judgment was “cryptic” and did not address these
issues. The court also found the trial court’s language concerning the
dismissal of Producer’s breach of contract claim “puzzling” and only
consistent if the lease termination ruling was upheld which it was not. The
court reversed and remanded the judgment.
Dixon v. Dixon, 2017 ND 174, 898 N.W.2d 706.
Trustee brought action against trust Beneficiary, seeking injunctive relief,
declaratory judgment, and to quiet title to mineral interests, or alternatively,
for reformation of Warranty Deed that granted Beneficiary a life estate
which transferred mineral interests to the exclusion of his siblings. The trial
court reformed the Warranty Deed to reserve and except the minerals, and
to retain the mineral interests as property of the trust. Beneficiary appealed,
arguing there was no mutual mistake and the statute of limitations
precluded the reformation claim. The Supreme Court of North Dakota
affirmed. The court held: (1) it was the intent of the trustor, as evidenced by
the trust agreement, that the mineral interests connected to the subject
property be reserved and retained as property of the trust; (2) that the
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Warranty Deed conveying the mineral interests into a life estate held by
Beneficiary was made in error; (3) that a subsequent mineral deed failed to
correct the mistake as it conveyed a fee simple interest to the original
beneficiaries from Beneficiary’s life estate; and (4) that reforming the
Warranty Deed to reflect the true intent of the trust agreement was justified.
The court disagreed that latent ambiguity existed in the above-referenced
conveyances because no doubt existed as to “the object which the intention
applies.”. The court did not consider Beneficiary’s argument that the statute
of limitations bars Trustee’s reformation claim.
Fahey v. Fife, 2017 ND 200, 900 N.W.2d 250.
The children of previous mineral interest owner (“Children”), sought
cancellation of a quit claim deed of mineral rights executed by their mother
to their deceased father. The lower court deemed the deed invalid, but the
mineral rights then became subject to the state’s intestacy scheme, which
distributed the rights to the deceased father, and consequently, his surviving
spouse. Through this action, Children questioned their mother’s
competency in executing the deed and, because they did not want the rights
in question to go to their father’s surviving spouse, Children argued that the
court did not value the estate accurately. This valuation impacts the
application of intestacy laws in their jurisdiction, thus impacting Children’s
distributed share of their father’s estate. In review, however, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota presumed the lower court’s competence with such
matters and in the absence of clear error it found that Children did not
address the issue of undervaluation, or the lack of accounting of the real
property with the mineral rights in earlier proceedings, and therefore cannot
bring up the issues on appeal. The court thus denied Children’s claim for
equitable relief, offering that unfortunate circumstances do not necessarily
change the law or how it is applied. The court affirmed the lower court’s
judgment that the subject mineral rights were property distributed to the
surviving spouse’s wife, pursuant to the relevant intestacy scheme.
Hokanson v. Zeigler, 2017 N.D. 197, 900 N.W.2d 48.
Under a Contract for Sale patent from the State Board of University and
School Lands of the State of North Dakota (“Board”), North Dakota retains
the legal title to the property as security for the purchaser's compliance with
the contract. North Dakota also retains fifty percent of the mineral interests
in the property. The purchaser holds equitable title until the terms of the
installment sales contract is completed and a patent has been issued.
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Thereafter, the legal title merges with the equitable title, perfecting title,
relating back to the date of the contract. In 1957, Board and Purported
Owners entered into an Installment Sale Contract for the purchase of
property. Then in 1967, Purported Owners conveyed the property to
Predecessor by Warranty Deed excepting and reserving any mineral
interests. Then in 1971, Predecessor conveyed to Surface Owners the
property by Warranty Deed “except easements of record and subject to
exceptions, reservations of . . . minerals of record.” Additionally, in 1971,
North Dakota issued a patent for the property to Predecessor. In 2014,
Surface Owners initiated a quiet title action, claiming a fifty percent
mineral interest in the property. Surface Owners argued they received this
interest because the property was conveyed to them from Predecessor with
no reservations of mineral interest appearing in a 1971 Warranty Deed.
Surface Owners argued the predecessor-in-interest to Predecessor was
North Dakota who conveyed to Predecessor the surface and fifty percent
minerals by a 1971 Patent. The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded
that an Installment Sales Contract for patent is the same as a Contract for
Deed regarding the ability to convey and reserve equitable interest.
Therefore, Purported Owners reserved equitable title to fifty percent of the
minerals in the 1957 Warranty Deed. Therefore, Surface Owner did not
have title to any of the mineral interests.
Langveld v. Continental Res., Inc. 2017 ND 179, 899 N.W.2d 267.
Mineral Owner challenged the North Dakota Industrial Commission’s
(“Commission”) approval of Developer’s application to modify and create
oil and gas well spacing units and well set requirements for several pools.
Mineral Owner claimed that the granted application negatively impacted his
bargaining power with Developer and that his royalty payments would
decrease. At an evidentiary hearing, Developer offered evidence in support
of its application demonstrating the inefficiency of the current spacing unit
scheme and demonstrated that it was unsuccessful in negotiating surface
use agreements with Mineral Owner. On the other hand, Mineral Owner
failed to present any expert evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
Consequently, Commission approved Developer’s application because, the
evidence suggested increased efficiency. In reviewing Commission’s
decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized its limited review of
Commission orders. Given the substantial deference the court gives
Commission compounded by the facts that Mineral Owner failed to present
expert evidence at the evidentiary hearing and the “substantial evidence”
supporting increased efficiency—precisely the type of finding North
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Dakota law delegates to Commission—the court affirmed Commission’s
judgment.
Mosser v. Denbury Res., Inc., 2017 ND 169, 898 N.W.2d 406.
Surface Owners sued Operator for nuisance, trespass, and damages
pursuant to North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation
Act. Surface Owners allege that Operator unlawfully disposed saltwater
into their pore space. At issue here are several certified questions issued by
a magistrate judge to the North Dakota Supreme Court. The first question
was whether Surface Owners own the pore space below their properties
absent a conveyance of that pore space to a third person when Surface
Owners have severed the mineral estate. The court reasoned that Surface
Owners in this circumstance do own the pore space because North Dakota
law specifically states that “[t]itle to pore space in all strata underlying the
surface of lands and waters is vested in the owner of the overlying surface
estate.” Second, the court concluded that Surface Owners may be entitled to
compensation for lost land value and “lost use of and access to” their
surface estate for three reasons. First, the answer to question one was yes.
Second, it was the purpose of the North Dakota legislature to “provide the
maximum amount of constitutionally permissible protection to surface
owners.” Third, as the pore space is part of the surface estate, Surface
Owners may be entitled to compensation for lost land value and “lost use of
and access to” their surface estate. Finally, questions three through five can
be characterized as evidentiary issues determining the Surface Owner’s
compensation. Ultimately, the court concluded that Surface Owners were
entitled to compensation under one of the remaining certified questions.
Specifically, the Surface Owners may recover damages for unlawful use of
pore space when the only evidence available to calculate damages is what
other Surface Owners are being paid and the number of saltwater barrels
likely being injected into the pore space.
Wilkinson v. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 2017 ND 231, No. 20160199, 2017
WL 4296216.
Successors in Interest (“Successors”) brought action against Board of
University and School Lands (“Board”) for injunctive relief and a
declaration regarding ownership of mineral interest in property, alleging a
takings claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Board,
determining that it owned certain property below the ordinary high
watermark of the Missouri River, and that the disputed property was below
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that watermark. However, while the case was pending, a new law was
passed that governed mineral rights of land inundated by the Pick-Sloan
Missouri Project Dams, which included the disputed land. This new law
provided that the “state sovereign land mineral ownership of riverbed
segments . . . extends only to the historical Missouri riverbed channel up to
the ordinary high watermark.” Since this law was enacted while the case
was pending, and since it does apply retroactively, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota held that it applied to this case. The ordinary high watermark
determination under this law is retroactive and applied to all oil and gas
wells spud after January 1, 2006, for purposes of mineral ownership.
Successors also asserted that the district court erred in finding that Board’s
actions were not a taking that required just compensation. Board
compensated for the surface, but never for the mineral interest. Successors
are entitled to compensation if it is determined that Board’s actions resulted
in a “taking” of the mineral interests. The court held that the district court
erred in determining there was no taking and that the district court must
consider this issue on remand if it determines the Board owns the disputed
minerals. Thus, the case is reversed and remanded.
Ohio
Sheba v. Kautz, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 14 BE 0008, 2017 WL 4167407
(Sept. 18, 2017).
Property Owner, and Company to which Property Owner gave an undivided
oil and gas interest, brought action against Heirs of prior owners, who had
transferred land in 1848 but reserved to themselves and Heirs the right to all
the minerals and coal lying under a portion of the land. Property Owner
sought a declaratory judgment and quiet title, claiming the reservation did
not reserve title to the oil and gas, the oil and gas interest was abandoned
under the 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act (“DMA”), the oil and
gas was abandoned under the new version of DMA, and adverse possession
of the oil and gas. Trial court found for Property Owner and Heirs appealed.
Appellate court held that the grantor in the 1848 deed did not reserve the oil
and gas interests as the use of the term “mineral” in the reservation showed
intent of the parties was to reserve coal and other non-migratory minerals,
not migratory minerals. Important to the analysis was that the first oil and
gas commercial well was not drilled in Ohio until 1860, so the parties likely
did not intend to reserve oil and gas. Also, after looking to locality and
timeframe, appellate court also noted that the deed’s easement language
pertained to mining of minerals in place, and not migratory minerals such
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as oil and gas. Furthermore, appellate court held that the lower court erred
when it found the mineral interest was abandoned under the 1989 DMA
because the 1989 DMA was not self-executing and could not result in
automatic abandonment. Therefore, since the complaint in the present case
was not filed until 2013, the 1989 DMA could not be applied and the newer
version was applicable. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Pennsylvania
United Ref. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 163 A.3d 1125 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2017).
Refinery owns and operates an eighty-three-acre petroleum refinery, on
which it has never drilled an oil and gas well. Operator applied for a permit
to drill a slant well, with the top hole across the street from Refinery’s
property, and the bottom hole underneath Refinery’s property. After some
negotiation, the Department of Environmental Protection (“Department”)
issued permits for Operator’s desired wells, and Refinery appealed to the
Environmental Hearing Board (“Board”), citing concerns about potential
damage from Operator’s hydraulic fracturing operations. Board found that
Refinery did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Department
abused its discretion—acting unreasonably and/or in violation of the laws—
by issuing the permit, and dismissed Refinery’s appeal. Refinery appealed
Board’s decision to the trial court. The court held that: (1) because Refinery
failed to meet its burden of proof as to how the drilling or fracturing would
have the negative impact it alleged, Board did not err in its conclusion that
Refinery failed to show that Department abused its discretion in issuing the
permit; and (2) whether Department considered that evidence in reaching its
decision to issue the permit is immaterial.
Texas
Apache Deepwater, LLC v. Double Eagle Dev., LLC, No. 08-16-00038-CV,
2017 WL 3614298 (Tx. App. Aug. 23, 2017).
Property Owner sued mineral lessee (“Lessee”), demanding that Lessee
relinquish its interest to several tracts of land. The land in dispute was
divided in two four equal tracts. Property Owner argues that because the
wells on three of the four tracts of land had stopped producing, that Lessee
no longer had legal right to the tracts. Lessee, on the other hand, argued that
because one of the wells was still producing at the relevant time-period, and
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because the lease had a habendum clause, that the lease to the entire plot of
land—including all four tracts—was still held. The court ultimately held
that the entire tract of land was still under proper control of Lessee for
several reasons. First, the language of “leased premises” used in the lease
refers to the entire plot of land, including all four tracts. Second, there is
specific language in this lease’s habendum clause and drilling operations
clause which made clear that so long as one of the wells on one of the four
tracts is producing or that drilling operations were taking place on it, the
lease for the whole plot of land continues. This is despite Property Owner’s
contention that the lease’s retained acreage clause ends the right to an
individual tract when it stops producing because the lease itself contained
no clear intent in the retained acreage clause to negate the habendum
clause. Implicit in Property Owner’s argument is that the lease should be
understood as a continual relinquishment agreement, but the court said that
if that were intended, such language would have and should have been
included in the original lease.
Fairfield Indus. Inc. v. EP Energy E&P Co., No. 14-15-00586-CV, 2017
WL 2882187 (Tex. App. July 6, 2017).
Licensor, a provider of seismic data, sued Licensee, who contracted to use
Licensor’s seismic data, after Licensee underwent a change in control, and
attempted to unilaterally terminate the parties’ licensing agreement and not
pay a transfer fee as set forth in the same agreement. Licensee’s theory for
its actions was that since it returned Licensor’s seismic data, it was not
obligated to pay the fee or continue to be obligated by the licensing
agreement. At trial, Licensee moved for summary judgment to dismiss
Licensor’s claims and the trial court granted Licensee’s motion. On appeal,
the court reviewed the grant of summary judgement and the claims made by
the parties. First, the court analyzed the licensing agreement to determine if
a change of control would require Licensee to pay a transfer fee to Licensor
for data licensed under the agreement that the acquiring company did not
already have a license from Licensor for the same type of date. The court
held that the unambiguous language of the agreement determined that any
change in control of Licensee required that the fee be paid regardless of
whether any of Licensor’s data was actually transferred to the acquiring
party. Regarding the same matter, the court held that the trial court
mistakenly found that industry custom and usage confirmed that Licensee
was obligated to pay the transfer fee only if Licensee actually transferred
the data to its acquiring company. Finally, the court analyzed the unilateral
actions of Licensee. The court held that nothing in the agreement allowed
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any unilateral actions by Licensee to terminate the contract, and its attempt
to terminate would not relieve it of its obligation to pay the transfer fee.
Freeman v. Harleton Oil & Gas, Inc., 528 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App. 2017).
Owner of a working interest in deep rights below several oil and gas
properties brought action against Vendors and Purchaser of such interests,
asserting claims for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and
unjust enrichment seeking specific performance and the imposition of a
constructive trust. Purchaser answered, asserting that Owner lacked
standing to sue, and filed cross-claims against Vendors. All parties moved
for summary judgment. Trial court granted Vendors’ motions to dismiss
Owner’s claims, and denied Purchaser’s motions against Vendors.
Purchaser and Owner appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) Owner's
unjust enrichment claim was not entitled to benefit of tolling of two-year
statute of limitations; (2) Purchaser's claims against Vendor were governed
by agreement to assign rights, rather than a claim for unjust enrichment; (3)
Purchaser could not recover supposed overpayment to Vendor; (4) Owner
was not a third-party beneficiary to contract whereby Purchaser agreed to
purchase interests from Vendors; and (5) president and sole-shareholder of
Vendor could not be held individually liable for any damages stemming
from Vendor's purported breaches of agreement.
GB Tubulars, Inc. v. Union Gas Operating Co., 527 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.
2017).
Operator sued Manufacturer for several causes of action, including products
liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties
following the failure of Operator’s well during hydraulic fracking
operations. Operator claimed the cause of the well failure was
Manufacturer’s coupling. Jury found, that Manufacturer breached an
express warranty resulting in $3 million in damages. After the trial,
Operator was granted a new bench trial on attorney fees and the trial court’s
final judgment included a damage award to Operator for “damages for
breach of an express warranty and attorney’s fees, but did not reduce the
damages award based on [Operator’s] own negligence.” On appeal,
Manufacturer properly preserved four issues, but the court denied all issues
and affirmed. First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s finding, Operator provided evidence sufficient for the jury to
conclude Manufacturer breached express warranties because the expert
testimony presented by Operator directly addressed its theories of recovery.
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Moreover, Manufacturer failed to cite any conclusive evidence in support
of its counter evidence. Second, the evidence of other well failures
presented by Operators was properly admitted because the presented
evidence showed that the other failures “failed in the same way with many
of the same factors as were present in the case at hand.” Third, the trial
court was correct to refuse reduction of Operator’s damage for its own
negligence because the statutory scheme that calls for such a reduction is
not applicable in breach of express warranty cases. Finally, the trial court
was correct to grant a new trial on attorney’s fees because the jury did not
render an incomplete or inconsistent verdict, nor did Manufacturer cite any
authority indicating Operator waived a new trial by first moving to accept
the verdict.
Hardin-Simmons Univ. v. Hunt Cimarron Ltd., No. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017
WL 3197920 (Tex. App. July 25, 2017).
Lessors sued Lessee for: (1) breach of express covenant to explore and
develop land for oil and gas; and (2) breach of implied covenant to drill
initial wells, develop premises, protect premises from damage, and market
produced oil or gas. Lessors also sought a declaratory judgment concerning
Lessee’s failure to file a release describing mineral interests. The trial court
returned a verdict in favor of Lessee. Lessor appealed, asserting that the
trial court erred in denying its motions for judgment and new trial because:
(1) the subject lease expired at the end of the primary term regarding nonproductive acreage; (2) the jury’s finding that Lessee had not breached
certain lease covenants was against the preponderance of the evidence; (3)
the jury’s failure to find that Lessee had breached the lease by not executing
a release was against the preponderance of the evidence; and (4) the jury’s
finding that certain wells were producing in paying quantities was against
the preponderance of the evidence. The appellate court determined that
Lessors met their burden of proof regarding issues (1) and (3) but did not
meet their burden of proof to show that issues (2) and (4) were against the
“great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Accordingly, the
appellate court reversed the trial court’s “take-nothing” judgment in favor
or Lessee and declared the entire acreage of the subject lease terminated
except for a forty-acre tract associated with certain wells.
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Jarzombek v. Ramsey, No. 04-16-00571-CV, 2017 WL 2561556 (Tex. App.
June 14, 2017).
Landowners owned the surface estate of two tracts plus 1/16 royalty in one
tract and the entire mineral interest in the second. Landowners executed a
real estate transaction with Purchaser, in which Purchaser agreed to
purchase the surface estate of both tracts of land. The contract stipulated
that Landowners were to keep one-half of the mineral and royalty interest in
the estates for a twenty-year period and the other half would be vested in
Purchaser. However, upon closing of the purchase, the deed conveying the
property to Purchaser only reserved a 1/32 royalty interest to Landowners.
Landowners sued Purchaser seven years later on numerous causes of
actions including deed reformation, alleging the deed was inconsistent with
the language in the real estate contract. Purchaser claimed the statute of
limitations (“SOL”) barred Landowners’ action. The court of appeals
reviewed whether the trial court erred in concluding Landowners’ deed
reformation claim was barred by the SOL. Landowners’ argument rests on
the discovery rule, which would prevent the SOL from running until the
discovery of the mistake in the deed. However, the court of appeals
determined that Texas state law says a grantor or property owner is charged
with knowledge of the material terms of an unambiguous deed upon
execution of said deed. The court held that the mistake in the deed was
plainly evident on its face, thus Landowners were charged with actual
knowledge of what the deed included, and subsequently the “discovery rule
is inapplicable, and limitations began to run from the date the deed was
executed.”
Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017).
Lessors and Stakeholders requested review action regarding underpayment
for mineral interests. The Lessors and Stakeholders originally claimed that
an overlap in a pooling unit prevented them from receiving appropriate
royalties for their interests. Lessee had previously conducted a redesignation of boundaries for units applying to pooling agreements and in
that process created the overlap of one assignment well to another unit.
Lessee argues that the avenue for royalties amounts to a conveyance of
legal title to property rights and thus cannot be conducted to two different
parties. The Supreme Court of Texas however, addressed this case as a
contract dispute, and held that Lessee breached the contract by not paying
royalties as agreed upon pursuant to the valid contract. The court denied
Lessee’s impracticability defense, determining that Lessee caused the
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situation, and had notice prior to issues arising. Likewise, the court rejected
Lessee’s defense that the overlap was a scrivener’s error as such error
requires both parties to be under the same misunderstanding. Lessee’s
quasi-estoppel claim was also rejected, despite Lessor’s and Stakeholders’
prior payments, because of the ambiguity of the payments. The court
affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, and restricted Lessee from
reclaiming any payments from Lessors and Stakeholders, because the
payments were made voluntarily, with understanding of the pooling issues
without effort to remedy.
Spellman v. Love, No. 13-16-00011-CV, 2017 WL 3431801 (Tex. App.
Aug. 10, 2017).
Former Royalty Owner sued Mineral Interest Owner for money received
pursuant to obtaining his expired royalty interest. Former Royalty Owner’s
interest expired due to the lack of a producing well on the property on a
given date. The month after that expiration, a well began to operate on the
property, and Mineral Interest Owner—who had obtained the expired
royalty interest—began collecting royalty payments. Former Royalty
Owner sued on multiple counts, including money had and received, and
unjust enrichment (the two at issue in this appeal). The trial court issued
summary judgment to Mineral Interest Owner, and the appellate court
affirmed. The court held that money had and received is essentially an
equitable doctrine existing to prevent unjust enrichment, and that because
the record showed Former Royalty Owner had no claim, “[i]n equity or
good conscience” to the money received by Mineral Interest Owner,
summary judgment against him was appropriate. Summary judgment for
the unjust enrichment claim followed naturally, because it is not an
independent cause of action.
Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017).
Grantor sued Grantee after a dispute regarding whether the language of
their warranty deed that conveyed a mineral estate and the land above it
passed the entire burden of a non-participating royalty interest (“NPRI”) to
Grantee or if the burden of the NPRI was to be proportionately shared by
both parties. When the Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the issue, it
stressed the importance determining the parties’ intent. The court held that
it is intent that governs interpretation of the deed, not arbitrary rules. In this
case, the deed and how the NPRI was to be paid was determined by the
intent of the parties, using careful analysis of the deed and the provisions
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contained therein. The court noted that parties are free to contract in the
deed whatever division of interests they desire, and this express intent
would control. Generally, a NPRI is burdened by the entire mineral estate,
so without an express intention to stray away from that principal of mineral
conveyance it would govern. This leads to the burden of the NPRI in this
case to be proportionately shared by Grantor and Grantee because alternate
intent was not expressed. Additionally, the court held that although the
court of appeals reached the same conclusion, it did so incorrectly by
relying only on a default rule that the NPRI should be proportionately
shared by the mineral ownerships instead of reviewing the intent of the
parties when the warranty deed was created. Therefore, the court affirmed
the judgement of the appellate court, but on different grounds.
Washington
In re Estate of Johnson, No. 34315-4-III, 2017 WL 2984030 (Wash. Ct.
App. July 18, 2017).
Decedent owned mineral rights to a piece of land in North Dakota, which
he purportedly left to his alleged testate successor (“Successor”) in 1977. In
2011, Oil Company contacted Successor and entered into an oil and gas
lease for the land. Oil Company began exploring for oil and asked
Successor to probate Decedent’s estate, but the original last will and
testament of Decedent could not be found. Successor brought action under
the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA”), seeking to admit
and confirm the validity of her photocopy of the will. The trial court
determined that the photocopy was authentic and admitted to probate.
Successor’s children appealed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court
affirmed, holding that: (1) the trial court had discretion under TEDRA to
hold an evidentiary hearing; (2) the trial court did not err in applying the
dead man’s statute; (3) the will was validly executed; and (4) the will was
authentic. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state
court rules should be consulted before citing as the case precedent.
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Midstream – Federal
Second Circuit
Constitution Pipeline Co. v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation,
868 F.3d 87 (2nd Cir. 2017).
Pipeline Company with proposed natural gas pipeline project applied for
water quality certification from New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (“NYSDEC”). After reviewing Pipeline
Company’s application, NYSDEC denied the application for failing to
provide sufficient information that its proposed natural gas pipeline would
comply with state water quality standards. Pipeline Company petitioned to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for review. Pipeline Company
contends that: (1) NYSDEC failed to issue its decision within a reasonable
time and was therefore a nullity and (2) it submitted sufficient information
and NYSDEC’s decision should be vacated on the grounds that denial was
arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires. The court of appeals dismissed the
petition in part and denied in part. First, on the nullity claim, the court
found that a failure to act by NYSDEC would be within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, thus the
claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Second, the court deferred to
NYSDEC’s expertise in the information requested from Pipeline Company
to determine the certification. Because Pipeline Company refused to
provide relevant information despite repeated requests, the court held that
NYSDEC’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious and denied the petition.
Third Circuit
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 869
F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2017).
In 2015, Energy Company submitted an application to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for approval of an interstate pipeline
project, which included a discussion and rejection of compression
alternatives. FERC published its environmental assessment, recommending
a Finding of No Significant Impact, then issued a certificate approving the
project. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) then issued
a Section 404 Permit authorizing construction. Environmental Organization
petitioned for review of the Corps’ approval of Energy Company’s
application to build an interstate pipeline project. Environmental
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Organization challenges Corps’ approval of the project on the grounds that
the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously by rejecting a compression
alternative. According to Environmental Organization, construction of the
pipeline would lead to deforestation, destruction of wetland habitats, and
other forms of environmental damage. Environmental Organization asserts
that such damage could be avoided by building or upgrading a compressor
station. The court held that Corps’ approval of the project was neither
arbitrary or capricious, reasoning that the project’s basic purpose did not
arbitrarily constrain the Corps’ alternatives analysis. The court also noted
that, despite Environmental Organization’s argument that the Corps
arbitrarily or capriciously ignored the compression alternative, a
compression alternative was evaluated in Energy Company’s application
and expressly referenced in the Corps’ findings. Lastly, the court held that
the Corps did not erroneously reject the compression alternative, reasoning
that a compression alternative would have more significant adverse
environmental consequences than would result from Energy Company’s
project. The court acknowledged the Corps’ well-founded and clear
preference for temporary environmental impacts in direct contrast to the
permanent impacts of compression. The Corps’ conclusion, therefore, was
not arbitrary or capricious.
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 870
F.3d 171 (3rd Cir. 2017).
Environmental Organization appealed Department of Environmental
Protection’s (“DEP”) order approving Pipeline Company’s application to
build an interstate pipeline project. Environmental Organization claimed
DEP made an erroneous water dependency finding and improperly rejected
a compression alternative to the pipeline project. Further, Environmental
Organization challenged the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals to rule on the petition because it claimed DEP’s order was not
final. The court held that it could exercise jurisdiction because DEP’s order
was final and the Natural Gas Act grant the court jurisdiction over review
of an order of a state agency. The court upheld the order because it
determined DEP’s interpretation of water dependency was reasonable and
worthy of deference, and DEP considered and rejected alternative definition
for reason that were supported by the record.
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Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easement for 2.59 Acres in Pine
Grove Twp., Schuylkill Cty., Pennsylvania, Case No. 17-1829, 2017 WL
1105237 (3rd Cir. Sep. 11, 2017).
Landowner filed suit against Pipeline Company after the two parties failed
to reach agreement on the compensation owed to Landowner after the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) granted Pipeline
Company a certificate of public convenience and necessity to build a
natural gas pipeline, which required rights of way on Landowner’s
property. The certificate had been granted after thorough administrative
review—in which Landowner did not participate—including notice and
opportunity for Landowner to respond. The district court granted Pipeline
Company’s motions for partial summary judgment—leaving only the issue
of just compensation to be determined—and for a preliminary injunction for
immediate possession of the rights of way. Landowner appealed, pro se, to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling,
holding that the district court did not err or abused its discretion in
weighing relevant factors or issuing the preliminary injunction. The court
held that: (1) Landowner’s received notice and opportunity to respond in
FERC’s administrative proceedings, combined with the opportunity to
litigate just compensation for condemned property at the district court,
constituted due process in Landowner’s action under the Natural Gas Act;
(2) Pipeline Company’s ability to demonstrate success on the merits of its
eminent domain claim weighed heavily in favor of the issuance of a
preliminary injunction for immediate possession of the rights of way; 3)
monetary harm that would be suffered by Pipeline Company if possession
was not allowed had not been weighed in favor of the injunction; and 4)
because the public would be able to access natural gas carried by the
pipeline, the public interest factor weighed in favor of granting the
injunction.
Forth Circuit
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 76 Acres, More or Less, In Baltimore
and Harford Ctys., Maryland, No. 15-2547, 2017 WL 2983908 (4th Cir.
July 13, 2017).
Pipeline Company commenced a condemnation action seeking to acquire
certain temporary and permanent easements over Landowners' properties to
construct a natural gas pipeline. Pipeline Company was granted an
injunction to take possession of the land and begin construction. Trial then

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

1040

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

commenced to determine Landowners’ just compensation. Before trial,
Pipeline Company filed motions in liminie to exclude testimony of
Landowners’ expert, as well as exclude claims by Landowners alleging the
size of the temporary easements that Pipeline Company took were larger
than the easements described in the order granting possession. The district
court denied both of these motions. Pipeline Company appealed the district
court’s decision allowing the Landowners to modify the size of the taking
and the court’s denial of Pipeline Company’s motions in liminie. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was within Pipeline Company’s
discretion to determine the size of the easements. Landowners did not have
a right to challenge that, but instead have a right to recovery through just
compensation for the land that was taken and damages caused by
construction to the remaining property. The appellate court also upheld the
district court’s denial of Pipeline Company’s motions in liminie because it
was challenging the expert witness’s opinion, not qualifications. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Tenth Circuit
N. Nat. Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, 862 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2017).
Company owned and operated the Cunningham Field, which was converted
into an underground storage facility due to depletion of the field's natural
resources. Before depletion, this area was certified by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") for gas storage. In 2010, Company's
certified boundaries expanded to a 12,320-acre area located about five
miles north of the original boundaries. Company negotiated and obtained
storage leases on approximately 3,040 acres of this Extension Area but over
time realized that volumes of storage gas was migrating outside of the
field's primary storage area boundaries. Company brought a condemnation
action against Landowners to acquire the other 9,000 subsurface acres for
its natural gas storage field. It also sought an immediate injunction against
further exploration, production, and operation, asking the district court to
order that Producers' wells be closed. The trial court entered a final
judgment, at the recommendation of a court-appointed commission,
requiring Company to pay $7,310,427 in principal, plus interest to
Producers. The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that the
value of storage gas in and under the Extension Area should be included
when calculating the condemnation award, reasoning that Producers had no
right to produce such gas after the date of certification because Company

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5

2017]

Recent Case Decisions

1041

owned all of the gas within its certified field boundaries after the date of
certification. The trial court's valuation of gas storage and buffer rights for
Extension Area traces, its valuation of Extension Area wells, and its denial
of attorneys' fees were affirmed.
D. District of Columbia
Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696 (D.D.C. 2017).
Natural Gas Company sought approval from Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) to extend its natural gas pipeline. As part of the
permitting process Natural Gas Company applied for a water-quality
certificate from the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (“DEC”). DEC took no action for more than one year, and
Natural Gas Company filed this action to compel DEC to act on the
application. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that
even if DEC put off acting on Natural Gas Company’s water-quality
certificate application for over a year, that inaction constituted a waiver
under the Clean Air Act, enabling Natural Gas Company to gain approval
from FERC. That waiver erased Natural Gas Company’s alleged injury,
meaning it lacked the ability to meet the actual injury requirement
necessary for standing. Natural Gas Company also claimed that DEC failed
to comply with the schedule issued by FERC. The court pointed out though,
that FERC regulations state that its deadlines will apply unless federal law
otherwise establishes a schedule—which the Clean Water Act does. The
court dismissed Natural Gas Company’s petition for review.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d
101(D.D.C. 2017).
Tribes sued Government under Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)
alleging that the construction of the pipeline violated National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”),
and Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”). Both Tribes and Government moved
for a partial summary judgment. Specifically, Tribes argued Government
did not sufficiently consider the environmental effects of the pipeline before
granting permits to construct it under a federally regulated waterway.
Tribes seek summary judgment on three claims: (1) that not preparing an
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) is a violation of NEPA; (2)
Government’s decision to grant an easement was arbitrary, capricious, and
contrary to law because Government reversed a prior policy without reason;
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and (3) Government wrongfully concluded that pipeline activities satisfied
terms and conditions of Nationwide Permit 12 (“NWP 12”). “[A]n agency
has taken a ‘hard look’ at the environmental impacts of a proposed action if
the statement contains sufficient discussion of the relevant issues and
opposing viewpoints, and the agency’s decision is fully informed and well
considered.” The environmental assessment (“EA”) was inadequate where
it failed to address the effects of a spill on Tribes fishing and hunting rights,
where it failed to consider the environmental-justice implications of the
project, and failed to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences.
These inadequacies were not enough to violate NEPA or require an EIS.
Government’s grant of easement was not arbitrary and did not breach
Government’s trust duties to Tribes because controlling law did not require
fiduciary or trust duty toward Tribes. Furthermore, Government only had to
show good reason for a new policy, which it did by displaying awareness
that it was changing its position, and by providing a reasoned explanation
for the change. The court held that Government did not have to comply
with all conditions to receive the permit, but it must comply with conditions
to remain eligible for the permit. district court ordered the parties to submit
briefs arguing whether remand or vacate is the appropriate remedy in light
of the EA’s deficiencies.
E.D. Louisiana
Vintage Assets, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., CIVIL ACTION NO. 16713, 2017 WL 3706314 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2017).
This case involves Right of Way Servitude Agreements for pipelines,
specifically addressing contractual obligations regarding width restrictions.
Landowners claim that Pipeline Company had inadequately and negligently
maintained pipelines causing property damage and that width restrictions
were exceeded, breaching the agreement. Pipeline Company’s first
argument in summary judgment is that remedies for the contract breach
should be limited because: (1) there is no remedy in the servitude contract
for restoration and (2) the jurisdiction only allows damages for the value of
land lost. The court found Pipeline Company did not account for a remedy
in the contract because it did not account for the impacts of erosion,
therefore the omission of remedy provisions is not meaningful. Likewise,
the court asserted a precedent that damages are governed by the contract,
not the value of the property lost. The court refused Landowners’ claim that
because the contract was breached in bad faith, damages are not restricted
to value difference of land itself. The court ultimately relied on a “good
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faith standard of foreseeability of damages at the time the contract was
made.” The court also determined that Pipeline Company did not meet its
burden of proof to establish that ownership of the eroded land shifted from
Landowners to the state. The court also said it would be an absurd result to
grant Pipeline Company’s last argument and allow it to take any actions
within the right of way, even though the actions were initially restricted, to
maintain the pipeline at a certain width. The court thus denied all motions.
N.D. Ohio
Rover Pipeline LLC v. 5.9754 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Defiance
County, Ohio, No. 3:17CV225, 2017 WL 3130244 (N.D. Ohio, July 24,
2017).
Pipeline Company was granted a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to build a 713mile-long natural-gas pipeline running partially through Ohio. Pipeline
Company filed suit to condemn the land on which its pipeline would run,
and sought a preliminary injunction that it could take immediate possession
of the land to start building, deferring the issue of Landowners’ just
compensation. Pipeline Company proceeded to settle with all 141 defendant
Landowners in the case as to immediate possession, and came to terms with
all but eight landowners regarding just compensation. Regarding the eight
landowners still arguing about the level of compensation, Pipeline
Company filed this motion for the court to appoint a commission to
determine just compensation. district court found that while Landowners
requested a jury in the appropriate time frame, it was left to the court’s
discretion to determine whether a jury or a commission would be the more
appropriate body to determine just compensation. Landowners argued that
the uniqueness of their individual tracts of land made individual jury trials
the appropriate forum for this determination, and that being all represented
by the same law firm would help maximize judicial economy. The court
sided with Pipeline Company, deciding that a commission was appropriate
because the proceeding involved multiple individually owned parcels,
presented complex valuation issues, and would put a heavy burden on the
court’s docket if sent to jury trial. The court also detailed the benefits of a
commission—including party review of the commissioners appointed, and
the ability to have experts examining complex subjects—as well as the
process for appointing the commissioners.
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Midstream – State
Colorado
In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 2030 C.D. 2016, 2017
WL 2805860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 29, 2017).
Landowners appeal action stemming from Pipeline Company’s assertion of
eminent domain for pipeline construction project. After other claims were
foreclosed in a prior condemnation challenge, Landowners challenged
Pipeline Company ’s authority to assert eminent domain under Property
Rights Protection Act (“PRPA”), since Pipeline Company is a private entity
not a public entity. The court agreed with Landowners that the PRPA does
not allow the imposition of eminent domain for “private enterprise,” but
ultimately agrees with Pipeline Company that it is an entity providing
public utility services and therefore is exempted from this restriction. The
court found that even though, as Landowners contend, there is no pressing
necessity for additional services, the services provided by Pipeline
Company are still considered a public benefit, and therefore it is irrelevant
that no new activity is needed, as Pipeline Company was granted a
Certificate of Public Convenience (“CPC”) by the Public Utility Council.
The court also clarified that once a CPC is granted, and the entity is
categorized as providing a public benefit, the court has no authority to
challenge that categorization or determine if the designation was warranted.
The court affirmed the lower court’s order overruling Landowners’
objections to Pipeline Company’s Declaration of Taking.
Illinois
Enbridge Pipeline, LLC v. Monarch Farms, LLC, 2017 IL App (4th)
150807.
The Illinois Commerce Commission granted Pipeline Operator eminentdomain authority to acquire easements over certain real estate for the
construction of a pipeline project. Pipeline Operator filed separate
complaints for “condemnation of permanent and temporary easements for
common-carrier pipeline” against Landowners. In response, Landowners
filed a “traverse and motion to dismiss,” seeking dismissal of Pipeline
Operator’s condemnation complaints. Trial court granted a directed verdict
to Pipeline Operator and awarded Landowners just compensation totaling
$124,000. Landowners appealed. The appellate court held that the trial
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court acted within its discretion in excluding proposed valuation testimony
by Landowners’ experts, but the trial court erroneously considered
Landowners’ traverse motion to be motions to dismiss asserting an
affirmative matter outside complaint that barred or defeated action.
Accordingly, the case was vacated and remanded for the limited purpose of
conducting an expedited traverse hearing.
Enbridge Pipeline, LLC v. Temple, 2017 IL App (4th) 150346.
The Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) granted Pipeline Company
eminent-domain authority to acquire easements over real property to
facilitate planned construction of a 170-mile liquid petroleum pipeline.
Pipeline Company then sued Landowners for “condemnation of permanent
and temporary easements for common-carrier pipeline.” Landowners
sought a “traverse and motion to dismiss,” which was denied by the trial
court. Pipeline Company then filed for summary judgment regarding just
compensation for the easements, alleging that it was entitled to such
judgment due to procedural errors by Landowners and Pipeline Company’s
compliance with state rules requiring the filing of affidavits in support of its
motion. The trial court granted Pipeline Company’s motion, and
Landowners appealed. The appellate court for the held that the trial court’s
denial of Landowners’ traverse motion deprived them of the ability to: (1)
rebut the statutory presumptions created by the Eminent Domain Act that
the acquisition of private property for public use is “primarily for the
benefit, use, or enjoyment of the public and [is] necessary for a public
purpose” and (2) refute the ICC’s determination that Pipeline Company
negotiated Landowners’ compensation in good faith. As such, the trial court
failed to properly provide Landowners with their sole opportunity to
challenge the ICC’s condemnation powers. Therefore, the court vacated the
trial court’s denial of Landowners’ traverse motions, and remanded for
further proceedings. The court declined to decide on the trial court’s
granting of Pipeline Company’s summary judgment motion, waiting to
make such decision until the traverse hearing was held and the new record
was certified to the court.
Michigan
Lowery v. Enbridge Energy Ltd. P’ship, 898 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 2017).
Company appealed appellate court’s decision finding for Landowner
regarding a toxic tort claim. Landowner allegedly suffered injuries due to a
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significant pipeline oil spill into a woodland area and nearby creek and
river. Landowner claims he was exposed to toxic substances from the spill,
subsequently developed symptoms that resulted in a major surgery. The
Supreme Court of Michigan disagreed with Landowner’s ‘post hoc propter
hoc’ reasoning regarding his injuries, saying that despite an alleged
relationship between the spill and Landowner’s injuries, Landowner has not
shown sufficient evidence of causation. The court accordingly reversed the
appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s decision.
Pennsylvania
In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 165 A.3d 1044 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2017).
Condemnees sought review of the trial court’s dismissal of their
preliminary objections to Pipeline Operator’s declaration of taking. Pipeline
Operator intended to condemn easements on Condemnees’ property for
pipeline construction. State law allows public utility corporations to
condemn private property to transport natural gas for the public through the
state’s regulatory commission. Noting that the Rules of Civil Procedure
have been repeatedly held as not applying to eminent domain proceedings,
the appellate court held that Pipeline Operator had demonstrated a public
need or demand for the proposed pipeline. The appellate court held that the
trial court did not err in dismissing Condemnee’s objections as Pipeline
Operator’s notice of taking satisfied the requirement of demonstrating a
public need for the proposed service. The court also held that Pipeline
Operator’s notice of taking was not deficient since Condemnees were the
only party responsible for defending any unrecorded bridle path easement
as the neighboring community likely would not be harmed by Pipeline
Operator’s alleged notice deficiency.
Lankard v. Lauren Mountain Midstream Operating, LLC, No. 1367 WDA
2016, 2017 WL 2539844 (Pa. Super. Ct., June 12, 2017).
Landowner sued Midstream Operator (“Operator”) following the placement
of a natural gas pipeline on a portion of Landowner’s property. Landowner
alleged seven causes of action: (1) ejectment; (2) trespassing; (3) continuing
trespass; (4) private nuisance; (5) conversion; (6) fraudulent
misrepresentation; and (7) a demand for equitable accounting. The trial
court granted Operator’s motion for summary judgment and Landowners
properly preserved four issues on appeal. Appellate court denied all four.
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First, the trial court did not improperly interpret the record against the nonmoving party because the trial court explicitly noted its careful review of all
available materials regarding Landowner’s specific claims. Regarding the
remainder of Landowner’s claims, the court—relying on the trial court’s
analysis—agreed that the “crux of [Landowner’s] averrments [sic] is that
[Operator] intentionally violated” the terms of a contract comprising of an
easement and one separate letter of agreement agreed to by both parties.
The court held the contract as valid because Operator “precisely followed”
the terms of the contract. More specifically, the trial court had two reasons
to enforce the contract and, thus, discount Landowner’s claims. First,
introduction of parol evidence by Landowner to prove inducement was
inappropriate because it was Landowner’s choice to sign the final contract
and the final contract was clear enough to enforce. Second, the trial court
was satisfied that there was no spoliation of evidence after four motions to
compel were filed, no sanctionable discovery mishaps occurred. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 0.16
Acres, Temp. Easement for 0.55 Acres, & Temp.Access Easement for 7.75
Acres in Coal Twp., Northumberland Cty., Pennsylvania, No. 4:17-CV005445, 2017 WL 3412375 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2017).
This is one of seven cases Pipeline Company brought against various
Landowners to use eminent domain to condemn the property. Pipeline
Company seeks to build a new pipeline across multiple states, including
Pennsylvania, and thus sought and received a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”). Pipeline Company was unable to reach a
compensation deal with the various Landowners, and thus sought to
condemn the lands through eminent domain. After filing its initial
complain, Pipeline Company filed a motion for partial summary judgement
and a subsequent motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted both
motions finding that: (1) Landowners had been given a chance to challenge
the FERC Order and failed to do so; (2) Pipeline Company is not required
to negotiate in good faith; (3) it is not abuse of discretion to grant Pipeline
Company immediate use and possession of the property while other cases
are ongoing; and (4) the harm to Pipeline Company in delaying is more
than just monetary harm. In the related cases, the court granted whichever
motions were at issues, which varies as Pipeline Company and some
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Landowners reached agreements on certain issues. These motions were
granted based on the same reasoning above.
Virginia
Chaffins v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 189 (Va. 2017).
Company is engaged in the underground storage and transportation of
natural gas and is subject to regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”). Company is seeking approval from FERC to
construct a natural gas transmission line. Company sent Landowners along
the proposed route letters seeking permission to enter their properties to
conduct surveys, tests, examinations, and appraisals. When Landowners
withheld their permission, Company provided Landowners with notices of
intent to enter their properties “on or after” a specific date. The notices
explained that Virginia law authorized operator to enter land without
permission to complete the sought-after conduct. Landowners argued that
the notices failed to “set forth the date of intended entry” as required by
state law. The Virginia Supreme Court concluded “on or after” notices do
not meet the requirement to “set forth the date of the intended entry”
because they are too vague and do not provide Landowners with a way to
determine when the entry would occur. The Virginia Supreme Court held
that notices of intent must provide Landowners with intended dates in
which Company is certain to enter the property.
Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 2017).
Pipeline Company sought permission to enter Landowner’s property to
conduct surveys necessary to build a natural gas transmission line.
Landowner denied Pipeline Company’s access to the property. Pipeline
Company sought declaratory judgment granting entry to the property under
state law. Landowner filed a plea in bar and a demurrer, claiming that the
relevant statute applies only to Virginia public service companies and that
the statute impermissibly burdens her fundamental right to exclude others
from property. The trial court overruled Landowner’s plea and demurrer.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the statute applies to
all corporations that are doing business within the Commonwealth of
Virginia. Additionally, the court held that the Landowner’s right to exclude
others is not absolute, and that Virginia law grants entry-for-survey
privilege specifically to public service corporations and natural gas
companies.
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Downstream – State
Illinois
Vanguard Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Shihadeh, 2017 IL App (2d) 160909.
Supplier alleges that Buyer breached several agreements in terminating his
agreement to purchase natural gas and argues, on appeal, that the breaches
should not be barred by the statute of frauds. Supplier contends that the gas
was set aside for Buyer specifically, and that Supplier subsequently took a
loss by salvaging the sale on the open market. Because a contract where the
goods are specially manufactured specially for the buyer alone are still
enforceable under the UCC absent a written contract, the court looked at
whether: (1) Supplier intended the gas for Buyer in particular; (2) the gas
becomes more difficult to sell without Buyer within Supplier's ordinary
course of business; (3) Supplier had already substantially committed to
fulfilling the agreements; and (4) the Supplier had reasonably indicated
through its substantiated actions prior to Buyer providing Supplier notice of
the contractual repudiation. The appellate court affirmed the trial court and
held that neither the merchant exception nor the specially manufactured
good exception applied in exempting Supplier's contract from the statute of
frauds writing requirement.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal
Sixth Circuit
Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2017).
Between 1967 and 2014, City sourced its water from Lake Huron via the
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (“DWSD”). On March 29, 2013,
City decided to join a water supplier, the Karegnondi Water Authority
(“KWA”), that was still in the development stages. Shortly after this
decision was made, DWSD informed City that its contract would terminate
in April 2014, spurring City to decide on an interim water source to be used
until the KWA was complete. Officials chose the Flint River despite a 2011
report that determined that the water in the river would need to be treated to
meet safety regulations and that the cost of the treatment of the water would
be more than the proposed KWA contract. Immediately after the switch,
residents complained that the water "smelled rotten, looked foul, and tasted
terrible." In October 2015, County officials declared a public health
emergency advising residents not to drink the water. Residents filed suit
against Former City Managers citing twelve different causes of action both
state and federal. The Residents filed for a preliminary injunction, seeking
to enjoin Former City Managers from billing Flint residents for water but
the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
district court said the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) precluded the
federal claim, leaving only state law claims. Residents also sued Governor,
citing six causes of action, four of which were federal. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the residents' federal claims were not
preempted by SDWA and reversed and remanded. This case has since been
appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.
Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 865 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2017).
Landowners of a private lakefront property sued U. S. Forest Service
(“USFS”), claiming that its prohibition of gas-powered motorboats and
limitation of electrically powered motorboats to no-wake speeds exceeded
USFS’s regulatory authority. The Michigan Wilderness Act of 2007 (“Act”)
granted USFS the ability to regulate any use of the lake “subject to valid
existing rights.” The district court dismissed the suit, holding that
Landowner’s rights did not exist at the Act’s enactment, because
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Landowners had not yet purchased the property. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the valid existing rights ran with the land,
and Landowners inherited those existing rights when they purchased the
property. In determining whether the regulations interfered with those
rights, the court looked to the lake’s history and Michigan law and
determined that the use of a gas-powered boat or an electrical boat above a
low-wake-zone speed was “reasonable.” Accordingly, USFS’s regulations
prohibiting recreational boating in this manner interfered with Landowners’
valid existing rights, and therefore were invalid.
Ninth Circuit
United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 859 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2017).
The district court entered a Consent Decree in 1935 to govern the
distribution of water from the Gila River among Community, Tribe, and
other landowners. The Decree allows parties to divert the water from the
Gila River for the beneficial use and irrigation of land. Additionally, the
Decree allows parties to change the point of diversion, if they do not injure
the rights of the other parties. In 1993, the district court outlined the
procedures to sever and transfer water rights. The party seeking to sever
and transfer must file an application. If there are objections, either party
may request an evidentiary hearing in which the applicant has the burden to
show a prima facie case of no injury to the other parties. In 2007,
Community, United States, and individual landowners entered into the
Upper Valley Forbearance Agreement (“UVFA”). The UFVA allows
parties to sever and transfer certain water rights to lands that were not
originally covered by the Decree. Pursuant to the UFVA, in 2008,
Corporation filed fifty-nine applications. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that Corporation failed to meet its prima facie burden of
no injuries to other parties. The court held that Corporation failed to address
the delay in time that parties would receive water downstream of the
proposed diversions, the return flow of the water into the Gila River, the
impact of the water quality, and the cumulative effect of the diversions and
not just each individual diversions’ effect. The court also concluded that
Corporation abandoned the water rights on a one and four-tenths acre parcel
of land because Corporation failed to use the water rights for at least eleven
years. The court held that Corporation’s involvement in prior negotiations
and litigations does not defeat a claim of abandonment under Arizona law.
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Federal Claim
Magnus Pac. Corp. v. United States, No. 13-859 C, 2017 WL 3765524
(Fed. Cl., Aug. 31, 2017).
Corporation sued the United States Section of the International Boundary
and Water Commission (“Government”) under the Contract Disputes Act
(“CDA”) over a contract to restore a levee on the Rio Grande. Corporation
brings four claims. In the first claim, Corporation asserts that it had to fill
the levee more than a reasonable bidder on this contract should have. In the
second claim (the “riprap claim”), Corporation asserts that Government
required it to do work beyond the scope of the contract. In the third claim,
Corporation asserts that Government wrongfully retained “disputed credit
owed the [G]overnment for a mid-project change to the levee design.” In
the final claim (the “slope change credit claim”), Corporation asserts that
after a mid-contract design change to the physical slope of the levee,
Government retained too much of the contract payments owed Corporation.
The court found in favor of Corporation on all of its claims. The court
found Corporation did fill more than was originally thought. Second,
analyzing the riprap claim under the constructive change doctrine due to a
change in the contract mid-performance, the court found that the riprap
work done was beyond the scope of the contract documents and the fault
for the constructive change lies with Government. Finally, because
Corporation “realized minimal financial benefits from” the slope change in
an amount “far less than [Government] retained from the contract price
due” Corporation, Corporation prevails on the slope change credit claim.
Because Corporation prevails on all of its contract claims, it is also
inappropriate for Government to retain the contract funds.
Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 133 Fed.Cl. 204 (Fed.Cl. 2017).
District sued United States claiming that Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”)
failed to provide District with contractually required volumes of surface
water from reservoir. The court determined that District was not entitled to
expectancy damages based on Bureau’s breach of its contractual obligation
to make minimum amounts or surface water available to District because:
(1) District failed to produce sufficient evidence quantifying the level of
demand required; and (2) even if the demand estimates were reliable,
District did not show that Bureau’s breaching announcements were the
actual cause of demand falling below what District had identified as
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expected demands. Thus, the court determined that any expectancy
damages would be speculative and were therefore unjustified. This case has
been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.
D. District of Columbia
Gov’t of the Province of Manitoba v. Zinke, Civil Action No. 02-2057
(RMC), Civil Action No. 09-373, 2017 WL 3437658 (D.D.C. August 10,
2017).
Province sued under National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”) to
prevent the Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) from proceeding with a
project to supply water from a foreign lake to certain communities in need
of water. The foreign lake water would transfer through pipes across a
divide which separated two other large water basins, causing the waters to
co-mingle. Province argued this co-mingling could introduce dangerous,
invasive species into the existing basins and as a result, threaten the health
of the indigenous species living there. Province also claims that the
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) provided by Bureau is insufficient.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district curt assessed the
EIS to ensure Bureau took a “hard look” at the environmental consequences
of the project. The court determined that Bureau, after several years of
“studious” efforts, produced an EIS which satisfies the NEPA. The court
found that Bureau adequately considered the implications of the plan,
proposed feasible alternatives, and showcased effort to mitigate the
negative effects. Any deficiencies which were present in the previous EISs
provided by Reclamation had been corrected. Accordingly, the court
granted Bureau’s motion for summary judgment against Province. This case
has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.
D. Idaho
Idaho Conservation League v. Atlanta Gold Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00161REB, 2017 WL 4099815 (D. Idaho Sept. 15, 2017).
Corporation was responsible for contamination of a waterway and was sued
by Conservationists in 2005 to reduce the contamination. The lawsuit was
settled by a consent decree that required Corporation to construct a water
treatment facility and obtain a discharge permit. The permit required that
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Corporation keep the contamination below a specified level, which it failed
to do on many occasions. Because of the failures, Conservationists sued
Corporation a second time and obtained an injunction in 2012 requiring
Corporation to comply with the terms of the permit. Following the
injunction, Corporation took steps to comply with the permit, but progress
was impeded by a large forest fire that occurred the same year. After the
fire, Corporation had brought the contamination to significantly lower
levels than it had been, but consistently not low enough to accord with the
permit. In 2017, Conservationists filed a motion to reopen the case and a
motion for civil contempt for Corporation’s consistent violations of the
injunction. Corporation argued that compliance with the injunction would
not be possible, considering the difficulties presented by the geography and
climate of the region. The court held that although Corporation had suffered
hardship by the 2012 forest fire and compliance with the terms of the
permit would be costly because of its location, compliance was not
impossible. The court found for Conservationists, imposed monetary
sanctions on Corporation. The court also ruled that Corporation must
comply with the permit limits within a year.
D. Minnesota
Richland & Wilkin JPA v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, Case No. 13-2262,
2017 WL 3972471 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2017).
Interest Group and Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) sued U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and Flood Diversion Board of Authority
(collectively “Corps”), alleging a violation of state and federal laws when it
signed a project partnership agreement and began constriction for a
permanent flood protection project without obtaining requisite permits from
the state. Interest Group and DNR further sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent Corps from continuing construction until it obtained the requisite
permits. The court looked at four factors to determine if injunctive relief
was appropriate: (1) the probability the moving part would succeed on its
merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party; (3) the
balance of harms between the parties; and (4) the public interest. After
weighing the factors, the court granted Interest Group and DNR motions for
preliminary injunction to stop construction on the project. The court
reasoned that construction of a project before compliance with state laws
creates the risk of a steamroller effect that could make it difficult to
mitigate damages. This case has since been appealed, but there is no
decision from the higher court as of publication.
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S. D. West Virginia
Foster v. EPA, No. CV 14-16744, 2017 WL 3485049 (S.D. W. Va. Aug.
14, 2017).
Landowner challenges an Administrative Compliance Order (“ACO”)
imposed by EPA on four tracts of land. The substantive issue challenged is
whether the “relevant reaches” of the property is considered federal
“waters” under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). One section of the property
was subject to violations of the CWA. The waters on the section were
subsequently filled and questions arose regarding whether they were
navigable waters and the definition of the term. The court analyzed the
CWA violation pursuant to EPA’s counterclaim for “injunctive relief and
civil penalties.” The court found affirmatively for most factors since the
violation was carried out: (1) by a person (or entity); (2) by a “discharge”;
(3) from a point source; and (4) without the authority of a permit. The court
applied the decided-upon permanent flow test and nexus test to determine
that the property was dry, with no substantial flow and no actual physical
link to downstream water. Additional questions were raised of whether the
water had a continuous flow prior to its filling and whether jurisdiction of
the CWA was cut off due to the disruption of the “ordinary high water
mark.” The court granted EPA’s motion for summary judgment regarding
the procedural due process claim, First Amendment retaliation claim, and
challenge to the reasonableness of the ACO pertaining to one section of
land at issue. The court found that the administrative record supported
EPA’s decision, with sufficient evidence provided. However, the court also
granted Landowners’ motion for summary judgment regarding the
reasonableness of the ACO pertaining to three remaining sections of land
because it found insufficient evidence of those particular tracts’ impact on a
navigable water in the administrative record.
State
California
Orange Cty. Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
County Water District (“District”) sued Operators and former Operators
(collectively, “Operators”) for damages under state statute (“HSSA”), a
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county water district act (“OCWD”), and tort claims for negligence,
nuisance, and trespass. In this consolidated appeal, the court addressed each
cause of action individually. First, District can bring an HSSA cause of
action because it “incurred response or corrective action costs.” Moreover,
on Operator’s motions for summary judgment, this court reasoned that no
defendant made an adequate evidentiary finding to rise to the level that
justified summary adjudication. Second, the trial court was incorrect to
grant summary judgment on District’s OCWD claim in favor of Operators
because merely characterizing their incurred costs as “investigatory” is not
dispositive for an OCWD claim. However, the trial court was correct to
grant summary judgment for one specific Operator because it was not
responsible for a fire that caused the disputed water contamination. Third,
applying the legal theory of “continuous accrual,” this court reasoned that
due to the breadth of District’s complaint, most Operators insufficiently
addressed each allegation. However, summary judgment against District’s
negligence claim was appropriate as to an Operator which District merely
acknowledged Operator’s statute of limitation argument and another for
whom District failed to prove any causation under the OCWD. Fourth,
District has generally “raised a triable issue of fact regarding its property
interest in groundwater,” but because this is based on District’s recharge
activities, District has a viable nuisance claim, but not a viable trespass
claim. Finally, the court reasoned that District’s declaratory relief claim
should be revived because it “incorporates the allegations of its other causes
of action” and at least one other cause of action has been revived.
Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
San Diego Cty. Water Auth. v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., 220 Cal. Rptr.
3d 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Purchaser is an independent public agency that serves as San Diego
County’s regional water wholesaler and is a customer of Seller. In Seller’s
capacity as the state government’s water delivery company from the
Colorado River and the Hoover Dam to the southern-most region of the
state, Seller has developed a system of rate costs for water delivery. After
many years of disputes concerning Seller’s prices, the two parties had
reached an uneasy agreement with a set price that was subject to change
over time. In June 2010, Purchaser filed an action challenging the water
rates Seller adopted for 2011 to 2012 and then filed another action in June
2012 challenging the 2013-2014 rates. The trial court coordinated the two
claims together, bifurcating the bench trial, and found that the rates adopted
by Seller “…over-collect from wheelers, because at least a significant
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portion of these costs are attributable to supply, not transportation,” and
invalidated the rates for both rate cycles. The court awarded Purchaser total
damages of $234,932,782. The appellate court found that the lower court
was incorrect in its valuation of damages in including State Water Project
transportation charges and excluding Purchaser’s payments under the
exchange agreement when calculating its preferential right to water supplies
in the event of a shortage. Additionally, it concluded that Seller’s
termination of Purchaser’s membership due to filing or participating in
litigation against it was unconstitutional. The case was reversed and
remanded.
Colorado
Gallegos Family Props., LLC v. Colo. Groundwater Comm’n, 2017 CO 73.
Owner of senior surface water rights (“Senior Owner”) sought to dedesignate a portion of a designated ground water basin (“Basin”) and have
its boundaries re-drawn to exclude twenty-five wells in order for the State
Engineer to curtail those junior groundwater rights (“Junior Owners”) in
favor of Senior Owner’s surface water rights. Junior Owners opposed the
petition because so long as their properties remain within the Basin, the
State Engineer is unable to curtail their groundwater rights. The trial court
denied Senior Owner’s effort to de-designate a portion of the Basin, and
issued an order awarding Junior Owners a portion of their litigation costs.
Senior Owner appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court held that Senior
Owner failed to meet its burden of providing enough evidence to show that
Junior Owners were pumping water connected to the creek in a way that
created future conditions, supported by data, justified de-designation of the
Basin. That the creek and groundwater were connected at the time of
designation was inadequate to de-designate a portion of the basin because it
did not show that a condition arose or was discovered since the date of
designation, and therefore does not satisfy the statutory requirements for
de-designation. The petition also fails due to claim preclusion because
connectivity—the question of whether a sufficient enough linkage between
surface water and groundwater to mean augmenting or depleting
groundwater would impact the availability or flow of surface water—could
have been litigated during the designation proceeding. Finally, the court
held that Junior Owners who had been joined as indispensable parties were
able to recover costs as prevailing parties, and the expert fees they claimed
were both reasonable and necessary. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
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Idaho
City of Blackfoot v. Spackman, 396 P.3d 1184 (Idaho 2017).
City applied for a water right to appropriate 9.71 cubic feet per second of
groundwater to be used for irrigation. The Idaho Department of Water
Resources (“Department”) denied the application. City appealed to the
district court and again to the Supreme Court of Idaho. The court affirmed
the district court, ruling that City must apply for a transfer of water
resources to use water seepage for “recharge” of groundwater drawn for
irrigation. To offset the injury resulting from the appropriation, City wishes
to use 1,066 afa of mitigation credit resulting from seepage that occurs
under Water Right No. 01-181C (“181C”). The court held that 181C
authorizes five different use purposes: irrigation storage, irrigation from
storage, diversion to storage, recreation storage, and irrigation. City argues
that although “recharge” is not included in the purpose of use element, it is
still an authorized use of 181C. The court rejects this argument finding that
“recharge is a statutorily recognized beneficial use” and as such it must be
included in the purpose of use element before being used for recharge.
Additionally, the court found that since recharge is not a listed use, the only
way to alter, add or subtract from a judicially decreed purpose of use
element is through an application for transfer, so if City wishes to use 181C
for recharge it must file for a transfer. The court ruled that a water right
under 181C could not be used for groundwater recharge without an
approved transfer application and could not be used as mitigation until such
transfer was approved. District court finding was affirmed.
Montana
City of Helena v. Cmty. of Remini, 2017 MT 145, 388 Mont. 1, 397 P.3d 1.
Junior Owner appealed Water Court’s decision to try and protect his water
rights. The central issue is whether City forfeited or abandoned its water
rights after a period of inactivity. The appeal addresses whether the Water
Court was wrong to find a presumption by applying provisions of state law
that City did not intend to abandon water rights. The court held that “[i]f the
City can establish that it has used “any part” of the water right and also
satisfies one of the four additional requirements under” the pertinent section
of the law, then it is presumed not to have abandoned its water right. The
Supreme Court of Montana determined that City’s construction activity on
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the pipeline creates a presumption of nonabandonment because it displays
City’s intent to use the water rights. The court ultimately held that there was
error in the Water Master’s decision that City abandoned its water rights;
holding instead that City did not abandon its water rights under state law.
The court remanded, ordering the lower court to restore City’s entire water
right.
Clark Fork Coal. v. Tubbs, 2017 MT 184, 388 Mont. 205, 399 P.3d 295.
The Montana Water Act allows permit exceptions for certain new ground
water appropriations. It exempts appropriations of outside streams that are
less than ten acre-feet per year and run for less than thirty-five gallons per
minute, unless the combined appropriation from the same source was of
two or more wells exceeds ten acre-feet, regardless of the rate of water
flow. The Montana Department of Natural Resources (“Department”) had a
rule in 1987 that stated that combined appropriation did not need to
physically connect or have a combined distribution system to fall under the
category of combined appropriation. Department issued a new rule in 1993
defining combined appropriations “as an appropriation of water from the
same source acquired by two or more groundwater developments that are
physically . . . the same system.” Senior water rights owners (“Owners”)
petitioned Department regarding the new rule and then moved for judicial
review of the rule. The district vacated the 1993 rule finding the new rule
inconstant with the statute and therefore invalid. On appeal, the Montana
Supreme Court affirmed that decision but reversed district court decision to
award attorney’s fees to Owners under the private attorney general. The
court reasoned that the award of attorney’s fees under the private attorney
general doctrine only in cases “vindicating constitutional interests.” In the
case at bar, the underlying issue was a challenge to a statute and therefore
the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees.
South Dakota
Rumpza v. Zubke, 2017 S.D. 601, 900 N.W.2d 601.
Landowner’s property was separated from Neighbor’s property by a rural
road. Neighbor’s property was immediately adjacent to West Neighbors.
Water flowed from Landowner’s property onto Neighbor’s property via a
culvert dug under the road. In 2012, Landowner constructed a dam and a
ten-foot pit on his side of the culvert, with a pump inside. When the water
in the pit reached a certain level, it pumped the contents of the pit over the
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dam and onto Neighbor and West Neighbor’s property. Neighbor and West
Neighbor sued Landowner, seeking an injunction and damages. They
argued that the increased water flow onto their properties had extended the
time that water lingers on the properties, ruining land that they had
previously been able to farm. Trial court returned judgment for Neighbor
and West Neighbor, prohibiting Landowner from operating the pump and
awarding damages of $12,465 and $16,173 respectively. The Supreme
Court of South Dakota held that the trial court did not err in granting the
injunction against Landowner. The court held that as the dominant
landowner, Landowner may not “transfer the burdens imposed by nature on
his land to that of the lower owner.” Additionally, under South Dakota law,
the dominant landowner may not transfer surface waters on his property to
a lower owner in “unusual or unnatural quantities.” Because Neighbor and
West Neighbor’s properties used to dry out gradually, and are now
“continually wet” since the installation of the pump, an injunction to
prevent the damage to their land was proper. However, Neighbor, unlike
West Neighbor, failed to deduct appropriate expenses from his damage
calculation. Therefore, the court did not have sufficient data to calculate
Neighbor’s damages. The injunction and West Neighbor’s damages were
affirmed; Neighbor’s damages were reversed.
Surat Farms, LLC v. Brule Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2017 SD 52, 901 N.W. 2d
365.
Company appealed Board of County Commissioners’ (“Board”) decision,
which found that Company impermissibly blocked watercourse drainage
with tile installation. The circuit court affirmed Board’s decision. South
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that
the award of injunctive relief was proper and supported by evidence. The
court said the tile created a problematic elevation difference, which thereby
caused significant water backup on an upstream Landowner’s property. The
court determined that a “civil law rule” applies requiring that Company not
interfere with drainage on another’s property under rural property
requirements. The court denied Company’s claim that Landowner suffered
no actual damages by highlighting the lack of evidence Company presented
for this particular claim. Additionally, the court held that Company did not
have the right to create water backup and impact a neighboring property
owner’s land. The court also held that Company’s claim that Landowner
misrepresented his property’s use was inaccurate and unnecessary, since
damages were not calculated factoring in the use of the land. Thus, the
court affirmed the injunctive relief granted to Landowner, enforcing
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Company’s requirement to “restore the natural flow of water” on his own
and Landowner’s property.
Texas
Bexar-Medina-Atascoas Ctys. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v.
Bandera Cty. River Authority & Groundwater Dist., No. 04-16-00536-CV,
2017 WL 4014703 (Tex. App. Sept. 13, 2017).
Bandera Water District (“Bandera”) sued the Bexar-Medina-Atascoas
Counties Water District (“BMA”) seeking a declaratory judgment that
BMA has no jurisdiction in Bandera County to do any of the following: (1)
inspect private or public wells; (2) enforce any jurisdiction or rules over
groundwater or surface water; (3) investigate any types of alleged water
well violations; (4) promulgate any rules relating to groundwater; and (5)
exercise any rights as a water control and improvement district. BMA
entered a plea to the jurisdiction asserting contrarily, that Bandera could not
show any of the five enumerated items have occurred or are imminent;
therefore, there is no justiciable controversy for determination. The trial
court denied BMA’s plea, and subsequently granted Bandera’s motion for
summary judgment, however, the court denied Bandera’s request for
attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed. The appellate court reversed and
remanded. In its holding, the court noted that there is no general right to sue
a state agency for a declaration of rights, and that although Bandera
attempts to define its claim as one challenging the validity of the
application of a Texas statute, its challenge aims to restrain BMA’s actions;
therefore, BMA is immune from the claims under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. However, Bandera requested that the case be remanded to allow
it to amend its pleading to pursue ultra vires claims against BMA’s officers.
The court held that because BMA raised its immunity challenge for the first
time on appeal, Bandera did not have an opportunity to amend its pleadings
and should therefore the proper course of action was to remand the cause
with instructions to allow Bandera an opportunity to amend its pleading.
Washington
Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding Co., 399 P.3d 493 (Wash.
2017).
A local Environmental Group, sued lakeside Property Owner, seeking
abatement and removal of fill material which Property Owner added to
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elevate and keep its property permanently above the artificially raised
seasonal water fluctuations of a public lake. Environmental Group’s cause
of action was based upon the State of Washington’s public trust doctrine,
which protects the public right to use water in place along navigable
waterways. The lower court held that State previously consented to
Property Owner’s fill and impairment pursuant to a “Savings Clause” found
in the State’s statutes. The clause protects from public trust challenges to
any fill improvements made pre-Wilbour (1969 case wherein Supreme
Court held that private property owners may not extinguish the public right
to use navigable waters by artificially elevating their own property). As
Property Owner’s fill had been added in 1961, Environmental Group’s
public trust claim was barred. Environmental Group appealed. The
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the lower courts holding that State
had consented to Property Owner’s fill improvement pursuant to the
Savings Clause, however, the court reversed and remanded to the trial court
to determine whether the Savings Clause violates the public trust doctrine
all-together. The court also held that Environmental Group has standing to
raise its claim under a public nuisance theory notwithstanding the
provisions and protections afforded in the Savings Clause.
Hamilton Corner I, LLC v. City of Napavine, 402 P.3d 368 (Wash. Ct. App.
2017).
Property Owner sued City, challenging the city council's ruling that
Property Owner owed $170,329.02 after being assessed due to the
construction of a public water system. City's local improvement district
(“LID”) instituted water system improvements to promote development
through providing City's water to an area not previously serviced by public
water. City's public health and city code requirements required completed
public water systems that provide potable drinking water and the appraisal
cited that the completed public water system would allow for full
development of Property Owner's property and surrounding properties. The
LID appraised the improvements through obtaining “before and after”
market values of Property Owner’s property. Property Owner did not
present any alternative appraisals of its own and Property Owner only
argued that its property was sufficiently serviced by its own private water
systems. The court held Property Owner's argument that City's confirmation
of the assessments was arbitrary and capricious as invalid because the LID's
fundamental purpose was accomplished. While Property Owner does not
benefit from a specific nearby well that was improved, the court found the
special benefit gained by Property Owner to be related from the public
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water delivery system improvements generally and that Property Owner
was afforded reasonable notice to an opportunity to meaningfully present its
objections to the city. The court therefore affirmed the assessment.
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS
Agricultural Use
Iowa
Thompson v. JTTR Enviro, L.L.C., No. 16-1610, 2017 WL 3065159 (Iowa
Ct. App. July 19, 2017).
Landowner purchased 146 acres of farmland from Seller. The contract
between them stated that Landowner would give Seller a permanent
easement on the 146 acres and a separate manure easement agreement
("MEA") that would be created at closing. The MEA was drafted, signed,
and recorded as permanent and running with the land, binding upon all
successors and interest, noting that Landowner would receive as much
animal waste generated from the hog facility on Seller’s land as needed for
his 146 acres, and that he would receive the benefit of reduced costs and
expenses regarding fertilizer application. Months following the MEA,
Neighbor purchased the neighboring 10.25 acres from Seller and filed a
manure management plan, under which Landowner could only receive
seventy-three acres of manure annually. Landowner filed suit, alleging that
Neighbor breached the MEA. The trial court found in favor of Landowner
and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that: (1) the terms of the MEA
explicitly impose a burden upon Neighbor as Seller’s successor to supply
Landowner with enough manure to cover the 146 acres; (2) nothing in
Neighbor’s argument supports the conclusion that the MEA's broad
wording was not meant to include manure from a finishing barn as opposed
to that of a farrowing barn; and (3) simply because Landowner planted
soybeans in year one—which do not require the same level of fertilization
as corn--does not provide proof of what Landowner would have done and
intended to do had manure been provided.
South Dakota
Hoffman v. Van Wyk, 2017 S.D. 48, 900 N.W.2d 596.
Landowners applied for a writ of mandamus to compel County Planning
and Zoning Administrator and Planning and Zoning Commission
(“County”) to revoke a building permit for a hog confinement unit applied
for by another party, arguing that building the unit would be in violation of
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County’s zoning ordinance. The circuit court denied Landowners’ request.
Landowners appealed, and County, in a notice of review, argued that the
court erred in determining that the unit was not a permitted use under the
ordinance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the
lower court decision, in part, determining that the hog confinement facility
was a permitted use and did not require a variance or conditional-use
permit. Further, although the court determined that the permit should not
have been issued, it affirmed the lower court’s decision in denying
Landowners a writ of mandamus, noting that construction of the facility had
already been completed at the time of the trial and a writ of mandamus
would be ineffective.
Easements - Federal
Sixth Circuit
Green Hills Mall TRG, LLC v. BakerSouth, LLC, Case No. 16-5758, 2017
WL 4217450 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2017).
Parking Lot Owner sued Property Owner for a declaratory judgment
challenging Property Owner’s claim to a parking easement that was
purportedly granted through the deed associated with Property Owner’s
purchase. Long prior to Property Owner’s purchase, the deed’s trustee died
without appointing a successor. Parking Lot Owner contended that the
original deed no longer contained an enforceable easement because a
deceased trustee’s heirs serve only as mere conceptual placeholders.
Arguing the contrary, Property Owner repurchased the property after the
deceased trustee’s heirs took title. Because Tennessee state law offers no
explicit answer to what occurs with trust property when a trustee dies, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to state case law in holding that the
trustee’s heirs only maintain “naked legal title” that automatically divests
when the court appoints a successor. Thus, the court affirmed the lower
court’s judgment that the conveyance did not give Property Owner an
enforceable right to the easement as a trustee’s heirs may not freely convey
trust property in fee simple to third parties under state law. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing as the case precedent.
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Federal Circuit
Caquelin v. United States, No. 2016-1663, 2017 WL 2684180 (Fed. Cir.
June 21, 2017).
Landowners owned property that was subject to a railroad easement.
Railroad and its predecessors had held the easement since 1870, which was
limited to railroad use only. In May 2013, Railroad sought to abandon the
line, effective July 5, 2013. The Surface Transportation Board (“Board”)
issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (“NITU”) that
prohibited Railroad from abandoning the line for 180 days, which blocked
the easement interest from reverting to Landowners. Landowners sued the
United States under the Tucker Act, alleging that the temporary blocking of
the reversion constituted a compensable temporary taking. Relying on a
prior decision, the district court granted summary judgement in favor of
Landowners, finding that a categorical taking had occurred. The United
States appealed, arguing that the standard for regulatory takings and
temporary takings should have applied. The Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case so the record could be
further developed to determine whether the proper standard was used in
resolving the merits of Landowners’ takings claim. This case is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Easements – State
Alabama
Commonwealth Savingshares Corp. v. Fayetteville Holdings, LLC, No.
2150916, 2017 WL 2822317 (Ala. Civ. App. June 30, 2017).
Servient Estate Owner (“Servient”) brought an action seeking an injunction
and damages based on theories of trespass and nuisance. After an
annexation in 2004, the properties became subject to Scottsboro Zoning
Ordinance. Servient argued that the ordinance prohibits the presence of the
Dominant Estate Owner (“Dominant”), an industrial conveyor, and
extinguishes the easement. The general rule in Alabama is that “an
easement given for a specific purpose terminates as soon as the purpose
ceases to exist, is abandoned, or is rendered impossible of
accomplishment.” Servient argued that the ordinance made the easement
impossible for accomplishment. However, the ordinance allows
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nonconformities to continue to exist if the nonconformities existed before
the ordinance began to govern the property. Therefore, the court had to
determine whether the use of the easement continued to exist. Existing use
is determined regarding the fact of discontinuance or apparent
abandonment. However, in Alabama, discontinuance in zoning ordinances
is equivalent to abandonment. Under Alabama law, a temporary cessation is
generally not held to be abandonment. The appellate court held that while
Dominant was not actively using the easement during the annexation,
testimony supports the lack of intent to abandon the use of the easement.
Therefore, the court determined that Dominant qualified as a permissible
nonconformity under the ordinance. Servient further argued that Dominant
was not registered as a nonconformity and the easement should not be
preserved. However, the court held that failing to register only creates a
rebuttable presumption of abandonment and Servient failed to demonstrate
an intent to abandon. The court further held that Servient is not entitled to
damages for nuisance because Servient purchased the property with notice
of the easement and presented no facts that Dominant acted outside the
scope of the easement.
Arkansas
Clark v. Caughron, 2017 Ark. App. 409, 2017 WL 3724989.
Landowner asked Neighbor for a right-of-way to gain access to landlocked
property, but Neighbor refused. Landowner subsequently sued to quiet title
for encroaching fence line and unlawfully removing timber belonging to
Landowner. Neighbor counterclaimed that fence line established boundary
by acquiescence, or in the alternative, by adverse possession. After a bench
trial, the trial court held that “by acquiescence and open and notorious
possession for a period in excess of seven years that the parties’ boundaries
in the areas in dispute should be fixed by the old fences,” and found in
favor of Neighbor. On appeal, the appellate court determined that the trial
court was correct in finding that the fence boundary lines were established
by acquiescence and further, that Neighbor owned the disputed property by
adverse possession. As such, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling,
holding that its findings were not clearly erroneous.
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California
DIII Properties LLC, v. EDF Renewable Energy, Inc., A148356, 2017 WL
3712454 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2017).
The predecessor-in-interest of Landowner granted an easement over its land
to the predecessor-in-interest of a wind energy project Operator to allowing
Operator to maintain a wind farm to generate electricity (“Project”). A
dispute arose over the scope of the easement and whether it allowed the use
of underground lines placed by Operator across a corner of Landowner’s
property to transmit electricity generated by wind turbines on neighboring
pieces of property. Landowner brought this action for declaratory relief,
quiet title, and trespass. The trial court concluded the written easement, as
clarified by a subsequent letter agreement, did allow the placement of the
line and its use to transmit off-site electricity. It accordingly granted
summary judgment in favor of Operator on Landowner’s claims.
Landowner appealed and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that
because a letter agreement and related email correspondence show that the
easement allows the placement of lines transmitting energy from all of the
Project’s turbines, and because the evidence shows the Project includes
turbines not located on the property in dispute, the Landowner could not
prevail on its claims for relief and summary judgment in favor of the
Operator was proper. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore,
state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Hawaii
Gold Coast Neighborhood Ass’n v. State, 403 P.3d 214 (Haw. 2017).
Neighborhood Association sued State, seeking a declaration that State was
required to maintain a seawall. State filed a separate declaratory judgment
against Neighborhood Association, seeking a declaration that it did not
have an easement over the seawall. The two actions were consolidated.
State contended that state law requires State’s formal consent as a condition
of implied dedication of private property, while Neighborhood Association
argued that state law did not require State’s formal acceptance as a
condition of implied dedication. Relying on common law and case law, the
court held that formal acceptance is not a necessary prerequisite to implied
dedication. Because of State’s statements and its repairs and maintenance of
the seawall as well as its use by the public, the court ruled that State had
acquired an easement over and across the seawall by virtue of implied
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dedication and that State did not own the seawall or the real property
underneath it by virtue of surrender.
Idaho
Fuquay v. Low, 397 P.3d 1132 (Idaho 2017).
Property Owners sued Neighbors, seeking declaratory judgment for
prescriptive easement across private road on Neighbors’ properties. District
court granted summary judgment for Neighbors concluding that Property
Owners failed to present evidence of any hostile or adverse taking, a
required element in proving the existence of an easement by prescription.
Accordingly, the trial court found the easement was permissive and could
be withdrawn by Neighbors at will. Owners appealed. The Supreme Court
of Idaho affirmed, holding first that Property Owners use of the easement
was presumptively permissive because the use of the easement was “in
common” with Neighbors and that Property Owners had not rebutted that
presumption with an independent act that would have put Neighbors on
notice that the use of the easement was no longer permissive. Second, the
court reemphasized the need for an adverse taking and that no use can be
considered adverse unless it constitutes an actual invasion on the rights of
the owner.
Regan v. Owen, No. 43848, 2017 WL 3927024 (Idaho Sept. 8, 2017).
Easement Holder sued Landowner after a dispute arose as to whether a
prescriptive easement was extinguished by operation of a former Idaho
statute when the land was sold by a tax deed. This case represents the
second time the issue has been appealed Supreme Court of Idaho. The first
came after the district court found that the deed contained mutual mistake
and should be reformed to reflect an express easement, but on appeal the
court held that the deed should not be reformed. On remand the court found
that the prescriptive easement was extinguished based on Idaho statute
stating that tax deeds convey property free of all encumbrances. By the time
the supreme court heard this case, the statute had been amended as a
response to the court’s first impression so that title conveyed by tax deeds
are free and clear of encumbrances monetary in nature, not all
encumbrances. Regardless, the court began by determining that the district
court was correct in finding that the prescriptive easement was an
encumbrance, based upon the plain, literal interpretation of the statute, and
was therefore extinguished in the tax deed conveyed to Landowner. Even
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though the statute had been amended to prevent easements from being
terminated by the conveyance of a tax deed, the court then determined that
the amended statute did not apply retroactively. Additionally, the court
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Easement Holder’s due process
claim that it did not receive notice of the pending issuance of a tax deed for
the servient estate. Since the easement was prescriptive, there was no
official filing that it existed. Therefore, the existence of the easement was
likely unknown, even if valid, and notice to surrounding landowners not
required, just to record owners or parties in interest.
Kentucky
Majestic Oaks Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Majestic Oaks Farms, Inc., 2016SC-00213-DG, 2017 WL 4310491 (Ky. Sept. 28, 2017).
Homeowners’ Association (“HOA”) sued Developer to stop Developer’s
continued use of an easement for ingress and egress after a majority of
HOA members voted in favor of its termination. Developer’s recorded
subdivision plat included a declaration of covenants, conditions, and
restrictions incorporated in the homeowners’ deeds that provided
Developer’s possessory interest terminated at any time by a sixty-seven
percent vote. Holding that Developer’s easement in gross was defeasible
through the declaration’s granting language, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky found the term easement to fit under the declaration’s covenant
and restriction umbrellas. The court also noted the contract canon of contra
proferentem that construes ambiguity against the drafter when a contract is
susceptible to two meanings. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of HOA
and found the easement to be defeasible and as having been validly
removed.
Shields v. Univ. of Louisville Found., Inc., No. 2015-CA-001679-MR, 2017
WL 2705402 (Ky. Ct. App. June 23, 2017).
Landowner and Neighbor each conveyed a one-half undivided interest to
each other in their abutting property. At issue in the case is if Neighbor was
also granted in fee simple the fifteen-foot roadway across Landowner’s
property, or if Neighbor was only granted an easement across the property.
Landowner argued that the roadway was an easement across its property for
Neighbor’s use, whereas Neighbor argued it owned it in fee simple. Based
on the language of the deeds, the trial court found for Landowner, that
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Neighbor only had an easement across Landowner’s property. The appellate
court affirmed.
Massachusetts
Baker v. Town of Plymouth, 16-P-996, 2017 WL 3623502 (Mass. App. Ct.
Aug. 24, 2017).
Landowner sued Town, claiming that a decree of registration for land
written in 1911 gave Landowner an easement, and he sought to enjoin
Town from interfering with the easement. The trial court granted Town’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that no easement existed beyond
Landowner’s narrow implied easement to cross Town’s land to the sea. In
affirming the judgment, the appellate court held that no express easement
existed, because there was no language within any deed that suggested that
Town, the dominant estate, intended to grant Landowner any easement. The
language “with all the privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging” is
insufficient to create an easement. That language is similarly insufficient to
create an implied easement, because the court could not infer an intent on
the part of the grantor to grant an easement over Town’s land. Therefore,
Landowner has no easement greater than any citizen who may use Town’s
road for the limited purpose of traveling along one road to the sea. This is
an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Michigan
Oakland Twp. Parks & Recreation Comm’n v. Marlowe, No. 332020, 2017
WL 2989062 (Mich. Ct. App. July 13, 2017).
Landowners appeal the trial court’s decision favoring Township in a dispute
regarding adjoining parcels of real property. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court’s decision. In this case, a portion of real property owned by
Township was utilized by Landowners without Township’s consent.
Township sent many notices to Landowners to stop using the property, but
to no avail. Township filed a four-count complaint against Landowners
alleging claims of trespass and quiet title or ejectment. The issue was
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether ownership
rights to the property at issue had vested to Landowners or the previous
owner fifteen years prior. The appellate court reviewed the issue de novo
and held that Landowners had no vested property rights in the disputed
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property, affirming the decision of the trial court. This is an unpublished
opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before
citing the case as precedent.
Montana
Fox v. BHCC II, Inc., 2017 MT 218, 388 Mont. 443, 401 P.3d 705.
Easement Holder (“Holder”) held a secondary easement that permitted him
to distribute irrigation water and maintain an irrigation ditch on
Landowner’s property. Holder sued Landowner, alleging that by planting
trees and shrubs and expanding the landscape, Landowner had interfered
with Holder’s easement because Holder was no longer able to access the
ditch with his large equipment and the foliage shedding disrupted the flow
of the water. Instead of ordering Landowner to remove the trees and shrubs,
the district court accepted Landowner’s judicial admission and tender and
found that Holder failed to prove that Landowner unreasonably interfered
with Holder’s rights under the secondary easement. The Montana Supreme
Court affirmed. The court noted that Holder could still access the property
to inspect, repair, or maintain the irrigation ditch; while Holder may no
longer utilize his large equipment, he could still use smaller equipment to
maintain the ditch; and, moreover, Holder would not be required to
purchase smaller equipment, because Landowner, and not Holder, had been
performing the maintenance regularly since 1999.
New York
Bank of Akron v. Spring Creek Athletic Club, Inc., 59 N.Y.S. 3d 214, (N.Y.
App. Div. 2017).
Grantee held solar and wind energy easements over two properties. Bank
initiated foreclosure proceedings regarding the two properties. Bank moved
for summary judgment, and the lower court granted its motion. Grantee
appealed, arguing that the easements he held were not subject to
foreclosure. The court determined that the easements were interests in
reality that were subject to foreclosure, and since the mortgage was prior in
time to Grantee’s easements, the easements were subject to the mortgage.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5

2017]

Recent Case Decisions

1073

Pennsylvania
In re Petition of Adams, 170 A.3d 584 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).
Landowner leased his land to a natural gas production company that created
a private road (“Road”) for business operations that ran through Neighbor’s
property. Neighbor initially used the Road as a convenient right of way, but
then gates were erected to keep him out. Neighbor had a separate
accessway to his property by way of a treacherous path once used by a
logging operation to roll logs downhill. Neighbor filed a petition to open
the Road. The trial court granted the petition and appointed a Board of
View (“Board”) to visit the properties and determine if the use of the Road
was necessary for access to Neighbor’s property. The Board found that the
additional logging accessway would be too expensive and arduous to
feasibly be created into a safe road, so Neighbor’s property was effectively
landlocked without access to the Road. The trial court accepted the Board’s
findings, and Landowner appealed. On appeal, Landowner argued that the
Road was not necessary for Neighbor’s access to his property since the
logging trail also granted access to the property. The appellate court, using
state precedent, declared that “necessary” did not mean absolutely
necessary, and that if all other accessways are “extremely difficult and
burdensome” the land will be considered virtually landlocked. Neighbor
argued that the use of the Road by the natural gas company supplied a
public utility, and the taking was for a public use. Neighbor also argued that
his property was dedicated for public hunting, which is also a matter of
public concern. The appellate court found these arguments to be compelling
and held that the taking was reasonably necessary and for a public use,
affirming the trial court.
Tennessee
Stinson v. Mensel, No. M2016—00624—COA—R3—CV, 2017 WL
2972219 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017).
Landowner’s property was burdened by an easement for Neighbor to
ingress and egress to its home. Landowner sued Neighbor, alleging that it
unlawfully bulldozed the easement, encroached onto Landowner’s property,
and used threats and intimidation to prevent Landowner from coming on or
using the non-exclusive easement. Neighbor counter-sued, alleging that
Landowner was preventing Neighbor from enjoying the peace and use of its
easement, which was part of Neighbor’s driveway. The trial court found
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that Landowner was liable to Neighbor for nuisance, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and invasion of property. The court enjoined
Landowner from having any use of the easement. Landowner appealed and
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the
nuisance claim, but reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to
the intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy
claims. The court reasoned that Neighbor could not have expected privacy
or seclusion on the land encompassing the easement that it shared with
Landowner. Furthermore, the court noted that Neighbor did not meet its
burden of proof that it experienced "serious mental injury," as required in
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court also vacated
the injunction against Landowner, noting that such an injunction would
prohibit it from the lawful use of its property.
Texas
Muhammad v. Plains Pipeline, L.P., No. 12—16—00189—CV, 2017 WL
2665180 (Tex. App. June 21, 2017).
Company originally filed a petition in a condemnation action against
Landowner seeking easement rights for the construction and operation of a
pipeline through and across real property. In response to the petition, the
trial court appointed three disinterested special commissioners to assess
damages due to the acquisition through eminent domain. The special
commissioners held a hearing to assess the damages, at which Landowner
appeared in person. The special commissioners awarded landowner $3,191
in damages, which was then filed with the court two weeks later. Neither
party objected to the award. Company filed a motion for judgment in
absence of any objections and the court held a hearing at which it entered a
judgment of condemnation adopting the special commissioner's
recommendation of $3,191 in damages. Landowner appealed. The appellate
court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because neither
party filed objections to the special commissioners' award. It specifically
referenced the property code and reasoned that no appeal can be taken when
the trial court renders judgment based on an award to which neither party
filed objections, because it is the judgment of the special tribunal. The court
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
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Utah
Garfield Cty. v. United States, 2017 UT 41, No. 20150335, 2017 WL
3187505.
Utah brought actions in federal court against the United States, “seeking to
quiet title to 1,510 rights of way located on federal land.” The issue in the
case at hand is whether a state code and its predecessor are statutes of
limitations or statutes of repose. The Supreme Court of Utah addressed
three main issues to this question: (1) should it address the certified
question at the risk of issuing an advisory opinion; (2) should it interpret the
code and its predecessor as statutes of limitations or statutes of repose; and
(3) if it is to interpret the statutes as of repose, should it reform the statutes
under its absurdity doctrine. After reviewing the case, the court held it
should address the question on its merits, and that even though the plain
language rendered them statutes of repose, the court construed the statutes
as statutes of limitations as to the claims. The court points to the
legislature’s intent and the triggering action to determine which to apply to
the statute.
Vermont
In re Vermont Gas Sys., 2017 VT 83, Bo. 2016-396, 2017 WL 4216473.
Utility Company, in 2012, had filed a petition with the Public Service
Board (“Board”) to construct a natural gas pipeline, and under state law.
Utility Company could not begin until Board issued a certificate of public
good (“CPG”) authorizing the project. Board ultimately issued a CPG in
2013 and Utility Company began construction in 2014. Utility Company
subsequently sought an easement though a park to complete its pipeline
expansion. A group of Vermont residents (“Intervenors”) appealed Board’s
order authorizing Utility Company to condemn the easement. On appeal,
Intervenors argued that Board erred in authorizing the condemnation as the
park was already dedicated to a public use and the condemnation was thus
necessary under the Vermont statute. The Supreme Court or Vermont
concluded that because the easement would not materially impair use of the
park, the prior use doctrine did not prohibit condemnation. Further, the
evidence in the record supported a finding that condemnation of the
easement was necessary. The court accordingly affirmed Board’s decision
but remanded to amend the initial order to reflect that the town would have
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a right to use the easement area pursuant to the restrictive covenant attached
to the land and subject to specified limitations in Board’s order.
Washington
Schoenfelder v. Larson, No. 48885-o-II, 2017 WL 3726805 (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 29, 2017).
Neighbor sued Property Owner, alleging that Property Owner’s building of
a fence along or near the road would interfere with the purpose of an
expressed easement between the parties. Because Neighbor uses a section
of Property Owner’s property to accommodate passing vehicles via turnout
areas, Neighbor sought to quiet title in the express easement and for a
prescriptive easement in the turnout areas. To determine whether Neighbor
had established a prescriptive easement, the court examined whether the
claimant had used the land for a period of ten years and showed that: (1) the
claimant used the land in an open and notorious manner; (2) the use was
continuous or uninterrupted; (3) the use was on a uniform route; (4) the use
was averse to Property Owner; and (5) the Property Owner had knowledge
of the use and could have asserted and enforced his rights. Property Owner
argued that the prescriptive easement was unsupported by substantial
evidence as it alleged that the former property owner had not blocked
access to the turnout areas as an assertion of its ownership rights. The court
ruled against Property Owner’s attempt to construct a fence in proximity to
the easement and affirmed the trial court’s reliance on extrinsic evidence to
determine the intentions of the original parties due to the express
easement’s ambiguity. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Other Land Issues – Federal
Supreme Court
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (U.S. 2017).
Landowners own two Lots, Lot E and Lot F, which they inherited from
their parents in 1995 and 1994 respectively. The Lots were located along
the St. Croix River, in Wisconsin, and subject to State preservation laws
which said that separate lots must have at least one acre suitable for
development unless neighboring lots, with less than one acre suitable for
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development, were owned by separate owners in 1976, when the law was
passed. Additionally, state law allowed for a merger of lots when
neighboring lots came under common ownership, meaning that even if the
lots fell under separate ownership regulations pre-1976, if sold or granted to
a common owner after 1976, the neighboring lots would merge and the one
acre suitable for development requirement would be instituted.
Landowners’ parents held the Lots in separate ownership until they granted
the Lots to Landowners, at which time the Lots merged. Landowners
sought a variance from County, so that Landowners could sell Lot E to fund
improvements on Lot F. County denied the variance sighting that the Lots
had merged and that even with the merged Lots, the total land suitable for
development was still less than one acre, therefore the variance to sell Lot E
could not be granted. Landowners sued arguing that by not allowing the
variance, the State effectively took their property without just
compensation. The state courts held there was no taking under the merger
regulations, the proper property unit was the combined Lot E and F, the
decrease in value was less than ten percent, and Landowners knew the laws
when they acquired the Lots. The Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed finding that Landowners had not experienced a taking under
Lucas, which requires Landowners to be deprived of all economically
beneficial use of their property, or under the more general Penn Central
test.
Third Circuit
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. R.R., 870 F.3d 244 (3d Cir.
2017).
Railway sought a declaratory judgment that it was not in default of a Lease
between Railway and Railroad Company. The district court determined that
Railway was not in default any Lease provisions. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that: (1) the district court appropriately
considered course-of-performance evidence in interpreting the Lease; (2)
Railroad Company did not expressly reserve any subsurface rights in the
Lease, which allowed Railway to enter into third-party subsurface
extraction agreements; (3) Railway had not violated the Lease’s
indebtedness provision; (4) the Lease did not require Railway to pay
Railroad Company’s attorney or litigation costs; and, (5) Railway was
entitled to nominal damages for fraud.
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Forth Circuit
Quinn v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Queen Anne’s Cty. 862 F.3d 433 (4th Cir.
2017).
County planned to extend sewer systems to all streets on an island with
failing septic systems. Both developed and undeveloped lots on those
streets would receive the sewer service, but the service would not extend to
streets with only vacant lots. This plan would also prevent future
connections outside the initial service area, unless the lot fell within the
Grandfather/Merger provision for lots smaller than the minimum size under
the zoning regulation but are merged with larger contiguous lots.
Landowner sued after realizing that he would be prohibited from
developing his smaller isolated lots that fell outside of the initial service
area. Landowner argued that County’s plan was a regulatory taking,
requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment, and County’s action
violated his due process and equal protection rights. Landowner also argued
the State violated his due process rights by approving the sewer extension
plan. The district court dismissed Landowner’s claim against the State and
granted County summary judgment. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the decision. The court rejected Landowner’s Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause claim based on his lack of sewer service due to: (1) the lack of
economic harm suffered by Landowner; (2) the highly speculative nature of
the initial purchase of land; and (3) the reasonableness of the
Grandfather/Merger provision in preventing overdevelopment and health
hazards from failing septic systems. The court denied Landowner’s due
process challenge to the Grandfather/Merger provision because State law
does not recognize a property interest in sewer services. Finally, the court
denied Landowner’s equal protection claims, because County’s purposes of
limiting costs for the sewer system and preventing overdevelopment
provide a rational basis for the disparate treatment of landowners on the
island.
Schoene v. McElroy Coal Co., No. 16-1788, 2017 WL 3037455 (4th Cir.
July 18, 2017).
Landowner sued Mining Company for alleged damage to the surface estate
and residence caused by subsurface operation. Landowner filed both
common law claims for loss of support to the surface estate and statutory
claims under the Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“Act”). Mining
Company moved for partial summary judgment, alleging that a waiver
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clause contained in the 1902 deed precluded relief on Landowner’s
common law claim and that the Act did not authorize the relief Landowner
sought in his statutory claims. The trial court denied Mining Company’s
motion for summary judgment and eventually awarded Landowner
$547,000. Mining Company appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The appellate court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia because deciding the issues on appeal—
specifically the deed language—in the case will require the application of
competing principles of case law and the interpretation of West Virginia
statutory and regulatory provisions that are silent on the disputed issues in
this case. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Sixth Circuit
Lyles v. RDP Co., Nos. 16-6346, 16-6347, 2017 WL 3393947 (6th Cir.
Aug. 8, 2017).
Lessors sued Lessees asserting numerous claims and a declaration that their
leases granting Lessees a right to quarry limestone on their property is no
longer valid. Lessors became frustrated with the quarrying operations, felt
there was overuse under the lease, and the ability for the lease to be
extended by Lessees. Both Lessors had separate, but similar, leases dating
back to the 1977. Generally, the leases provided Lessees could mine for
limestone on the property and provide a royalty payment to Lessor and that
Lessees could extend the lease in five-year increments for ninety-nine years
from the year of the original lease execution. At trial the court found for
Lessees. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court
held that any trespass claims brought by Lessors were without merit
because Lessees had obtained a prescriptive easement on the property by
continuing with the alleged overuse for more than fifteen years after an
objection by one Lessor. Additionally, the court held that lease did not
obligate Lessees to provide notice or some sort of writing when they elected
to extend the lease for another five-year increment. Since Lessors continued
to accept and cash royalty payment checks, many of their complaints that
Lessees did not comply with terms of the lease were waived. The court also
reviewed Lessors request that the leases be reformed because a change in
circumstances rendered the lease unconscionable and because they were
procedurally and substantively unconscionable when they were originally
executed. The court rejected the request and affirmed the district court’s
refusal to reform the leases. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
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therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Ninth Circuit
Guidiville Rancheria of Cal. v. Zinke, No. 15-15221, 15-17069, 2017 WL
3327828 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2017).
The Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians (“Tribe”) sued City for breach of a
Land Disposition Agreement (“LDA”) between City and Tribe as well as
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Trial court
granted City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the
breach of contract and bad-faith claims, denied Tribe leave to amend, and
awarded City legal fees. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Tribe
plead a plausible claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith,
reasoning that a third amended complaint evidenced City violating such by
interfering with Tribe’s ability to obtain federal approval for a casino,
thereby preventing Tribe from satisfying a condition precedent of the LDA.
The court agreed that the amended complaint regarding breach of express
terms of contract were conclusory and unsupported by any specific
allegations, however, Tribe should have been able to augment these
allegations in a fourth amended complaint. Disallowing such, the court
concluded, was an abuse of the lower court’s discretion and that
determination is reversed. This opinion has not been released for
publication; therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing
the case as precedent.
E.D. Louisiana
Vintage Assets, Inc. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No. 16-713, 2017 WL
3601215 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2017).
Landowner sued Pipeline Company, alleging that Pipeline Company failed
to maintain canals which Pipeline Company’s predecessors constructed on
a right of way servitudes across Landowner’s property. There was no
dispute that the canals had grown to a size not contemplated in the original
agreements, and Landowner brought actions for trespass, breach of
contract, and negligence. The district court first dismissed Landowner’s
trespass claim after deciding that Louisiana law requires intentional,
affirmative action to establish trespass. The court then found that
Landowner’s breach of contract claims had not prescribed because the
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suppletive rules on servitudes, which Landowner argued imposed an
ongoing duty to maintain the canals, applied to the servitude agreements at
issue in this case. Because those suppletive rules applied in this case, the
court granted Landowner’s motion for summary judgment on four of the
breach of contract claims. The lack of particular language in the two
remaining contracts, however, led the court to dismiss Landowner’s two
other breach of contract claims. The court also denied Pipeline Company’s
motion for summary judgment on its duty to dam the canals finding issues
of fact to be resolved. Because it could not settle the prescription issue on
the duty to dam claim, the court also denied Landowner’s summary
judgment motion on its claim that Pipeline Company had breached its duty
to dam. Finally, the court dismissed Landowner’s claims for negligence
based on Pipeline Company’s failure to maintain the canal because the
violation of the duty to maintain at most constitutes a passive breach of
contract, which does not also give rise to a tort claim.
E.D. Texas
Tareco Properties, Inc. v. L&S Minerals, LLC, No. 6:16-CV-482, 2017 WL
3414868 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2017).
Development Company held two judgments against Debtors. Debtors
quitclaimed 92.71 acres of property to Mineral Company; Debtors allegedly
asked Mineral Company to pay them a bonus and to quitclaim the property
back to them. Development Company sought to use the property to satisfy
the judgments and initiated a lawsuit seeking a Turnover Order.
Development Company moved for summary judgment against Debtors and
Mineral Company, arguing that Debtors were still asserting a claim to the
property against Mineral Company and further argued that it had a claim to
the property because the property transfer lacked consideration. Debtors
argued that they no longer had an interest in the property, they had no
control over the property, and had further released any claim they would
have against Mineral Company for the property. Mineral Company failed to
respond to Development Company’s summary judgment motion. The
district court granted Development Company’s motion on two grounds: (1)
undisputed facts showed that the Debtors did have a claim to the property;
and (2) the subsequent release was insufficient to release that claim since it
did not expressly mention a contemplated claim against Mineral Company.
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N.D. Alabama
Ryals v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-01879-JEO, 2017 WL 2984881 (N.D.
Ala. July 13, 2017).
Landowner acquired title to a forty-acre tract of land (“Property”) located
within the Talladega National Forest (“Forest”) in 1993. Landowner had
been familiar with the Property since the 1950’s. Landowner sued United
States to quite title to the Property pursuant to the Quiet Title Act. United
States argued that Landowner or his predecessors knew or should have
known of its claim as early as 1936 and, therefore, the twelve-year statute
of limitations bared Landowner’s claim. The district court held that the
claim was not time bared for several reasons including: (1) the President’s
proclamation in 1936 was insufficient to constitute notice because it did not
specifically assert a claim to any private property located within the Forest;
(2) the 1986 land survey did not properly mark the property so as to put
Landowner or his predecessors on notice; (3) there was no evidence that a
1997 forest map was widely disseminated so as to constitute notice; (4)
Landowner repurchased the property in 2014 to remove a cloud from the
title; (5) Landowner had been paying the taxes on the Property since he
purchased it in 1993; and (6) Landowner complained to the Forest Service
about a control burn in 2010 or 2011 which damaged the Property.
Therefore, the court granted in part and denied in part the United States’
motion to dismiss.
S.D. California
United States v. Kriegsmann, Case No. 15-cv-02744-BAS-BGS, 2017 WL
3966580 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2017).
In August of 2017, Landowner, Bank, and the Government filed a Joint
Motion to Enter Judgment and for Order of Foreclosure and Judicial Sale.
This order pertained to two parcels of land and a 1992 promissory note,
secured by a deed of trust encumbering the two parcels of land at issue.
Landowner executed the promissory note, promising to pay Bank the
principal sum of $150,750.00 plus interest and other costs contained in the
note. The Government had valid tax liens on all property and rights to
property of Landowner. The Government protected its liens by filing
Notices of Federal Tax Liens with the County Recorder. Therefore, the
Government is entitled to enforce its liens against the property in order to
apply the proceeds towards the tax liabilities of Landowner. The court held
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that the Government’s federal tax liens against Landowner’s property were
foreclosed, thus authorizing the United States Marshal (“Marshal”) or an
IRS Property Appraisal and Liquidation Specialist (“PALS”) to offer the
property for public sale. The court then gave the Marshal or PALS
representative the responsibility to, upon confirmation of the sale or sales,
promptly execute and deliver a deed of judicial sale conveying the property
to the purchaser or purchasers. The court also placed the responsibility of
preserving the land, including all buildings, improvements, fixtures, and
appurtenances thereon, upon the Landowner up until the property was sold.
Once the property is sold by the Government, Bank’s lien will be paid in
full from the sale proceeds before the federal tax liens or any other junior
lienholders.
W.D. Wisconsin
Pronschinske Trust Dated March 21, 1995 v. Kaw Valley Cos., No. 16-cv640-slc, 2017 WL 3498712 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 2017).
Landowner entered into a Mining Lease Agreement (“Lease”) with
Company granting Company exclusive right to conduct mining operations
on Landowner’s property. The lease contained three separate provisions for
sequential payments to be made by Company. These payments included an
“Initial Royalty Credit” to be paid upon the execution of the lease, and the
other two, “Commencement Royalty Credit” and “Production Royalties”,
which were to be paid to Landowner subsequent to mining operations.
However, Company walked away from the Lease before ever conducting
any mining operations. While Landowner was paid the Initial Royalty
Credit, it sued to recover the two remaining payments it believed it was
entitled to. Company claimed the plain language of the Lease provide that
the two remaining payments were not due to Landowner until materials had
been extracted or mined from Landowner’s property. The court found that
under a plain meaning of the Lease, the two payments subsequent to
execution of the Lease were only payable upon commencement of mining
operations on the land, not simply preparation for such operations. Thus,
Operator’s motion for summary judgment was granted. This case has since
been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.
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Bankruptcy
In re Eicher v. Candler, No. 1:12—bk—10283—NWW, 2017 WL 3732012
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2017).
Debtors owned two pieces of property, Property 1 and Property 2, at the
time of foreclosure. Because Tennessee is a title theory state, a trustee
under a deed of trust, not the debtor, holds legal title to a property following
foreclosure. In a motion to reconsider, Debtors argued that there was unity
of ownership in Property 1 and Property 2 that was severed upon
foreclosure of the former, and that upon foreclosure, an implied easement
of necessity for the benefit of Property 2 resulted. However, the court held
that there was no such unity and no implied easement. In its reasoning, the
court noted that it could not be inferred that the Trustee intended to grant an
easement over Property 1 for the benefit of Property 2 in which he never
held an interest. Had the Debtors transferred their equitable interest in the
property, an implied easement from prior use or by necessity may have
arisen for the benefit of Property 2 through Property 1. However, because
Debtors were not the granters or parties to the actual transfer at issue, any
possible inferred intent on their part to reserve an easement for the benefit
of Property 2 was irrelevant. The court also reasoned that Debtors did not
own Property 2 at the time Mortgagee’s deed of trust encumbering Property
1 was executed, so they did not have unity of ownership in Property 1 and
Property 2 that could be severed with the execution of the deed of trust
encumbering only Property 1. The court also held that even if it was to be
assumed that an implied easement arose upon the foreclosure of Property 1,
it was then extinguished by the foreclosure. It reasoned that it is well-settled
law in Tennessee that a foreclosure extinguishes interests in property,
including easements, which are junior to the deed of trust.
Other land Issues – State
Georgia
DeKalb Cty. v. Speir, 801 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App 2017).
Lessor and Lessee sued County after a piece of their property was
condemned for road improvements. Lessee operated a business from the
property and claimed after condemnation and resulting alterations the
property, its use for the business was no longer viable. At trial, damages
were awarded to both Lessor and Lessee. However, part of the damages
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awarded were based on the obligation of Lessee to continue making lease
payments to Lessor for the duration of the lease, even if the business was no
longer viable. County challenged the ruling that allowed in the evidence
regarding the post-taking lease obligation used in calculating damages,
claiming that the evidence should have been limited to the market value of
the land before the taking and immediately after, and not any post-taking
lease payments. Upon review, the appellate court noted that business loss
evidence is admissible for calculating damages to a lessee after a
condemnation action if the evidence shows that there was a diminution in
value of the land not condemned. Additionally, the court held that the
correct measure of damages awarded to a business after condemnation is
the value of the business before and after the taking. Therefore, the
obligation to pay the future lease payments affected the market value of
Lessee’s business after the taking and was properly included.
Idaho
Fletcher v. Lone Mountain Rd. Ass’n, 396 P.3d 1229 (Idaho 2017).
Landowner sued Road Association (“Association”) seeking a declaration of
rights and obligations regarding a road adjacent to Landowner’s property
because Landowner wanted to address the dust clouds created by the road’s
use near his home. The district court found that the lot owners on the
property lot that used the road had waived their right to demand
contribution to the road from the owners that had not used the road. The
court also found that Association’s covenant regarding maintenance of the
road was ambiguous, and that each owner who used the road had a right to
maintain the road but could not force any other owner to contribute to the
maintenance without a two-thirds vote of the owners that used the road. The
Idaho Supreme Court held that: (1) Association’s covenant was not
ambiguous; (2) there was no waiver of the right to demand contribution for
maintenance of the road after two-thirds of the landowners on each property
voted in favor; (3) the dust on the road was not an additional burden on
Landowner’s servient estate; and (4) Association had no right to maintain
the road or obtain involuntary contributions for past expenditures.
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Kansas
Grimmett v. Luellen, 399 P.3d 292 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
Landowner and Neighbor own adjoining parcels of land. Landowner sued
Neighbor to assert he had either an easement by prescription or by
implication for a water meter and water lines serving his parcel of land and
an easement area adjoining parcels of land owned by both Landowner and
Neighbor. The lower court wholly denied Landowner’s petition. Appellate
court reviewed this case to determine whether the lower court relied on
“substantial competent evidence” to support its findings. First, the court
held that Landowner did not have an easement by implication for the water
lines and water meter on Neighbor’s property because—in direct conflict
with a state law factor of implied easements— “the water meter and lines
are the servitude and were ‘in uses at the time of severance.’” Moreover,
nothing stopped Landowner from installing his own water lines and meter.
Second, Landowner does not have an implied easement for the area
adjacent to his parcel because despite Neighbor’s placement of a fence in
the area both claim right to inconvenience Landowner’s mobile home
tenants, Landowner failed to prove his claimed easement was necessary.
Third, Landowner does not have a prescriptive easement for the water lines
and meter because he failed to show exclusivity. Namely, there is no
exclusivity because water service to Landowner’s parcel continued after
Neighbor capped off what he believed to be the only water line. Landowner
also fails to show he has a prescriptive easement over the disputed area
between the parcels for the same reason. Specifically, Landowner’s claim
that Neighbor’s testimony that he had not used the property for storage
units is insufficient in proving exclusivity because that testimony does not
mean the disputed property was not at all used. Landowner is entitled to no
easements. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Shepherd v. Thompson, 397 P.3d 1257 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).
Seller sold property to Buyer after a divorce where Seller was the sole
owner of the surface and water rights. Seller delivered Buyer with a general
warranty deed conveying “the surface and water rights” to the real property
reserving unto grantor a life estate in and to all the oil, gas, and other
minerals lying in and under that may be produced. A few years later a writ
of execution was issued in the divorce case of Seller and spouse. The sheriff
executed an order of sale that directed the mineral rights of Seller’s
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property conveyed to Seller’s spouse. After the death of Seller, Buyer filed
petition to quiet title the real property arguing that after the death of Seller,
Buyer was the sole owner in fee simple to the mineral rights of the
property. The Kansas Supreme Court found that the deed granted Buyer
surface and water rights in the real property and reserved life estate in all
oil, gas, and other mineral rights to Seller. The court found the deed
remained silent as to who received the mineral rights after the death of
Seller. The court looked at the rule of construction in interpreting the deed
and based on that found that the use of “life estate” showed Seller’s intent
to retain something less than fee simple title to the mineral rights. This case
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Michigan
Goodrich v. Cook, No. 333418, 2017 WL 3441495 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug.
10, 2017).
Landowners purchased four parcels of land, three of which were properly
conveyed to them while the fourth was mistakenly left out of the
conveyance. Despite this mistake, Landowners occupied all four parcels,
including the disputed property, believing it had been conveyed to them
along with the other three parcels. Five years later, Landowners constructed
a barn that was partially situated on the disputed fourth parcel of land. After
Landowners defaulted on their mortgage, Buyers moved into the house and
disputes began concerning the use of a well and liquefied petroleum tank on
Buyers’ land. Buyers built a fence that blocked an easement that
Landowners used to access the water well, meanwhile Buyers also learned
that the disputed fourth parcel of land had never actually been conveyed to
Landowners. After consulting the tax assessor and discovering who the
actual owners were, Buyers contacted said owner, who subsequently
deeded the disputed property to them. Buyers then served Landowners with
a notice to quit, requesting that they remove their belongings from the
disputed property. Landowners refused and filed a quiet title action based
on adverse possession. The trial court found for Landowners and the
decision was appealed. The appellate court found no basis for reversal,
holding that Landowners showed they possessed the disputed property
openly, adversely, exclusively, and continuously for the statutorilyspecified minimum period. Specifically, the court noted that there was
privity of estate between Landowners and their predecessors in interest and
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that Landowners never intentionally relinquished their claim to the disputed
property. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Minnesota
Wescott v. Wabasha Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. A16-1358, 2017 WL
2729597 (Minn. Ct. App. June 26, 2017).
Citizen appealed the decision of the County Board to grant a conditional
use permit to construct and operate an agronomy center in a land zoned for
agricultural use. The appellate court stated that the threshold question under
state statute for determining if a permit was wrongfully granted was
whether there was material evidence of potential significant environmental
effects. The court held that Citizen had not established material evidence of
potential significant environmental effects, thus County Board’s grant of
the application for a conditional use permit is appropriate. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the cases as precedent.
Nebraska
Andrew v. Vill. of Nehama, No. A-16-208, 2017 WL 2774067 (Neb. Ct.
App. June 27, 2017).
In July 2014, Landowners began to install two 12,000-gallon anhydrous
ammonia storage tanks upon their property, 0.5 miles north of Village
limits, without first notifying Village and requesting a building permit. In
September 2014, Landowners submitted an application for a building
permit, which was ultimately dismissed by the Village Board of Trustees,
who determined that the storage facility was unsafe and a nuisance to the
public. In May 2015, the Board of Appeals denied Landowners’ appeal.
Landowners subsequently filed a petition in error with the district court,
seeking reversal of the decision that the storage tanks constituted a
nuisance, reversal of the building permit application denial, and an order
directing Village to issue a building permit. The court denied Landowners’
petition in error, and Landowners then appealed stating that the district
court erred in; (1) placing the burden of proof on Landowners to prove the
storage tanks did not constitute a nuisance; (2) finding that Village did not
need to provide evidence that the storage tanks did constitute a nuisance;
(3) finding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the tanks did
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constitute a nuisance; (4) finding that there was sufficient evidence to
support Village’s finding that it lacked adequate protection from an
anhydrous ammonia leak; (5) relying on an invalidly enacted Ordinance
2014—1; and (6) failing to direct Village to issue a building permit. The
appellate court affirmed the district court decision, holding that Village
provided sufficient evidence to deny the permit because the tanks did
constitute a nuisance. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing as precedent.
New Hampshire
Carlson v. Latvian Lutheran Exile Church of Boston and Vicinity Patrons,
Inc., No. 2016-0251, 2017 WL 4182892 (N.H. Sept. 21, 2017).
Church and Trustee both claimed rights to use a third party’s private
driveway to access a lake and property on the lake. The trial court issued a
ruling that Trustee lacked standing to quiet title to the driveway, but that
she did have standing to pursue her claim for declaratory relief against
Church, ruling that Church had no right to use the driveway. Both parties
appealed. Church argued that an easement holder, such as Trustee, only has
standing to challenge an alleged trespass if the trespass interferes with the
easement holder’s rights. Conversely, Trustee argued that regardless of
interference, she had standing to challenge Church’s trespass. The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court’s judgment in favor of
declaratory relief against Church, reasoning that Church’s claimed right to
use the driveway is not inherently adverse to Trustee’s right to use the
driveway. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Church’s use of the
driveway interfered with Trustee’s use of the driveway, and there was no
evidence that Church was likely to overburden or interfere with Trustee’s
right in the future. Trustee’s asserted invasion of rights she seeks to prevent
is purely speculative. The court also reasoned that because an easement is a
non-possessory interest in land, Trustee cannot bring an action that is
traditionally established to protect possession, such as trespass and
ejectment. The court then affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Trustee had
no standing to maintain a quiet title action against Church because the
relevant statute provides that a person may only bring a quiet title action
against another who may claim to have an adverse interest. Here, no such
adverse interest exists.
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North Dakota
Paving Dist. 476 Grp. v. City of Minot, 2017 ND 176, 898 N.W.2d 418.
Landowners sued City, alleging that the errors in City’s notice of roadway
improvements violated Landowners’ constitutional due process rights and
therefore City’s assessments should be invalidated. City performed a
special assessment to establish the costs of a proposed roadway
improvement project. Notice of the results of that assessment were sent to
Landowners, as well as published in the local newspaper. That notice
contained maps of the assessment and the cost of the assessment for each
property, along with the time and date of a public hearing on the
assessment. The City Council approved the assessment one month later, but
at the hearing it was made known that the published notices contained an
error in the description of the assessment—the resulting fix did not increase
the cost, and no new notice was sent out. Three months after the assessment
was approved, Landowners sued City for improper notice. The district court
granted City’s motion for summary judgment without reaching the question
of the notice requirement because Landowners failed to follow the state
statute requiring such actions to be filed within thirty days of the adoption
of the resolution. The Supreme Court of North Dakota did examine the
notice requirement, and held as follows: 1) City’s decision to create the
assessment district and make improvements did not deprive Landowners of
property rights, and therefore they had no constitutional right to notice and
opportunity to be heard; and 2) North Dakota’s constitutional “gift clause”
does not reach claims such as this. The decision of the district court,
granting City’s motion for summary judgment, was affirmed.
Ohio
Ford v. Baska, 7th Dist. Harrison NO. 16 HA 0008, 2017 WL 2665144
(June 19, 2017).
Landowner-1 sued Landowner-2 for breach of warranty deed and seeking a
declaratory judgment quieting title against Landowner-2. The trial court
granted Landowner-2’s motion to dismiss because a previous landowner
“lacked authority to transfer the entire mineral interest estate [to
Landowner-1] because she did not own the minerals.” On appeal,
Landowner-1 argues, among other things, that Landowner-2 relied on the
wrong state law in its motion to dismiss. Although this court agreed with
Landowner-1 on this particular issue, this case instead turns on whether
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Landowner-1 was a bona fide purchaser of the land at issue. Landowner-1
could not be a bona fide purchaser if he knew or was on constructive notice
of Landowner-2’s mineral interests at the time he believed he purchased the
land. The court concluded that Landowner-1 was on constructive notice of
Landowner-2’s mineral interest because Landowner-1’s “certificate of
transfer referred to the underlying probate matter” which outlined the
proper and enforceable conveyance of mineral rights to Landowner-2.
Appellate court affirmed the case’s dismissal.
Texas
Carter v. Harvey, 525 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017).
Majority Owner, owning 7/8 interest, of a tract of land brought a partition
action against Minority Owner, owning the remaining 1/8 interest. Minority
Owner responded by raising a claim for equitable adjustment, claiming that
improvements on the property that he made through a previously dissolved
corporation entitled him to over one-quarter of those improvements.
Majority Owner filed and was granted a motion for partial summary
judgment as the court held “that the claim in question [was] a corporate
claim of [the corporation] that was required to have been brought within
three years of [the corporation’s] dissolution … [and] was not.” Upon later
bench trial, the court found that partition in-kind would significantly
diminish the value of the land and thus ordered a public sale of the land
with the net proceeds being split between the two parties according to their
respective ownership shares of the land. Minority Owner appealed claiming
that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his equitable adjustment
claims and that the trial court had no jurisdiction because it did not join a
necessary party to the case. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s
decision, overruling all of Minority Owner’s claims. It stated that he could
not stand in the shoes of a dissolved corporation and bring an equitable
adjustment claim that the corporation, itself, could not bring; that the sale of
the property was in the best interest of both parties and the trial court was in
the best position to determine so.
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Wisconsin
Scenic Pit LLC v. Vill. of Richfield, 2017 WI App 49, 377 Wis. 2d 280, 900
N.W.2d 84.
Operator managed a solid waste facility and desired to purchase an
abandoned gravel pit for a “clean fill” facility, a low hazardous waste
landfill. After purchase, Municipality told Operator that land would need to
be rezoned for such purpose and that construction, storm water, and erosion
permits must be obtained. Operator applied for permit, and Municipality
denied. Operator sought declaration that it need not comply with any local
approvals. The lower court granted summary judgment for Municipality
because the local approvals were not “diametrically opposed” to state
interests. Operator appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) local
ordinances that conflict with state legislation are preempted by state law;
(2) state law exempts clean fill facility operators from applying for local
approvals; (3) zoning was expressly enumerated as a local approval by state
law; and (4) state law was broad enough to include permitting requirements
as a local approval. Thus, the Municipality had no power to require
Operator to comply with local approvals. The court reversed and remanded.
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS
Traditional Generation
D.C. Circuit
City of Orangeburg v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 862 F.3d 1071
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
Citylocated a willing supplier of wholesale power in neighboring North
Carolina but, according to City, the deal was scuttled by the North Carolina
Utilities Commission (“NCUC”). The Federal Power Act (“Act”) states that
authority over interstate wholesale power sales belong to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), not state agencies like NCUC.
City alleges that, in exercising its retail ratemaking authority, NCUC
interposed itself as a gatekeeper for access to the neighboring state’s most
affordable and reliable wholesale power, thereby intruding upon FERC's
exclusive jurisdiction. City challenged FERC’s approval of an agreement
between two utilities, arguing that the agreement constitutes an
authorization of NCUC’s “unlawful regime.” FERC interposed a threshold
objection to City’s petition, arguing that City lacks constitutional standing
for reviewing such a petition. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals emphasized that the Act affords judicial review only to parties who
have been “aggrieved” by an order issued by FERC and a party is
“aggrieved” only if it has standing. To satisfy these “twin demands,” City
must show an actual or imminent injury in fact, traceable to the challenged
agency action, that will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. The
court held that City had standing to challenge FERC’s approval because
City demonstrated an imminent loss of the opportunity to purchase a
desired product (reliable and low-cost wholesale power), and that injury is
traceable to the FERC’s approval of the agreement at issue. Accordingly,
the court vacated in part the orders approving the agreement and denying
rehearing, and remand to FERC for further explanation.
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Traditional Generation – State
New York
Riverkeeper Inc. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 59 N.Y.S.3d 806
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Environmental Group sued Department of Environmental Conservation
(“DEC”) after DEC issued updated operating permits to the owners of an
electrical production Station. Prior to issuing the permits, DEC made
available draft versions which the public could comment on or raise
objection to. Environmental Group argued that DEC was also required to
hold a public adjudicatory hearing prior to issuing the final permits, and
thus sought declaratory judgment to annul the final permits and DEC’s
determination that Station would have no significant impact on the
environment. The lower court dismissed Environmental Group’s claim; its
appeal followed. The appellate court affirmed. The court reiterated the
premise that its judgment is not substituted for that of the agency
responsible for making the determination, but may only ascertain whether
there is a rational basis for the agency’s decision or whether it is arbitrary
and capricious. The court held that DEC’s determination that an
adjudicatory hearing was not required prior to issuing permits was not
arbitrary and capricious, reasoning that the burden fell upon Environmental
Group to raise its concern which would illuminate a need for such a
hearing, which it did not met. The court also held: (1) DEC had rational
basis to conclude that discharge of hot water would comply with regulatory
requirements; (2) DEC’s determination that owner of Station was not
required to undergo new source review under Title V of Clean Air Act was
rational; and (3) DEC complied with state law.
Renewable Generation - Federal
Second Circuit
Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F. 3d 82 (2d Cir. 2017).
The State legislature enacted a Statute authorizing the Department of
Energy and Environmental Protection (“DEEP”) to solicit proposals for
renewable energy, select winners, and direct the state’s utilities to enter into
power purchase agreements with the winners. Development Company
submitted proposals for five solar projects; none were selected.
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Development Company sued DEEP, alleging that implementation of the
Statute effectively fixed wholesale energy prices and was preempted by the
Federal Power Act (“FPA”). Development Company sought to void the
contracts with the chosen projects and further sought to enjoin DEEP from
violating the FPA or the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act
(“PURPA”). There was a question as to whether Development Company
had standing, which was ruled in the affirmative by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. Still, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s
decision to dismiss Development Company’s complaint. The court found
that the Statute’s authorization of DEEP to direct utilities to enter into
contracts did not amount to compulsion and, therefore, did not violate the
FPA. Regarding Development Company’s preemption claim, the appellate
court found that State had the regulatory power to specify the sizes and
types of generators that may bid into the 2015 request for proposal, and,
furthermore, incidental effects on wholesale prices did not amount to a
regulation of the interstate wholesale electricity market that would infringe
on FERC’s jurisdiction. Regarding Development Company’s dormant
commerce clause claim, the appellate court rejected the claim of
discrimination against two of its facilities for two reasons. First, the court
found that DEEP’s rejection of another state’s renewable energy certificate
simply had an indirect effect of interstate commerce. Second, the court
found that Company failed to show that the charged it alleged were
discriminatory were anything more than use fees. This case has since been
appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.
Forth Circuit
City of Rockingham v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 15-2535,
2017 WL 2875112 (4th Cir. July 6, 2017).
Anticipating expiration of its license, Operator filed a renewal application
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for its two
North Carolina hydroelectric facilities. After FERC issued its “Order
Issuing New License” to Operator, City filed a petition for review claiming
that FERC violated the: (1) Federal Power Act (“FPA”); (2) the National
Environment Policy Act (“NEPA”); and (3) the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”). First, City does not claim that FERC’s order falls outside its
discretion pursuant to the FPA, it only claims that its preferences for what
should have been in FERC’s order were not properly considered. However,
because City’s preferences were not specifically required by law and FERC
sufficiently addressed City’s concerns in its order and elsewhere, the court
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reasoned that FERC did not violate the FPA. Additionally, several of the
conclusions made by FERC in its order were made with scientific
expertise., which the court readily deferred to. Second, City failed to prove
FERC violated NEPA because it conceded that FERC’s “considered and
rejected” it’s proposal regarding water flow that City now requests be
reviewed. Third, the court reasoned that FERC did not violate the ESA
because FERC’s choice to use a particular type of analysis falls squarely
within its discretion and such a “scientific determination” is not a decision
the court was willing to make. Further, FERC’s decision to not consider
City’s alternative plan for minimum water flow was not found to be
arbitrary and capricious. Ultimately, because City failed to prove the
violations of law it claims FERC made and review of the order is therefore
denied. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. This case has
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.
Renewable Generation - State
Alaska
Daggett v. Feeney, 397 P.3d 297 (Alaska 2017).
Landowner cancelled a Contract with Renewable Energy Contractor
(“Contractor”) to install wind turbines on his property after discovering that
it would violate subdivision’s land-use covenant. The Contract expressly
held that Contractor would be responsible for all permits, variances, and
height restriction waivers. Landowner sued to rescind the Contract and to
recover his down payment to Contractor. The lower court found that
Contractor was not properly licensed and Landowner was entitled to
rescission for misrepresentation. Additionally, the court awarded damages
to Landowner minus Contractor’s equitable setoff. After Contractor failed
to satisfy judgment with ninety days, the lower court issued an amended
final judgment and concluded that Contractor’s successor company was
liable to Landowner. Contractor appealed and Landowner cross-appealed
the determination of the setoff amount. The Supreme Court of Alaska held
that the lower court had clearly erred in its the setoff calculation because it
used what was supposedly paid and not the lower wholesale price actually
paid by Contractor. While Contractor was entitled to offset its cost, the
court concluded, it could only do so to the “extent that their costs are
greater than the profit they gained.” Therefore, the court reversed and
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remanded to the lower court to determine the setoff amount, and affirmed
the remaining judgements.
Pennsylvania
Hommrich v. Commonwealth, No. 674 M.D. 2016, 2017 WL 3203437 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. July 28, 2017).
Resident sought to develop alternative renewable energy assets, specifically
solar facilities, for his own use and for the benefit of himself and his heirs.
He planned to build one facility per year between 2017 and 2019, each
facility having a nameplate capacity of 3,000 kilowatts in size. The
proposed projects were within the service territory of Pennsylvania's
electric distribution companies (“EDCs”). The General Assembly
authorized Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) to develop technical and net
metering interconnection rules under state law. Resident claimed that PUC
exceeded its statutory authority by deciding eligibility for net metering,
arguing that his proposed projects qualify for net metering under the state
law but could be disapproved under PUC's imposition of new regulatory
definitions and review process. This regulatory threat, Resident argued,
would prevent investors and lenders from even participating in the due
diligence phase, thus preventing him from obtaining funding for his
projects. PUC responded with preliminary objections, asserting that the
regulations have no direct and immediate effect on Resident. The court
sustained PUC's preliminary objection for legal insufficiency, reasoning
that Resident did not allege how the application of the regulations against
the existing projects would cause him present harm to justify bypassing the
normal post-enforcement review process.
Vermont
In re New Haven GLC Solar, LLC, 2017 VT 72, SUPREME COURT
DOCKET NO. 2016-125, 2017 WL 3668583.
Town appealed decision of the Public Service Board (“Board”), which had
issued a certificate of public good (“CPG”) to Company for construction of
a net-metered solar array within Town. Town asserted that Board acted in
excess of its authority by issuing the CPG without: (1) holding a hearing on
issues raised by Town; (2) giving due consideration to Town’s
recommendations or Town plan; and (3) following its own mandatory
regulations on interconnection procedures. The Supreme Court of Vermont
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held that while Board was required to hold a technical hearing to consider
the project’s ability to interconnect with the existing system, it was not
required to hold a hearing based on Town’s general objections. The court
reversed the Board’s CPG issuance and remanded to consider Town’s
comments.
In re Programmatic Changes to Standard-Offer Program & Investigation
into Establishment of Standard-Offer Prices, 2017 VT 77, Case No. 2016399, 2017 WL 3662392.
Applicant appealed State Board’s denial of a motion to reconsider
following the decision of State Board to award standard offer contract to
five wind projects and two solar projects. Applicant argued on appeal that
State Board was required to award standard-offer contracts to several solar
projects because they provided sufficient benefits to the operation of State’s
electric grid, as noted in state statute. The Supreme Court of Vermont held
that because Applicant’s claims related to benefits to the electrical grid
were not raised or decided previously, the court must decline to address
them on appeal. The court concluded that State Board did not err in denying
Applicant’s motion of reconsideration.
Rate Case – Federal
Sixth Circuit
MISO Transmission Owners v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 860 F.3d
837 (6th Cir. 2017).
Members of an association of public utilities (“Members”) petitioned for
review orders of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) that
permitted two departing utility members to not pay costs under provisions
of Tariff for projects that an independent system operator approved after
announcement of their departure but before they left. On appeal, Members
claim that FERC’s interpretation of the Tariff was incorrect and did not
align with the rational of its prior orders. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed FERC’s interpretation based on several findings. First,
based on the language of the Tariff, departing utility members had no
monetary obligations when they left because construction of projects had
not begun. Second, departing utility members could not be responsible for
future costs after departure because the Tariff reallocates costs annually to
members based on energy withdrawn. Third, prior orders of FERC related
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to projects that preceded the existence of current projects, and thus could
not conflict with the orders in this case. The court denied Members’ petition
for review.
D.C. Circuit
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 860 F.3d 691
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
Louisiana Public Service Commission (“LPSC”) petitioned the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals to review the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) “bandwidth remedy” which outlined
the maximum difference of production costs for several energy-producing
companies. LPSC made a complaint to FERC that because energy
companies in different states use different depreciation rates to calculate
their production costs, Louisiana customers were put at a disadvantage
because other states used depreciation rates in a way that was “unjust,
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential.” FERC did not agree
with LPSC’s arguments and continued use of the “bandwidth remedy.”
LPSC makes three arguments which are reviewed on an arbitrary and
capricious standard—thus affording FERC substantial deference. First, that
FERC did not give appropriate consideration to evidence submitted by
LPSC regarding undue discrimination for Louisiana customers under the
“bandwidth formula.” Although, LPSC sufficiently demonstrated that states
use different depreciation rates, FERC considered this issue and determined
LPSC did not meet its burden, which meets this court’s requirement that the
evidence be confronted. Second, FERC did not depart from its own rules
requiring it use its own depreciation rates because it was only overseeing
the “bandwidth agreement”—not engaging in ratemaking itself. Finally,
FERC did not unlawfully delegate its jurisdiction over wholesale rates
because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear on this same
argument because it has lawfully “exercised, and intends to exercise its . . .
review authority.” For these reasons, the appellate court denied LPSC’s
petition for review.
Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 861 F.3d
230 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Electrical Cooperative claimed Power Company overcharged it for
electricity. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) accordingly
ordered a refund, but Electrical Cooperative claims it was entitled to a
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larger refund for overcharges arising out of Power Company’s applied rate.
Electrical Cooperative alleged that Power Company violated Schedule 4 of
the tariff governing rates that Power Company may charge. Electrical
Cooperative claimed that: (1) FERC improperly interpreted the twentyfour-month time-bar provision in the service agreement to limit Power
Company’s refund liability; and (2) that Schedule 4 of the tariff required
Power Company to use apportionment, rather than non-apportionment, to
calculate Electrical Cooperative’s charges. The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held that; (1) FERC was correct in concluding that the
service agreement between parties required Electrical Cooperative to make
any challenges within twenty-four months of receiving the bill; and (2)
FERC was reasonable in interpreting ambiguity in tariff to allow Power
Company to use non-apportionment to charge Electrical Cooperative for
deviating from scheduled usage because the text of the tariff did not compel
apportionment. Thus, the appellate court denied Electrical Cooperative’s
petition for review.
Rate Case – State
California
Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara, 397 P.3d 210 (Cal. 2017).
City imposed a surcharge on electricity bills, which Consumers challenged.
Consumers argued that the surcharge is an improper tax, because it was not
approved via community-wide vote. The Supreme Court of California
determined the surcharge qualified as “compensation for use of government
property” rather than a tax. The court holds that Proposition 218, which
Consumers rest their argument on, does not place restrictions on City’s
ability or authority to gather payment for selling or leasing City property, as
long as the compensation is reasonably proportional to the value of the
property interest conveyed. If it is disproportionate, then it is considered a
tax, but the court held this fee is not disproportionate. The court asserts that
Proposition 218 does not actually impose any limitations on fees, only on
taxes. The court determined that the restrictions are mainly in place to
combat abuse, so they only limit disproportionate, outrageous fees. The
court overturned the appellate court’s order supporting summary
adjudication for Consumers, but affirms the appellate court’s reversal of the
grant of City’s motion for judgment.
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Russell City Energy Co. v. City of Hayward, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 162 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2017).
Utility formed a Cooperation and Option Agreement (“Agreement”) with
Municipality in 2005 to facilitate the construction and operation of
Operator’s power plant. Agreement contained a Payments Clause that stated
Municipality was prohibited from imposing any taxes on the “development,
construction, ownership and operation” of Utility’s power plant except
those taxes linked to the ownership of real property. In 2009, voters
approved a Utility Users Tax Ordinance (“Utility Tax”) on the usage of
electricity and gas. In 2011, Municipality informed Utility that it had to pay
the Utility Tax. In 2014, Utility filed a claim against Municipality for
breach of contract. Municipality argued that the Payments Clause violated
article XIII, section 31 of the California Constitution. Section 31 states that
the power to tax may not be surrendered by contract. Utility argued that the
Payments Clause should be interpreted as a PILOT (payment in lieu of
taxes) agreement and is an exercise of Municipality’s taxing power.
However, the court found, and Utility conceded, that the complaint does not
refer to the Payments Clause as a PILOT agreement and should be
interpreted as claimed. Additionally, the court concluded that the Payments
Clause, whether interpreted as stated or as a PILOT agreement, violated
section 31 and is therefore invalid and unconstitutional. However, the court
did conclude that Utility should be allowed to amend its complaint to allege
a quasi-contractual restitution claim.
Colorado
Carestream Health, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2017 CO 75.
A health corporation (“Corporation”) was a customer of the Public Service
Company of Colorado (“Provider”). Though Corporation was a new
customer, Provider used information from the previous customer’s meter to
calculate Corporation’s energy usage resulting in an underreport of about
15%. When Provider realized the mistake three years later and attempted to
back-bill Corporation for the resulting $716,919.71, Corporation filed a
formal complaint with Provider stating that although Provider’s tariff
allows it to recover for billing errors, it is required to “exercise all
reasonable means to assure accurate computation of all bills for gas
service,” which Corporation argued it did not. Upon a formal hearing, an
ALJ determined that Corporation’s complaint should be denied because it
failed to prove a direct violation of a tariff provision. Corporation’s
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exceptions to the decision were denied by Provider which stated that
“[Corporation] did not provide sufficient evidence from which it can be
concluded that [Provider] should have foreseen the problem and thereby
taken reasonable means to prevent it,” and that decision was affirmed in a
district court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado agreed with
Provider and the district court and compounded that the language “all
reasonable means” as read in the tariff meant that rather than requiring
some bright-line rule, the tariff called for appropriate measures to be taken
given the circumstances; wherein Provider served millions of customers
and could not be expected to prevent unforeseeable errors. The court
determined that the tariff correctly contemplated this issue by realizing that
undercharges were inevitable and creating a policy to back-bill customers to
make up for these mistakes. The court also noted that “[a] foreseeability
requirement confines the inquiry to those errors [Provider] could have taken
reasonable steps to avoid.”
Massachusetts
Energy Express, Inc. v. Dept. of Pub. Util., 80 N.E.3d 309 (Mass. 2017).
Because of the unbundling process that took place in Massachusetts in the
1990s, some consumers began purchasing their gas from one entity (a
marketer) and having it transported to them by another (a local distribution
company). Here, Marketer of natural gas, competing as a supplier of natural
gas in the Commonwealth, requested a proportional share of Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s ("FERC") ordered pipeline-rate refunds
that Local Distribution Company ("Company") received and had to pass on
to its customers under an order from the Department of Public Utilities. The
issue in this case was whether the assignment of pipeline capacity by
Company to Marketer causes Marketer to become a "customer" of
Company, such that Marketer is entitled to a share of that refund under
State law. The Supreme Judicial Court accepted the conclusion that only an
end consumer, not Marketer, is entitled to the refund. It held that Marketer
was not Company's customer and did not actually consume the gas, so it did
not qualify it for the department-ordered refunds. However, the court noted
that the department-ordered refunds to Marketer's customers, rather than
Marketer, did not violate the filed-rate doctrine, which requires that
interstate power rates filed with FERC must be given binding effect by
State utility commissions determining intrastate rates.
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Ohio
In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., 150 Ohio St. 3d 437, 2017-Ohio-5536, 82
N.E.3d 1148.
Utility Company’s predecessor operated one or two manufactured-gas-plant
sites, making Utility Company liable for remediation of those sites under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”). After a third party purchased one of the sites and
announced plans to construct a residential development on the land, Utility
Company initiated remediation of both sites through the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency’s Voluntary Action Program. Utility
Company then applied to the Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”)
to have its future remediation costs deferred. Commission granted the
application without determining whether Utility Company could recover its
deferred costs before filing an application for cost recovery. Utility
Company then applied to increase its natural gas distribution rates and to
recover its deferred costs. Commission authorized Utility Company to
recover its remediation costs, holding that while shareholders should bear
some responsibility, Utility Company instituting a “Rider MGP” to recover
costs from ratepayers on a per-bill basis is appropriate under state law.
Ratepayers appealed the decision of Commission. The Ohio Supreme Court
held that: (1) Commission was correct to refuse to apply the “used-anduseful standard” because Utility Company sought to recover costs for
environmental remediation not capital investment, and (2) Commission did
find a relationship between Utility Company’s recovery of remediation
costs related to manufactured-gas-plant sites and its current distribution
service provision, thus it is proper to allow Utility Company to recover
those remediation costs from current distribution customers. The court held
that Ratepayers were required to demonstrate Commission’s order was
either unjust, unreasonable, or unlawful, and that it failed to do so.
Accordingly, the court affirmed Commission’s order.
Virginia
Old Dominion Comm. for Fair Utility Rates v. State Corp. Comm’n, 803
S.E.2d 758 (Va. 2017).
State Corporation Commission (“Commission”), regulates electric company
rates, and reviews occur every two years. During this biennial review, “the
Commission considers the company's rates, terms, and conditions for the
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provision of generation, distribution and transmission services for the
preceding two years.”. In 2015, the state legislature enacted legislation
which suspended Appalachian Power Company's (“APCO”) biennial
reviews until 2020 (to review 2018–2019) and prohibited Commission from
adjusting APCO's base rates for any part of this interim period, except for
possible temporary, emergency increases requested by APCO. This
essentially effected a four-year base rate freeze for APCO. An association
of large industrial customers of APCO (“Association”), filed a petition
asking the court for: (1) a declaratory judgment that legislation violates the
state constitution and, accordingly, that APCO is to make biennial review
filings in 2016 and 2018 and (2) an order directing APCO to make such
filings. Association asserted that state constitution does not grant the
legislature the power to transfer the Commission’s ratemaking authority to
itself and that this legislation does just that. Commission stated instead that
the constitution was not intended to bequeath to it a plenary power to
legislate that is exclusive and superior to that of the legislature as
Association implied. The Supreme Court of Virginia stated the same and
upheld Commission’s decision that the legislation is constitutional.
Washington
King County v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, Case No. 49347-1II, 2017 WL 3601890 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2017).
County appealed Commission’s order that denied County a declaration that
Utility Company was obligated to replace an electrical extension line and
recover replacement costs through customer rates. County argued that
Commission’s order was erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious because it: (1)
found that the electrical extensions line was not a part of the Utility
Company’s general distribution system (2) misinterpreted Utility
Company’s service agreement with County; (3) considered Utility
Company’s economic feasibility; and (4) applied a fact-based analysis.
County further argued that the order was discriminatory because it granted
undue preference to Schedule 24 customers and resulted in rate
discrimination. The trial court affirmed Commission’s order. On appeal, the
appellate court held that the order was neither erroneous, arbitrary, or
capricious because it was not willful and unreasoning or taken without
regard to the attending facts and circumstances. The court declined to
review the discrimination issue because there was no actual or existing
dispute regarding a discriminatory effect of any rate requiring County to
replace the electrical extension line.
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Transmission - Federal
D.C. Circuit
Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 860 F.3d
656 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Organizations objected to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
(“FERC”) approval of revisions to the rules governing the capacity markets
operated by a regional transmission organization. The regional transmission
organization wanted to ensure organizations that made capacity
commitments in the capacity market provided electricity when their
capacity was needed, so the regional transmission organization received
approval of revised capacity market rules to FERC. After approval by
FERC, Organizations raised numerous challenges on appeal to the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. First, it claimed that FERC did not
adequately consider the increased costs of the new rules being just and
reasonable under the Federal Power Act (“Act”). The court held that FERC
properly weighed the various costs and benefits of the new rules prior to
approval. Next, the court deferred to FERC’s determination that some of
the proposed rules were reasonable and just while also determining that
some of the prior rules were unreasonable and unjust under the Act. The
court also deferred to FERC’s finding that the penalties a resource will face
if it fails to fulfil its capacity commitment are not too low and inadequate to
ensure performance by all resources. Additionally, the court deferred to
FERC’s finding that the default offer cap in the capacity market was
appropriate. The new rules also allowed bids from non-year-round
resources to pair up together in the capacity market, but year-round
resources were forbidden from doing so. Organizations claimed this
aggregate offer accommodation imposed undue discrimination, but FERC
did not believe there was undue discrimination and the court agreed. The
court also rejected a claim that FERC accepted the rules without adequate
explanation by the regional transmission organization. Lastly, the court
agreed with FERC that capacity performance penalties were acceptable
even when operating limits caused non-performance in the capacity market.
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S.D. California
Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Case No.: 15CV-1576-AJB-RBB, 2017 WL 4228832 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).
The dispute centered on access to California’s electric transmission grid.
Imperial Irrigation District’s (“IID”) alleged that California Independent
System Operator Corporation’s (“CAISO”) duped IID into incurring
millions of dollars in expenses and then used IID’s facilities, without
authorization, to import substantial out-of-state power. IID alleged that this
unauthorized use of its facilities rendered such use unavailable to IID and
the entities it served. Also, IID asserted that those burdens ultimately
affected the rates passed onto the public. So, IID filed suit alleging
conversion and a claim under California’s unfair competition law (“UCL”).
CAISO moved for judgment on the pleadings. CAISO argued that the
conversion claim failed because conversion only applied to personal
property, and transmission lines are real property. Furthermore, CAISO
argued that the unfair UCL claim must fail because there was no harm to
competition based only on the increase in prices. Before the record before
it, the court could not determine whether the transmission lines were real or
personal property, and thus denied CAISO’s motion to this claim. Next,
CAISO argued that injury to a competitor is not injury to competition, and
an increase in consumer prices is insufficient to show harm to competition.
However, as the court pointed out, this argument ignored that when these
two categories of allegations are coupled, they can state an “antitrust injury
or an injury the antitrust laws were designed to prevent” and, thus an unfair
UCL claim. Therefore, CAISO’s motion was denied on this claim. Also, the
court found it appropriate to allow IID to amend its complaint because it
had done so only once before, and granting the request would not delay the
proceedings because they were still in the early stages.
Transmission – State
Illinois
Illinois Landowners All., NFP v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2017 IL
121302.
Illinois Commerce Commission (“Commission”) granted a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to Company for a project to construct
power transmission lines to connect with wind generation facilities. Various
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parties sought administrative review. The appellate court reversed finding
that because Company could not meet the requirements of Illinois’s Public
Utilities Act (“Act”) to qualify as a public utility, the Commission had no
legal authority to issue Company a certificate of public convenience and
necessity. Commission, Company, and others appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court alleging the appellate court: (1) “adopted an unreasonable
and erroneous construction and application of the governing statutes”; (2)
did not follow recognized principles of administrative review; and (3)
usurped the power of the Commission in the regulatory process. The court
concluded that to qualify as a public utility under the Act, a company must
presently own, control, operate, or manage a plant, equipment, or property
associated with the transmission of power. As such, the court held that
Company lacked ownership to qualify as a public utility and was ineligible
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity granted by
Commission. Thus, the court affirmed the appellate court’s decision.
Indiana
NIPSCO Indus. Group v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 78 N.E.3d 730 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2017).
Utility brought action against Regulatory Commission appealing
Regulatory Commission’s enactment of a state statute that designated
improvements to gas transmission, distribution, and storage systems
through a seven-year plan. Utility estimated the plan to exceed projected
estimated capital costs by $149.1 million and filed an appeal, which the
court found to be lacking in sufficient detail regarding whether the
proposed plan was “reasonable” and a “best estimate of the cost” of the
improvements. Utility argued on appeal that Regulatory Commission erred
in approving the fourth proposed plan. The appellate court found
Regulatory Commission to have erred in approving the fourth plan, holding
that the updated plan did not include new projects and that the subsequent
identifying of improvements that had been previously approved by
Regulatory Commission was proper.
New Jersey
Cty. of Cumberland v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., No. C-70-15, 2017 WL
2797431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 28, 2017).
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County sued Electric Company to pay for the movement of high-voltage
power lines that were in the way of County’s courthouse improvement
project. The Law Division judge ordered that Electric Company show cause
for why it should not pay to move the lines. Electric Company answered,
counterclaimed against County, and named Contractor as a third-party
defendant. The judge heard arguments from all parties and ruled that
Electric Company was responsible for bearing the cost of the movement of
the lines because under the common law a public utility is financially
responsible for relocation in return for the allowance to use the public rightof-way. Electric Company appealed the judgment. On appeal, the appellate
court reversed the lower court and held that precedents only require a public
utility company to bear the costs of moving power lines if the government
is engaging in a road widening project, therefore Contractor must pay the
cost of moving the lines even if the costs end up being shifted to County by
Contractor. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS
Merger and Acquisition
D.C. Circuit
Office of the People’s Counsel v. Pub. Service Comm’n, 163 A. 3d 735
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
In June 2014, various related entities (“Companies”) requested a merger
approval from the Public Service Commission (“PCS”). After multiple
community hearings and evidentiary hearings, PCS concluded the merger
was not in the public interest in August 2015. Just two months later,
Companies moved to reopen the record where PCS would consider a NonUnanimous Settlement Agreement (“NSA”) executed by Companies, the
Office of the People’s Counsel (“OPC”) and several other parties. PCS
agreed to consider the NSA, reopened the record, and held multiple
hearings, after which it determined the NSA was still not in the public
interest in February 2016. One PCS Commissioner concurred with the
decision and proposed a Revised NSA (“RNSA”) that she believed would
be in the public interest and Companies were instructed to file a notice with
PCS indicating their opinion concerning the RNSA or instead to request
further relief. When they did neither, PCS approved the merger under the
terms of the RNSA and denied Companies’ resulting application for
reconsideration. Companies brought the matter to the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals on grounds that PCS made procedural errors,
exceeded its statutory authority, approved merger terms that are contrary to
law or unreasonable, did not clearly explain its reasoning, and failed to
make an independent finding that the merger was in the public interest.
Upon appeal, the court determined that PCS’s legal conclusions were
reasonable and based upon factors within its expertise. Specifically, the
court concluded that rejection of the NSA was made upon logical reasoning
and with a proper consideration of alternatives, namely the RNSA, and that
the explanation of the decision was reasonable and sufficient when
considering the extensive proceedings involved in considering the merger.
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Patent Issues – Federal
Federal Circuit
In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Company appealed decision of United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) Patent and Trial Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming Examiners
rejection of Company’s patent claims. The claims were for an expandable
tool used for drilling oil and gas wells. The case turned on the proper
interpretation of the term “body.” The PTO Examiner rejected the claims,
determining that “body,” as read in the context of the claims, referred to
multiple components of the tool, meaning there is no definition or limiting
features of the term “body.” Board affirmed PTO Examiner’s rejection of
the claims based on the broad reading of the term “body.” The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Board’s interpretation was
unreasonably broad, holding that Company’s failure to expressly define the
term “body” in its claims did not preclude Company’s interpretation of the
term—that it does not include other separately identified components. For
that reason, the court reversed the Board’s rejections of the appealed
claims.
E.D. Louisiana
Wright’s Well Control Servs., LLC v. Oceaneering Int’l, Inc., CIVIL
ACTION NO. 15-1720, 2017 WL 3706344 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2017)
This case involves Patent Holder’s motion for summary judgment against
Company for infringing on one of its patents and Company’s partial motion
for summary judgment. Patent Holder and Company are both involved in
providing “hydrate remediation services for the oil and gas industry” and
Patent Holder developed a system that remediates hydrates “from subsea,
deepwater pipelines.” The court granted Patent Holder’s motion for partial
summary judgement which, in turn, dismissed Patent Holder’s patent
infringement claim. The court came to this conclusion by first determining
that because this is a method claim, Patent Holder must first demonstrate
that Company used the patented method. Consequently, because Patent
Holder failed to prove “use,” it legally cannot prove infringement of its
patent.
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E.D. Texas
Effective Expl., LLC v. Bluestone Nat. Res. II, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-00607JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 3193322 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 2017).
Patent Applicant-1 (“Applicant-1”) and Patent Applicant-2 (“Applicant-2”)
filed claims disputing the meaning of several terms used in a patent (“840
Patent”). Applicants made eight claims, and court found as follows. First, in
construing the phrase “subterranean zone or shale” and “wherein the
subterranean zone is shale,” the court applied the plain language of the 840
Patent and construed these terms to mean “the depth interval includes one
or more layers of rock composed primarily of shale and is in the aggregate
composed primarily of shale.” Second, the second disputed phrase, “a . . .
wellbore extending from the surface . . . and a . . . substantially horizontal
drainage bore,” carries the plain meaning of the language used in the 840
Patent. Third, the phrase “proximate to the subterranean zone” means “in or
near the subterranean zone” as depicted in the figures and as the most
common and ordinary meaning of the word “proximate.” Forth, the phrase
“extended in the subterranean zone in different directions of each other”
means “in different drainage regions within the subterranean zone.” Fifth,
the phrase “extend in substantially opposite directions” was insufficient to
“inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope
of the invention” and, thus, the meaning was indefinite. Sixth, that
“different types of measurements or measurement locations could lead to
different results.” And finally, the word “cavity” carries its plain and
ordinary meaning as the specification did not support either of the
Applicant’s proposed constructions.
Other Issues – Federal
First Circuit
Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co. v. United States, 871 F.3d 131 (1st Cir. 2017).
Insurance Company sued Marine Company and United States under the Oil
Pollution Act (“OPA”) to recover monies paid to reimburse an insured’s
cleanup costs that resulted from a ship’s oil spill. Insurance Company also
sued for negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to United
States and Marine Company; it also dismissed Insurance Company’s
negligence claim sua sponte. Insurance Company appealed. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court did not err by

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

1112

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

considering documents outside the pleadings – a contract between United
States and Marine Company – when it decided United States’ motion to
dismiss, because the OPA exempts public vessels from liability, and the
contract was necessary to make such determination. The court further held
that the ship was “operated” by the United States because Marine Company
was acting under the operational control of United States. Additionally, the
court reinstated Insurance Company’s negligence claim against United
States, holding that the OPA did not affect admiralty and maritime law as
applied to public vessels prior to the OPA’s enactment. However, as a
result, the negligence claim against Marine Company could not stand due to
the Suits in Admiralty Act’s exclusivity provision, which stated that “if a
remedy is provided by this chapter, it shall be exclusive of any other action
arising out of the same subject matter against the . . . agent of the United
States . . . whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.”
Third Circuit
In re Semcrude L.P., 864 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2017).
Midstream Company had bankruptcy protection agreements with
Purchasers, but not Producers. Subsequently, when Midstream Company
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Purchasers were paid in full, but Producers
were only paid in part. The Bankruptcy Court recommended summary
judgment in favor of Purchasers because the oil was purchased free of any
security interest either as: (1) buyers for value or (2) buyers in the ordinary
course. The district court overruled Producers’ objections to the
recommendation and granted summary judgment to Purchasers. On appeal,
the Third Circuit held that Texas and Kansas Producers cannot rely on the
Uniform Commercial Code’s (“U.C.C.”) language granting Producers an
automatically perfected security interest which would require Purchasers to
pay off Producers’ liens. The court held that this reliance on the U.C.C. was
improper because: (1) the security interests were not perfected;(2)
Purchasers bought the oil from Midstream Company, qualifying them as
“buyers for value”; and (3) Purchasers did not have knowledge of the
Producers’ security interests. The court also rejected Producers’ claims of
fraud for lack of evidence. Purchasers invested heavily in premiums to
secure a price in oil and protect themselves against an oil-price increase.
The fact that Midstream Company did the opposite was a risky strategy that
did not pay off does not demonstrate that Purchasers ever intended to take
oil from the Producers without payment. Additionally, Oklahoma Producers
cannot rely on the Oklahoma state law that Producers claim implied a trust-
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like relationship between all oil producers and any downstream purchasers.
The Third Circuit refused to extend this trust-like relationship to “anyone
who has unwittingly filled a gas tank with Oklahoma-produced oil.” The
court affirmed the ruling of the district court, and upheld summary
judgment for Purchasers.
Fifth Circuit
United States v. Third Coast Towing, LLC, CAUSE NO. 3:16-CV-34CWR-FKB, 2017 WL 4051766 (5th Cir. Sep. 12, 2017).
The United States sued Barge Owner (“Owner”), Tug Boat Operator
(“Operator”), and Insurer under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”)
following an accident involving a tug pushing a barge that struck a bridge
spilling oil into the Mississippi River. The United States sued for “oil spill
removal costs and civil penalties.” Before the court is Operator and third
party’s motion in limine, their motion for summary judgment, and the
United States’ motion for partial summary judgment. Predominantly, the
parties disagreed about who is liable for the removal costs and damages.
The court granted United States’ motion and denied the others. First, the
court noted that the OPA creates strict liability for the “responsible party”
which is statutorily defined as “any person owning, operating, or demise
chartering the vessel.” Because this language is rather vague, the court
turned to the Coast Guard’s analysis on the common understating of what it
means to “operate.” In this case, because the tug had control over the
barge’s movement, it was determined that it was the “operator.” Therefore,
it is liable for more of the removal costs and does not enjoy compensation
from the OPA’s oil spill trust fund. Second, because this court found
Operator liable, the issue of whether it waived reimbursement is irrelevant.
Finally, the administrative record, including the Coast Guard’s finding that
Operator is not entitled to reimbursement will not be stricken because there
is no authority to do so and Operator failed to show that the disputed
portions of the administrative record are material. This case has since been
appealed, but there is no decision form the higher court as of publication.
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C.D. Illinois
Monsanto Prod. Supply L.L.C. v. Rosentreter, No. 3:16-cv-03038, 2017
WL 4284566 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017).
Production Company sued Farmer for patent infringement of its seeds,
which contained Production Company’s biotechnology, and sought a
permanent injunction. The court granted the permanent injunction, holding
that: (1) Production Company would suffer irreparable harm because
infringement of seeds could cause widespread proliferation of Production
Company’s technology; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law because
Farmer is likely to continue infringing on Production Company’s patent
without a permanent injunction, which would require a multiplicity of
lawsuits; (3) the balance of hardships weighs in favor of granting the
permanent injunction because Farmer would still be able to farm without
using Production Company’s technology, it does not create a new burden
on Farmer, and Production Company would be prevented from fully
protecting its intellectual property without the injunction; and, (4) no public
interest would be disserved by the injunction. The court awarded
compensatory damages based on a hypothetical contractual price.
Furthermore, due to the willful nature of Farmer’s infringement and
Farmer’s litigation misconduct, the court held that enhancements and
attorney fees and costs were warranted. The court also awarded
prejudgment interest to accrue from the date on which Farmer should have
made royalty payments.
E.D. Louisiana
Wolverine Indus., LLC v. Monforte Expl., LLC, CIV. ACTION NO: 1614691, 2017 WL 2599211 (E.D. La. June 15, 2017).
Company sued Operator alleging that Operator had failed to pay Company
over $460,000 for labor, services, equipment, and supplies used in drilling
two oil wells. Company moved for summary judgment on the theory of an
open account. The court found that Company’s submission of invoices sent
to Operator seeking payment could not establish the existence of an open
account. Operator’s denial of the existence of an open account creates a
material issue of fact; summary judgment, therefore, was improper.
Company’s other theory for summary judgment rested on the recognition of
its privilege on the two wells pursuant to the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act
(“LOWLA”). Operator claimed that LOWLA did not apply to the oil wells
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at issue, because the wells were located on the Outer Continental Shelf
(“OCS”), and exclusively regulated by federal law. The court held that
because Louisiana is an adjacent State to the OCS, State law is applicable
as surrogate law so long as it is not inconsistent with federal law. Therefore,
Company can qualify as a contractor or laborer under LOWLA, but that
alone cannot entitle Company to summary judgment. Company failed to
prove the existence of a contract between the parties showing Operator
owes an obligation. Because no obligation had been established, the court
denied Company’s motion for summary judgment.
N.D. California
Oster v. Caithness Corp., Case No. 16-cv-03164-WHO, 2017 WL 3727174
(N.D. Cal Aug. 30, 2017).
Employee brought an action against her former Employer alleging that she
is entitled to invest in an energy project but was denied. The court affirmed
Employer’s motion for summary judgment because Employee failed to: (1)
establish that a contract existed; (2) establish fraud and misrepresentation;
and (3) prove promissory estoppel. Employer is an energy corporation.
Employer approached Employee regarding the Vice President position.
Before accepting, Employee requested to become a partner. Employer said
not right away, but mentioned she could have a potential opportunity to
become an investor in the projects she worked on. Employee accepted the
Vice President position. The employment agreement outlined the salary and
the target performance bonus and job benefits. Employer offered Employee
the opportunity to invest in a specific project. Employee did not receive any
details or any paperwork regarding the equity investment. Employer stated
that if Employee won the bid on the project then she could invest. She did
not win the bid and never received paperwork regarding the bid. At
different times Employer mentioned that “she would have the opportunity
or right to invest” but nothing official happened, no terms were agreed
upon, and no paperwork drafted. The court found that Employee failed to
demonstrate she reasonably relied upon any promise to her detriment made
before or after her employment with Employer. Therefore, the district court
granted Employer’s motion for summary judgment on all issues. This case
has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.
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S.D. New York
Schiller v. Duthie, No. 15-CV-4933 (CS), 2017 WL 3726993 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2017).
Energy Service Consultant (“ESC”) brings an antitrust and conspiracy
action against multiple Energy Service Consultants (“Consultants”). To
survive a motion to dismiss by Consultants, ESC must describe the
applicable geographic market, assert an antitrust injury, and assert behavior
in violation of antitrust laws. Consultants filed a motion to dismiss stating
that ESC did not allege an antitrust injury. ESC alleged four alternative
theories for an antitrust injury. First, ESC alleged that it is competitors of
Consultants and Consultants actions made the market less competitive.
Second, ESC alleged that it competes in a market in which it is
subcontractors of its energy suppliers. Third, ESC alleged that Consultants
participated in a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. ESC did not elaborate how this
theory constitutes an injury to ESC. Fourth, ESC contended that its injuries
were “inexplicably intertwined” with the injuries of market participants.
However, after analyzing the four theories presented, the court concluded
that ESC did not satisfy the injury requirement of an antitrust claim. ESC
also alleged that Consultants conspired with a Municipality to publicly
discredit and defame ESC in retaliation for challenging Municipality’s
conduct. The court determined that while ESC did sufficiently allege a
conspiracy against Municipality, ESC did not plausibly allege a conspiracy
claim against Consultants. The court concluded that ESC did not assert any
facts to support that there was an agreement or meeting of the minds among
Consultants and the mere fact that Consultants were involved in the
incident with Municipality does not establish a conspiracy.
W.D. Louisiana
Hilcorp Energy Co. v. JP Oil Co., No. 6:16CV0598, 2017 WL 3528865
(W.D. La. Aug. 14, 2017).
Owner bought gas and oil leases from Seller. Pursuant to an agreement,
Owner agreed to indemnify Seller for “obligations and liabilities.” Owner
then sold the same lease to Buyer. Buyer agreed to indemnify Owner for
“obligations and liabilities.” Two property owners filed law suits against
Seller alleging that oil and gas operations of Seller and Buyer had
contaminated their property. Seller requested that Owner defend and
indemnify the action. Owner did so and then requested that Buyer
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indemnify Owner. Owner filed suit against Buyer in federal court
requesting reimbursement for the $100,000 that Owner paid Seller. Each
side filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted Owner’s
motion for summary judgment finding that the assignment sale was clear as
to the terms and Buyer agreed indemnify Owner for “obligations and
liabilities” arising from the leases. The court reasoned that broad
indemnification terms did not preclude this action because the language in
the assignment of the lease to Buyer conveyed the intent of Buyer to take
over all of Owner’s obligations arising from the property.
Bankruptcy
McDermott v. Fonner (In re Fonner), 573 B.R. 741 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2017).
Bankruptcy Trustee claimed that Debtor fraudulently failed to disclose
signing bonus payments for oil and gas leases mere months prior to his
Petition for Bankruptcy. At the Creditor’s Meeting Debtor testified that his
report of assets was correct, but later acknowledged leases to the
Bankruptcy Trustee (“Trustee”). Two separate attorneys contacted Trustee
on behalf of Debtor, mentioning some, but not extensive details about the
leases and undisclosed income. Debtor was granted discharge
approximately one month later, and Trustee filed an Amended Complaint to
seek revocation of said Discharge due to Debtor’s fraud a year earlier. The
court granted the revocation for the following reasons. One is that Debtor
had a duty of candor, but failed to disclose relevant and essential
information. The court found that this negatively modified the balance
between protecting Debtor and creditors. The court found this to be
evidence that Debtor had little regard for the legal system, since he openly
defied direct advice from his trustee by cashing a check. Debtor made a
materially false statement at the Creditors’ Meeting and the court does not
believe that he could have forgotten about the lease payments in such a
short amount of time, or did not understand that he needed to disclose the
lease payments. Another reason the court found that the Trustee did not
know of the fraud prior to the discharge, so it is proper to revoke the
discharge.
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Other Issues - State
Alabama
Drummond Coal Sales, Inc. v. Kinder Morgan Operating LP “C”, No.
2:16-cv-00345-SGC, 2017 WL 3149442 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2017).
Company and Transporter entered a long-term contract (“Agreement”) to
transport coal via Transporter’s terminal. Under the Agreement, Company
must meet a minimum yearly volume of coal to be handled by Transporter’s
terminal. If the minimum volume was not met, penalties were to be paid to
Transporter. After an increase in environmental regulations on coal use, the
market for coal substantially decreased and Company was consistently
unable to fulfil the volume requirements of the contract resulting in
substantial monetary penalties. Therefore, Company sought a declaration
that it not be required to fulfil the requirements of the Agreement or face
the monetary penalties for the remainder of the contract term, citing four
claims: (1) frustration of purpose; (2) force majeure (3) impossibility or
impracticability of performance; and (4) excused performance due to
Transporter’s inability to perform. Under the Agreement, New York law
controlled. First, the district court found that frustration of purpose as
insufficient for Company’s breach because environmental regulations
affecting the market for coal were foreseeable. Second, in the analysis of
the force majeure clause of the contract the court found that after a narrow
interpretation of the clause, environmental regulations did not constitute a
force majeure event within the definition of government intervention.
Third, the court found that financial hardship and a reduction in the coal
market did not serve as grounds for applying impossibility to the contract.
Lastly, the court allowed the claim for excused performance to continue
because there was an actual dispute regarding Transporters obligations if
Company was unable to meet volume requirements and the financial
implications of not meeting those requirements.
Alaska
Comsult LLC v. Girdwood Mining Co., 397 P.3d 318 (Alaska 2017).
Corporation sued Consultant it retained to obtain new capital investments,
seeking declaratory judgment that consulting contract violated state
securities law and seeking both equitable rescission of contract and
cancellation of shares of stock and royalty interests granted under the
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contract. The trial court determined that the contract was illegal and denied
relief to both parties. Corporation appealed. The Supreme Court of Alaska
held that state law, which bars suits based on contracts that violate Alaska
securities law, did not render unenforceable stock and mineral royalty
interests stemming from illegal contract. The court reasoned that because
“both stocks and mineral royalty interests are property,” both are protected
by sources of law outside of state contract law. Therefore, Consultant owns
the stock and royalties, and its rights to enforce them remain valid.
Missouri
Union Elec. Co. v. Estes, No. WD 80659, 2017 WL 4244396 (Mo. Ct. App.
Oct. 13, 2017).
Public Utility Company (“Company”) appealed the State Tax
Commission’s (“Commission”) determination affirming valuation of
Company’s real property interest in natural gas pipeline. Tax assessors were
tasked with valuing the property at hand for tax purposes. Assessors were
given a form promulgated by Commission for guidance. This form required
considering depreciation. However, the assessors did not affirmatively
consider depreciation because they believed the figures provided to them by
Company had already factored in depreciation. Meaning, they believed that
if they had accounted for depreciation, Company would enjoy “double
depreciation.” During a hearing before Commission, however, the assessors
admitted this was not the case. Therefore, because Commission adopted a
valuation method which required accounting for depreciation, the court
determined that it was unlawful for Commission to decide which excluded
depreciation. The court’s determination stands despite a couple of the
assessor’s claims. First, even though the assessor’s expert’s valuation
comes close to the valuation including depreciation, the court found no
authority to side with assessors’ valuation method just because it was
‘close’ to a valuation method accounting for depreciation. And second,
there is no authority to support the contention that the assessors’ valuation
method is ‘correct’—it was entirely within Commission’s authority to use a
valuation method including depreciation. Because of that, however,
Commission is now legally obliged to account for depreciation.
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Texas
Tex. Black Iron, Inc. v. Arawak Energy Int’l Ltd., 527 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2017).
A Seller distributes oil and gas drilling equipment entered into a deal and
executed a purchase order with Purchaser to supply various sizes and
quantities of casing and pup joints at set prices. Purchaser prepaid $2.8
million to Seller for the services. Seller delivered nearly all the purchased
materials and refunded Purchaser $400,000 for the equipment that was
never delivered. Purchaser then returned the rest of the equipment, seeking
an additional refund of $768,304 for those materials under the buy-back
condition of the parties’ contract, but Seller did not refund any of this
amount. Purchaser filed suit against Seller in Texas district court claiming
breach of contract and suit on sworn account, also requesting a temporary
restraining order and temporary injunction against Seller. During trial, it
was asserted that Seller did not pay the additional refund because the
market was weak and it did not have the money to do so. Purchaser
requested the injunction because it was concerned that Seller might resell
the equipment to someone else while the court proceedings were being
held. The court recognized this concern and issued an injunction against
Seller and set trial for a later date. Seller appealed arguing that the trial
court abused its discretion in granting the injunction as it fails to set forth
sufficient reasoning for its issuance. The appellate court determined that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Purchaser’s probable
right to recover nor did the trial court overstep in choosing the terms of the
injunction.
Wyoming
PacifiCorp, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 2017 WY 106, 401 P.3d 905.
Utility engages in the manufacture of electricity through coal-fired
electrical generation facilities, and petitioned for judicial review of the
Board of Equalization’s (“Board”) decision affirming the Department of
Revenue’s (“Department”) denial of Utility’s exemption from sales tax on
chemicals and reagents used in the generation of electricity sold to
customers. Specifically, Utility thought it qualified for either the
manufacturers’ sales tax exemption or the wholesalers’ sales tax exemption
because it manufactured electricity and purchased its chemicals as a
wholesaler. Board found that certain chemicals, because they are not used

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss4/5

2017]

Recent Case Decisions

1121

directly to generate electricity, are not exempt from sales tax under state
statutes. Board also found that the purchases of certain chemicals and
catalysts do not constitute wholesale purchases exempt from taxation under
the statute. Utility’s sales tax refund request was denied. Department argued
that because the electricity produced by Utility contains no coal, Utility
cannot be considered a manufacturer; Department cited the definition of
manufacturing: “the raw or prepared material must be produced into a final
form of the same material.” The court found this definition and reasoning of
the Department’s to be unconvincing and held that Utility is a manufacturer
under the Wyoming statutory definition. However, the court also held that
because the chemicals used by Utility in its water and pollution control
systems are not ingredients or components of the electricity produced, they
are not subject to the manufacturers’ sales tax exemption. Finally, the court
held that because Utility does not purchase the chemicals at wholesale for
the purpose of selling them in a subsequent sale, the Board did not err when
it determined that Utility does not qualify for the wholesalers’ exemption in
this case.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

1122

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
Federal
Forth Circuit
Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 861 F.3d 529 (4th Cir. 2017).
Company brought a suit against EPA alleging violations of the Clean Air
Act (“CAA”). Company claimed that EPA failed to perform a nondiscretionary duty under CCA. The district court granted Company’s
motion for summary judgment. The CCA section at issue provides that the
“[a]dministrator shall conduct continuing evaluations of potential loss or
shifts of employment which may result from the administration or
enforcement of the provisions of this chapter.” Company requested that
EPA conduct evaluations and be prohibited from engaging in regular
activities until it conducts the evolutions. The district court ruled in favor of
Company and EPA appealed. On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the CAA provision imposed a broad, open-ended
mandate to the administration and enforcement of the CAA on a continuing
basis. Therefore, EPA is left with considerable amount of discretion in the
management under that CAA provision. The court further found that
because the provision falling under the operations of an agency the court
lacked jurisdiction because the CAA did not authorize the suit in this instant
case. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the
higher court as of publication.
Sixth Circuit
Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. McGraw-Edison Co., No. 16-1264, 2017 WL
2829379 (6th Cir. June 30, 2017).
Insurer sued Manufacturer seeking a declaration that Manufacturer released
its insurance claims regarding groundwater pollution from Manufacturer’s
wastewater-treatments system, or settling pond, at one of Manufacturer’s
battery plant. Many years earlier, there was a claim for contamination on a
separate battery plant on the same property in which the Insurer sued
Manufacturer. That suit resulted in a settlement where Manufacturer
released any claim for coverage that involved contamination from part of
that plant. Therefore, as the EPA notified Manufacturer that a local river
may be contaminated from plant operations, Insurer claimed that this
release in the earlier settlement precluded Manufacturer from making a
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claim from contamination for both plants on the property not just the one
involved in the earlier settlement. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
analyzed the settlement agreement to determine if the agreement intended
to waive claims for the entire property or just the plant involved at that
point. The court held that the agreement unambiguously referred to only the
plant involved and not all plants on Manufacturer’s property. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Newell Brands, Inc. v. Bosgraaf, Nos. 16-2331/2403, 2017 WL 2629054
(6th Cir. June 19, 2017).
Buyer bought land from Seller knowing that chemicals pollutants
contaminated the land.
Under Michigan law the prior owner of land is responsible for cleaning up
pollution. To clean up pollution Seller needed access to the land which
Buyer denied. According to state law, courts may “provide compensation to
the property owner or operator for damages related to the granting of
access.” Seller brought an action against Buyer to gain access to the land.
Buyer counterclaimed for damages for the court to grant compensation
when it grants access onto someone’s land for the loss of the use of
property. Seller and Buyer stipulated to an order of the court granting Seller
access to the land. Seller moved for summary judgment arguing the lack of
Buyer’s entitlement to damages because Buyer knew of the pollution when
purchasing the land and that even if damages were proper the limit should
be to the fair market value of a license to access the property. The district
court granted Seller’s motion to limit damages to the grant of access
opposed to the ongoing presence of contamination itself. On appeal the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court because during
the litigation, Buyer never drew a link between damage to the court
granting access as opposed to the pre-existing pollution. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Ninth Circuit
All. For the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2017).
Environmental Organization brought action against United States Forest
Service (“USFS”), arguing that USFS violated the National Forest
Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act when it
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approved a forest restoration project for a national forest. Environmental
Organization sought a preliminary injunction against USFS. In order to
receive a preliminary injunction, Environmental Organization had to show
that: (1) it was likely to succeed in its merits; (2) it is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of
equities tips in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. The
district court found that Environmental Organization did not satisfy any of
the four required factors, and thus denied the request for an issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision, holding that Environmental Organization did not provide proof it
met all four factors.
Cent. Or. Landwatch v. Connaughton, 696 Fed. App’x 816 (9th Cir. 2017).
City has long sourced drinking and municipal water from two creeks—both
tributaries of a river which runs through Deschutes National Forest
(“Forest”)—and has been authorized by the United States Forest Service
(“USFS”) to operate an intake facility and pipeline for withdrawing that
water. Conservation Group sued after USFS approved issuance of a Special
Use Permit (“SUP”) authorizing City to upgrade its intake facility,
construct a new pipeline, and operate the system for twenty years subject to
certain requirements (collectively, the “Project”). Conservation Group
alleged that USFS’s decision to authorize the Project was arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(“FLPMA”), National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), and National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed, affirming the validity of the Project. In doing so, the court held
the Project was not arbitrary and capricious, reasoning that “substantial
deference” must be given to USFS’s determination that the Project is
consistent with the Forest’s Plan. The court also held that the Project
satisfied the requirements under NEPA because USFS included a “brief
discussion of reasonable alternatives” during the proposal of the Project.
Lastly, the court held that because USFS provided an explanation as to why
a “quantitative” analysis of the Project’s impact on climate change could
not be provided, a discussion in “qualitative” terms was permissible under
NEPA. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court
rules should be consulted before citing as the case as precedent.
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Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power & Conservation Council, No. 15-71482,
2017 WL 3049570 (9th Cir. July 19, 2017).
Environmental Group petitioned for review of the 2014 fish and wildlife
program promulgated by Northwest Power and Conservation Council
(“Council”) alleging that Council: (1) “improperly equated its mandate”
under the Northwest Power Act (“NPA”) with the “substantive
requirements of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”); (2) arbitrarily and
capriciously failed to adopt “quantitative, measurable biological
objectives;” (3) rejected recommendations for improper reasons; (4)
arbitrarily and capriciously refused to include environmental measures that
would be in effect unless the “economical and reliable power supply” of the
region was threatened; and (5) was improperly influenced by the Columbia
Basin Fish Accords (“CBFA”). The court found that Council: (1) did not
improperly equate its mandate because the aims of the NPA and ESA
largely coincide; (2) did adopt quantitative biological objectives, although
the quantitative measures could be improved; (3) did not improperly reject
recommendations because the recommendations were either economically
infeasible or possibly harmful; (4) was not required to take every
environmental mitigation step until the region’s power supply was
threatened; 5) may have misunderstood its obligations under the CBFA, but
the misunderstanding did not affect the outcome of the program. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
W. Watersheds Project v. Ruhs, No. 15-17031, 2017 WL 3034308 (9th Cir.
July 18, 2017).
Environmental Group challenged United States Bureau of Land
Management’s (“BLM”) issuance of an environmental assessment. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of BLM, and
Environmental Group appealed, arguing that the assessment violated the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by: (1) failing to carefully
consider the assessment’s potential effects on surrounding habitat; (2)
inadequately considering impact of other past, present, and future projects
in the area; and (3) failing to assess potential impact of the project’s
“rangeland improvements.” The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s
grant of summary judgment, holding that Environmental Group failed to
show that the assessment was deficient under NEPA. This case is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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Wild Equity Inst. v. EPA, No. 15-70199, 2017 WL 3700996 (9th Cir. Aug.
28, 2017).
Environmental Organization sought review of EPA’s denial of its Petition
for Objection to Permit. A local California entity responsible for enforcing
elements of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) permitting requirements issued a
Title V Permit to Utility Company for its Gateway Generating Station in
California without objection from the EPA Administrator. Environmental
Organization then filed its Petition for Objection to the Title V Permit,
which was denied by EPA. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
Environmental Organization’s Petition and determined that EPA did not err
in its determination that Environmental Organization failed to demonstrate
that the Title V Permit failed to comply with the CAA. The court pointed to
Utility Company’s permitting history with EPA to justify its determination
that EPA did not err in judgment, and therefore denied Environmental
Organization’s Petition. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Wild Wilderness v. Allen, 871 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2017).
The Dutchman Flat and Tumalo Mountain (“Mountain”) is ideal for both
snowmobilers and cross-country skiers, creating conflict between motorized
recreationalists and non-motorized recreationalists, further fueled by the
lack of parking. In 2006, the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) began
considering the effects of adding a parking structure, began an
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), but then withdrew the EIS and
issued a Finding of No Significant Impact and an Environmental
Assessment (“EA”). Organization first alleged that USFS’s 2006 approval
violated the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”). NFMA states
that USFS’s actions must be consistent with the governing Land and
Resource Management Plan (“Plan”). The Plan states that when conflicts
develop between non-motorized and motorized recreationalists, certain
steps will generally be taken. The court concluded that the Plan articulates
“an aspiration, not an obligation.” Organization then alleged that USFS
violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). NEPA states
that when USFS determines an EIS is no longer needed, USFS must publish
a withdrawal notice. Organization argued an additional and implicit
requirement is established that USFS must issue a reasoned explanation for
why an EIS is not needed. However, the court concluded that Organization
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provided no support for this requirement. The court also concluded that
USFS did not violate NEPA by failing to provide a convincing statement of
reasons why the plan would not significantly affect the environment. When
analyzing the significant impact on the environment, USFS must analyze
both context and intensity of the impact. One factor of intensity is the
degree to which the plan impacted the environment is not likely to be
highly controversial. However, the court determined that controversial
refers to the size or nature of the plan, not whether or how passionately
people oppose the plan.
Tenth Circuit
Chevron Mining, Inc. v. United States, 863 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2017).
Company sued Government under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), seeking funds
for cleanup costs arising from a mining operation. At issue is whether
Government is liable under CERCLA as a “potentially responsible party
(“PRP”),” and owes funds to Company to aid cleanup costs. CERCLA
holds “covered persons” strictly liable for remedial action, and other
necessary response costs. “Covered persons” includes: (1) owners’; (2)
operators; (3) arrangers; and (4) transporters. Government did not assert
any of CERCLA’s defenses to avoid liability. Owner liability reaches “any
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned . . .
any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.” Under
CERCLA, an owner is also the legal title holder of contaminated land.
Government held legal title to the lands where significant waste disposal
occurred, and actively exercised its ownership by conveying portions of its
land for waste rock disposal and for a tailings pond. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Government was an owner of portions of the
mining site, and therefore was a PRP that was strictly liable to contribute its
share of the cleanup costs.
Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 870 F.3d 1222 (10th
Cir. 2017).
Activist sued U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), claiming that
BLM’s approval of four mine leases (“Leases”) violated the National
Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”). Under NEPA, in evaluating a
lease that may result in increasing carbon dioxide emissions, BLM had the
option of approving the Leases or taking a “no action” alternative and deny
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the leases. BLM reasoned that there was no real difference in carbon
emissions between approving the Leases and the no action alternative,
because other sources of coal would fill the void in the market if the Leases
were denied. Furthermore, BLM reasoned that removing the coal from the
market would not result in a higher demand from the product, with a
corresponding increase in price. The district court found BLM’s actions
were reasonable, and upheld the leases. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that BLM’s reasoning was arbitrary and capricious. The
court explained that BLM ignored the basic economic principle that a force
that drives up the cost of coal would drive down consumption, thus leading
to a decrease in carbon emissions. Furthermore, BLM neglected to include
any data to suggest why that basic economic principle would not apply to
the case at hand. BLM was therefore not entitled to any deference on behalf
of the court. In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Tenth Circuit did not
vacate the Leases; it instead remanded the case to the trial court, and
entered an order requiring BLM to revise its studies and evidence.
D.C. Circuit
Alaska v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Civil Case No. 11-1122 (RJL), 2017 WL
4221057 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2017).
Alaska sued the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
because it passed the Roadless Area Conservation Rule (“Rule”), limiting
road construction and timber harvesting in national forests, including
Alaska’s Tongass National Forest. Alaska claimed the Rule was mandated
in an unrealistic timeframe, without considering the states’ needs, and
without properly considering multiple-use management of national forests.
Alaska brought these claims as violations of a multitude of federal laws.
The court analyzed the claims by first addressing Alaska’s assertion that the
Rule violated of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), in that
USDA did not fully consider the environmental effects of its actions.
However, after finding: (1) there was a true need for the Rule; (2) that
USDA did not mislead the public as to the cumulative effects of the Rule;
(3) that the USDA properly gathered informed comment and decision
making regarding the accelerated adoption of the Rule; and (4) that the draft
environmental impact study preceding the Rule and the final study were not
substantially different enough to require a supplemental study, the court
found that USDA complied with NEPA. Next, the court analyzed specific
challenges to the Rule as it applied to Alaska. First, it addressed whether
the Rule violated the Tongrass Timber Reform Act (“Act”) by rendering the
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possibility of meeting timber demand under the Act impossible. The court
found that USDA should try—but is not obligated to—meet demand under
the Act. Second, the court found that USDA did not violate federal law by
withdrawing public land from Alaska without congressional approval.
Then, the court analyzed whether USDA violated NEPA as it specifically
applies to Alaska and similarly found that USDA complied with the statute.
This case has since been appealed, but there is no holding from the higher
court as of publication.
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 862 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Organizations sought review of EPA’s rule defining “solid waste” under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that: (1) the requirement that
secondary hazardous materials be handled as “valuable commodities” was
reasonable; (2) EPA failed to demonstrate a rational basis for notice and
recordkeeping requirements regarding recycling hazardous wastes into
products for which there was a use; (3) EPA's update of the rule that
excluded hazardous materials that were transferred to a third-party for
reclamation from regulation under RCRA, was consistent with RCRA; (4)
EPA failed to demonstrate a rational basis for an update of its transferbased exclusion that added a requirement that waste generators only use
third-party recyclers that were approved by EPA or state regulators; (5) the
court would sever and maintain the portions of EPA's verified recycler
exclusion that severed and retained emergency preparedness and
containment requirements; (6) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
consider Organizations’ claim that EPA could not treat off-specification
commercial chemical products as hazardous secondary materials subject to
regulation under RCRA; and (7) the court did not have jurisdiction to
consider Organizations' challenge to EPA's decision to defer the decision on
whether to apply containment and notification requirements to generators of
excluded materials.
Ams. for Clean Energy v. EPA, 864 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
EPA announced a final rule that set several renewable fuel requirements for
the years 2014–2017. Several environmental organizations challenged
EPA’s final order on several grounds. Some felt EPA set the renewable fuel
requirements too low, while others felt the requirements were too high. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all challenges except
one petition arguing that EPA erred in its interpretation of the “inadequate
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domestic supply” wavier provision. The appellate court held: (1) EPA
wrongly concluded that “inadequate domestic supply” applied to the supply
of renewable fuel available to consumers rather than refiners, blenders, and
importers supply of volume needed to meet statutory requirements of the
provision and (2) EPA incorrectly considered demand-side factors affecting
the demand for renewable fuel, instead of considering the supply-side
factors as required by the provision. Thus, the court adopted this petition for
review, vacated EPA’s decision to reduce the volume requirement for
renewable fuel, and remanded the final rule to EPA for further
consideration.
Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Environmental Organizations filed an emergency motion for stay regarding
EPA’s decision to stay, pending reconsideration, implementation of
portions of a final rule regarding methane and greenhouse gas emissions.
Groups connected to oil and gas industry (“Industry Groups”) petitioned for
reconsideration of the rule under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Under CCA
there are two circumstances when EPA must reconsider a rule: (1) if it can
be demonstrated that it was impracticable to raise such an objection within
the notice and comment period: and (2) if such objection is of central
relevance to the outcome of the rule. Industry Groups argued that those
requirements were met because several provisions in the final rule were not
in the proposed rule, therefore, they were unable to raise objections to said
final rule. Environmental Organizations argued the stay violates CAA
because the issues raised by Industry Groups were debated during the
comment period, and therefore, Industry Groups could have raised
objections. EPA then argued the court has no jurisdiction over this case,
because the decision to grant reconsideration of the rule was not a “final
action.” However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found
that it was a “final action” because it was a decision that could have legal
consequences. Furthermore, the court held the only way EPA could grant
the stay, is if CAA conferred to it that power. The court held that EPA had
no authority because CAA only conferred authority to grant a stay if the
two elements above were satisfied. The court held that those two elements
were not satisfied because evidence showed that all issues Industry Groups
claimed were not in the proposed rule, were debated during the comment
period, and could have been raised. The court granted Environmental
Organizations’ motion to vacate the stay.
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Mexichem Flour, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Manufacturers petitioned for review of the EPA’s decision to remove
Hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”) from the list of substitutes for ozonedepleting substances, placing it on list of prohibited ozone-depleting
substances under Clean Air Act (“CAA”). EPA’s decision is based on its
finding the HFCs contribute negatively to climate change. Manufacturers
claimed the decision exceeded EPA’s authority under the CAA. The CAA
requires manufacturers to “replace ozone-depleting substances with safe
substitutes.” However, even though HFCs were placed on the prohibited
list, EPA never made a finding that HFCs deplete the ozone. EPA’s new
rule essentially forces manufactures and others to replace HFCs with
substitutes without finding HFCs cause the damage some entities claim.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals used the Chevron
analysis to determine whether, under the CAA, EPA had statutory authority
to issue a decision regulating the use of HFCs. Under the step one analysis
of Chevron, the court focused on the meaning of the word “replace” in the
statute. EPA argued that because manufacturers “continue to ‘replace’
ozone-depleting substances with HFCs every time [they] use HFCs in their
products,” EPA continues to have authority regulate manufactures’ use of
HFCs. The court found this interpretation to be too broad and without
limits. The court denied this interpretation of the term “replace.” The court
found that the plain-text of the statute along with legislative history proves
that Congress’ focus was on preventing the use of “ozone-depleting”
substances. EPA’s new rule goes beyond the reasonable interpretation of
the statute, and Congress’ intent, thus the court vacated EPA’s rule to the
extent it requires manufacturers to discontinue the use of HFCs.
Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
Landowners and Environmental Groups challenged Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) decision to allow three natural gas
pipeline be built. A primary question is whether the Environmental Impact
Statement (“EIS”) is adequate. The court looed to see if the deficiencies in
the EIS hinder public participation in the process, according to National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). The court said that one EIS for the
three pipelines was adequate; it answered the question of whether the
projects have a dramatically negative impact on certain subsections of the
population. An EIS is required to be “reasonable and adequately
explained,” but the path, or methodology, to that objective is given
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deference. The court held this EIS is adequate in this regard because “[i]t
discussed the intensity, extent, and duration of the pipelines’ environmental
effects” and how those effects would impact certain environmental-justice
communities. The court said that the EIS could have been more elaborate in
some areas, but the statement still meets the goal of NEPA. The court said
that FERC should have included an estimate of emissions in its EIS, or if
such an estimate was not practical or possible, Commission should have
explained why it did not include an estimate. FERC followed its
jurisdictional precedent regarding return on investment, imposing a capital
structure to make adjustments when it deemed a return on investment too
high and thus imbalanced. The court held this decision was not arbitrary or
capricious. Accordingly, the court remanded the petition for FERC to
prepare an EIS including more information about emissions from the
pipelines.
Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Environmental Group challenged Department of Energy’s (“Department”)
compliance with National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the
Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), for its grant of an application to export liquefied
natural gas (“LNG”) using terminal and liquification facilities in Brazoria
County, Texas. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Department had complied with both NEPA and the NGA. In determining
whether Department complied with NEPA, the court looked at whether
Department had adequately considered and disclosed the environmental
impact of its action and whether that decision is arbitrary or capricious. The
court held that Department had adequately considered the potential
environmental impacts of concern to Environmental Group, including
impacts on water resources, greenhouse gas emissions, and coal usage. In
determining whether Department complied with the NGA, the court
considered whether the approved application was inconsistent with public
interest. The court held that Environmental Group had not presented any
evidence to show that Department worked contrary to public interest when
it approved the application. Accordingly, the court denied Environmental
Group’s challenged to Department’s decision.
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C.D. Illinois
E.O.R. Energy L.L.C. v. Messina, No. 3:16-CV-03122, 2017 WL 4181346
(C.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017).
Company sued Director of Illinois EPA and the Illinois EPA (collectively
“IEPA”) after previous litigation was decided in the Illinois court. The prior
case related to an IEPA complaint against Company that alleged Company
unlawfully transported hazardous waste from Colorado to Illinois and that
the waste had been disposed of unlawfully in Illinois injection wells
without obtaining the proper permit. The Illinois Pollution Control Board
(“Board”) issued orders affirming the violations made by Company and
ordered them to cease. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed Board’s
findings. In the current case, Company sought protection using the Ex Parte
Young exception. The federal district court found that because the Illinois
appellate court had already upheld Board’s finding that Company violated
IEPA regulations that it was therefore powerless to overturn the Illinois
court. The district court analyzed the implications of the Eleventh
Amendment in connection with the case. The court reasoned that in this
situation it had to determine whether Company is seeking protection from
ongoing violations of federal law. The district court found that Company
failed to establish facts supporting the argument that IEPA was continuing
to violate a federal law. Therefore, Company’s claims fail. This case has
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.
D. Alaska
Gavora, Inc. v. City of Fairbanks, No. 4:15-cv-00015-SLG, 2017 WL
3161626 (D. Alaska July 25, 2017).
Property Owner sued Predecessor for the cost of past and present clean-up
operations. For a period of forty years, Predecessor owned the property, and
leased to Property Owner for twenty-one of those years. During this period,
a dry-cleaning company operated out of the property, causing
contamination to the surrounding soil and groundwater. The court looked at
a number of factors in assessing liability for clean-up costs, including: (1)
the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to the
discharge of a toxin can be distinguished; (2) the amount of the waste
involved; (3) the degree of toxicity of the toxin involved; (4) the degree of
involvement by the parties in the generation or disposal of the waste; (5) the
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degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the toxin; and (6) the
degree of cooperation by the parties with government officials to prevent
any harm to the public health or the environment. The court found that it
was equitable to allocate the Predecessor 55% of the recoverable response
costs, and to allocate Property Owner 45% of the recoverable response
costs.
D. Arizona
Concerned Citizens & Retired Miners Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV16-03115-PHX-DGC, 2017 WL 3896290 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2017).
San Carlos Apache Tribe (“Tribe”) sued the U.S. Forest Service (“USFS”)
to challenge its approval of Operator’s plan to gather environmental data
related to Operator’s potential development of an underground copper mine
(“mine”) and mine tailings storage facility (“TSF”). Operator thereafter
intervened as a defendant. To plan for the possible construction of the mine,
Operator proposed to conduct a baseline assessment of groundwater and
subsurface conditions in proximity to the possible location. Tribe contended
that the assessment violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the
National Historic Preservation Act, and the National Defense Authorization
Act (“NDAA”), as well as regulations related to these statutes. USFS
approved the baseline assessment after conducting an environmental
assessment through which it issued a Finding of No Significant Impact. The
court noted that this approval of the baseline assessment by USFS did not
constitute approval of the mine or the TSF. In determining whether the
potentially subsequent mine construction is a “connected action” of the
baseline assessment and, thus, should have been included in USFS’s
assessment. The court reviewed whether the actions: (1) automatically
trigger other actions that could require additional environmental impact
statements; (2) cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken
previously or in conjunction; or (3) are interdependent parts of a larger
action and depend on the larger action for their justification. The court
ultimately found the baseline assessment and mine construction to not be
connected actions because the mine construction is not dependent on nor
automatically triggered by the baseline assessment. As the baseline
assessment had independent utility outside the scope of mine construction
and because Tribe failed to show a violation of the NDAA, the court
ultimately ruled in favor of Operator in terminating the action.
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El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States, No. CV-14-08165-PCT-DGC, 2017
WL 3492993 (D. Ariz. Aug. 15, 2017).
Natural Gas Company sued the United States under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),
hoping to recover costs incurred in remediating former uranium mines
located on an Indian reservation. CERCLA holds liable virtually everyone
that has a connection to the property or the contamination. This typically
includes owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters. For purposes of
holding the United States liable, Company moved for summary judgment
for its claims that the United States is an owner and therefore potentially
liable for remediation costs. The court found that the United States is a fee
holder of the Indian reservation and that although the United States has
granted a significant property interest to the Indian nation, it has retained
substantial power over the land. Therefore, since the United States is an
owner under CERCLA, the court granted Company’s motion for summary
judgment.
WildEarth Guardians v. Provencio, No. CV-16-08010-PCT-SMM, 2017
WL 4286189 (D. Ariz. 2017).
The Kaibab National Forest (“KNF”) is located in northern Arizona and
consists of three ranger districts (“Districts”). All three Districts provide
recreational opportunities, are home to several plant and animal species,
and are home to numerous cultural resources. Each District undertook
projects to designate a system of roads throughout their prospective districts
to improve management of motorized vehicle use in accordance with the
2005 Travel Management Rule. Each District also developed an
environmental assessment presenting the results of the analysis of the
direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental effects of the proposed
action and alternatives to the proposed action. The decisions implementing
the chosen actions for each District were documented in Decision Notices
signed by the KNF Supervisor noting Findings of No Significant Impacts.
Environmental Group commenced this action in January 2016 alleging
violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and other
environmental preservation acts. Environmental Group moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the Forest Service violated the Travel
Management Rule (“TMR”), NEPA, and the National Historic Preservation
Act (“NHPA”). The court found in KNF’s favor in granting its crossmotion for summary judgment, citing that KNF took every proper step and
considered every potential violation in its actions and Environmental Group
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made no significant show of any violation of the TMR, NEPA, NHPA, or
any other statutory provision. This case has since been appealed, but there
is no decision from the higher court as of publication.
D. District of Columbia
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 861 F.3d 174 (D.D.C. 2017).
Environmental Group brought two actions against EPA alleging that it
violated the Endangered Species Act (“ESA) and the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”). EPA announced the
registration of a new pesticide and invited public comment regarding it.
EPA conducted an “Environmental Fate and Ecological Risk Assessment
for the Registration of the New Chemical” that determined the chemical
was “highly toxic or very toxic” to invertebrates such as butterflies and
beetles. ESA mandates that “every federal agency ‘shall … insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species’” or threaten
their habitat. ESA contains a broad citizen-suit provision allowing any
person to “commence a civil suit on his own behalf” against any person,
including the United States. FIFRA authorizes EPA to regulate the
distribution and sale of pesticides to prevent the unreasonable effects on the
environment. FIFRA contains a narrower civil suit provision granting
jurisdiction only to appellate courts. EPA moved to dismiss Environmental
Group’s suit. The district court granted it because the suit gave rise to an
actual controversy as to the validity of FIFRA and therefore it did not have
jurisdiction. The court relied on the fact that when there are special
statutory review procedures Congress intended for those jurisdictions to
have judicial review of those cases. Environmental group appealed
requesting a consolidation of both its claims in district court. The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found that even though EPA failed to
have consultation regarding the new chemical and further failed to register
it, registration should remain in effect until it is replaced by an order
consistent with the court’s opinion to maintain enhanced protection.
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D. Idaho
Paradise Ridge Def. Coal. v. Hartman, No. 1:16-cv-374-BLW, 2017 WL
3723636 (D. Idaho Aug. 29, 2017).
Landowner sued Administrator, claiming that Administrator’s extension of
a highway over Landowner’s endangered ecosystem violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Landowner sought to enjoin any
work on the project until Administrator complied with NEPA. Both parties
moved for summary judgment. In finding for Administrator, the court held
that while NEPA requires agencies to “rigorously explore and objectively
evaluate all reasonable alternatives” to a plan with significant
environmental effects, the plan will be reviewed under a “rule of reason.”
Therefore, Administrator only had to consider reasonable or feasible
alternate plans, and the plan would be disallowed only if the reason for
selecting a plan with significant environmental effects was arbitrary and
capricious. Because Administrator had spent considerable time and
resources investigating the effect on wetland erosion, wildlife collision, and
crash data, the court found that its selection of the plan that crossed
Landowner’s property was not arbitrary or capricious. Additionally, while
Administrator did not obtain “prior occurrence” from State and Federal
agencies for the plan, only about ten percent of the types of projects
Administrator sought to complete require prior concurrence in the first
place. This case has since been appealed, but there has been no decision
from the higher court as of time of publication.
D. Maryland
SPS Ltd. P’ship LLLP v. Sparrows Point, LLC, No. JFM-14-589, 2017 WL
3917153 (D. Md. Sept. 6, 2017).
Shipyard Owner (Owner) is seeking recovery under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”)
and four Maryland common law claims; negligence, trespass, nuisance, and
strict liability. Owner asserted that Steel Manufacturer (Manufacturer) had
caused an “ongoing and continuous discharge of pollutants” onto the
property previously owned by Manufacturer, and now owned by Owner.
Manufacturer acquired the property via an order under §363 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which authorized it to acquire the property without
assuming liability for any environmental contamination that occurred prior
to the purchase date. However, if a hazardous substance was disposed of on
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the property while Manufacturer owned said property, it could be liable.
Although here, Manufacturer was not liable under CERCLA because it did
not contribute to the contamination in any way, and because the bankruptcy
order protected it from liability. Likewise, Manufacturer was granted
summary judgment on all tort claims. Manufacturer was not negligent
because it was unclear what its duty was to Owner, and whether it was
breached. There was no trespass because Manufacturer did not control the
hazardous substance on Owner’s property. And there were no grounds for
private nuisance because Owner contributed to the flow of the hazardous
substance by its own activities, and was aware of the contamination as early
as 2004, eight years before Manufacturer purchased property. Furthermore,
when Manufacturer purchased the property, it was not engaged in an
“abnormally dangerous activity” simply because it was aware of the
contamination. Rather, Manufacturer was engaged in remediating and
redeveloping the property, and therefore, was not liable under strict
liability. The district court granted Manufacturer’s motion and denied
Owner’s motion.
D. Nevada
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
Case No. 2:14-cv-00226-APG-VCF, 2:14-cv-00228-APG-VCF, 2017 WL
3667700 (D. Nev. 2017).
To combat southern Nevada’s longtime water crisis, the Southern Nevada
Water Authority (“SNWA”) has been developing a massive pipeline to
convey water from eastern-central Nevada to Las Vegas since 1989. Under
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) the Bureau of
Land Management’s (“BLM”) must decide whether to give SNWA
permission to build the pipeline. The project also depends on SNWA’s
ability to secure the right to water from the State of Nevada which it was
grated in March of 2012 shortly before BLM approved its application for a
right-of-way for the first phase of the project, which included the main
pipeline. BLM decided to approve the project in stages because of the
complexity and scope of the project. Environmental Group sued BLM on
multiple counts related to violations of the National Environmental
Protection Act (“NEPA”) and the FLPMA, namely focused on tribal,
religious, and cultural land use rights. Both parties moved for summary
judgment and because the court found at BLM failed to explain how it
would mitigate losses of habitat in the development of the pipeline, it
violated the NEPA’s requirements for its Environmental Impact Statement,
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both motions were granted in part and denied in part and the case was
remanded back to the BLM to address these deficiencies. The case has
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.
D. New Hampshire
Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Pease Dev. Auth., Case No. 16-cv-493SM, 2017 WL 4310997 (D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017).
Non-Profit Organization filed claims under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)
alleging Developer is discharging stormwater runoff containing pollutants
from Developer’s airport without proper permits. Non-Profit Organization
alleged eight violations by Developer. Developer argued: (1) it is a state
agency and therefore immune from suits under the Eleventh Amendment;
(2) it already has a CWA permit; and (3) the specific permit Non-Profit
Organization is discussing expired in 2008. The immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment protects the states themselves and entities deemed
arms of the state. The court applied a two-step process to determine if
Developer is an “arm of the state”: (1) whether the state has indicated an
intention that Developer share state’s sovereign immunity and if not then
the structural indicators of the intention and (2) whether the state’s treasury
would be at risk in the event of a judgment against the entity. The district
court found that Developer fit under the arm of the state because the New
Hampshire legislature shows the intent that the entity has sovereign
immunity in several statutory provisions. The court further found that NonProfit Organization failed on its claim regarding the claims against the
officers and directors of Developer for past failure. However, the court
found the claim regarding continued failure of a federal law fell within the
Ex Parte Young exception of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly,
the court dismissed some of Non-Profits claims, but not all.
D. Rhode Island
Emhart Indus., Inc. v. New England Container Co., C.A. No. 06-218 S, 11023 S, 2017 WL 3535003 (D.R.I. Aug. 17, 2017).
Industries and Container had been in litigation for ten years to determine
which parties were responsible and what the appropriate remedy for toxic
chemical pollution at a project site in Rhode Island. In the end, the court
found that Industries was jointly and severally liable for the release of
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dioxin at the site. EPA created a remedial action plan (“Plan”) using the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”) and the National Contingency Plan (“NCP”), but the court
found several decisions the Plan violated CERCLA as they “were arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” These decisions were:
(1) labelling Source Area groundwater as potential source of drinking
water; (2) assuming that there are no largemouth bass in Allendale Pond;
and (3) using fourteen grams as the reasonable maximum consumption rate
for anglers fishing at the Site. The court held that until the issues with
decisions are resolved, Industries is not required to pay fines or fees
accruing from non-compliance during this time.
D. Utah
Grand Canyon Trust v. Energy Fuels Resources (U.S.A.) Inc., Case No.
2:14–cv–243, 2017 WL 4122614 (D. Utah Sept. 15, 2017).
Advocacy Organization sued Uranium Mill (“Mill”) seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief for Mill’s violations of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).
Advocacy Organization alleged that Mill did not comply with Subpart W of
the CAA by: (1) exceeding the two-cell limit for tailings impoundments and
(2) failing to properly monitor and conduct testing of its radon emissions.
The court granted summary judgement to Mill for several reasons. First,
Mill did not violate the two-cell limit because one of the cells was an
evaporation pond that did not count against the limit. Second, because there
is five-year statute of limitations for CAA citizen suits, no other
combination of cells could be considered since no other cell was
constructed within five years of the complaint. Third, Mill did not exceed
radon flux limit because cell two was not subject to Subpart W’s radon flux
limit. Finally, the court deferred to the Department of Air Quality regarding
proper scheduling and testing methods and concluded cell three was not in
violation of the radon flux limit. Advocacy Organization’s claims were
dismissed with prejudice.
E.D. Washington
Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., NO. 2:16-CV0293-TOR, 2017 WL 2962771 (E.D. Wash. July 11, 2017).
Environmental Group sued United States Forest Service (“USFS”) for
creating a Community Protection Line (“CPL”) to address a wildfire that
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had spread throughout the region. Environmental Group alleged that USFS
violated the National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”) by
constructing the CPL. Both parties motioned for summary judgment. NEPA
requires that a federal agency consider and file public reports over the
environmental impact of actions that could significantly affect the
environment to the fullest extent possible. Because of the exigency of the
situation, the trial court found that USFS did not need to incur the wait to
compile an environmental impact report before addressing the wildfire by
constructing the CPL and granted summary judgment for USFS.
M.D. Tennessee
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 3:15-cv-00424, 2017
WL 3476069 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2017).
Environmental Organizations sued the Tennessee Valley Authority
(“TVA”) over TVA’s operation of a coal plant near the city of Gallatin,
alleging that TVA: 1) unlawfully discharged pollutants in to state waters
through hydrologic flow from its ash ponds; 2) was responsible for
unauthorized point source discharges from its then active ash pond
complex; and 3) violated four different sections of its National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit. The district court
dismissed some of the claims on merit, others due to an ongoing state
enforcement proceeding, and then held a bench trial on the remaining
issues. The court stated that Environmental Organizations would prevail if
able to show either that discharges from the “Non-Registered Site” were
being made into a local river or that discharges from the Ash Pond
Complex via hydrologic flows were taking place and were not seeps alone.
The court found that: 1) the discharges did qualify as point source
discharges; 2) discharges of pollutants from the Non-Registered Site into
the local river constituted an ongoing violation of the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”); 3) the active ash pond complex was a violation of the CWA; 4)
Organizations’ claims were not prohibited by a diligent prosecution bar
because of the ongoing state action; 5) a finding that the CWA was violated
was not precluded by the “permit shield doctrine;” 6) the ash pond complex
violated the NPDES permit’s “removed substances provision;” and 7) the
ash pond complex did not violate the NPDES permit’s provision requiring
operation and maintenance which complies with the permit’s terms.
Accordingly, the judgement was for TVA in part and for Environmental
Organizations in part.
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N.D. Illinois
LAJIM, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 13-CV-50348, 2017 WL 3922139 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 7, 2017).
Illinois state court produced a Consent Order in 2010 requiring Company to
remedy contamination from its facility onto Landowner’s property.
Landowner contended that measures outlined in Company’s Remedial
Action Plan (“Plan”) were inadequate to remove contamination and
subsequently sought an injunction that would require Company to complete
an investigation of the site to identify measures required to remove the
contamination. Company argued that an injunction would be improper and
would interfere with the parallel state-court order. Under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), to obtain a permanent
mandatory injunction in federal court, Landowner was required to establish:
(1) it had suffered irreparable injury; (2) legal remedies were inadequate to
compensate for injury; (3) an equitable remedy was warranted; and (4) the
public interest would not be disserved by such an injunction. The court
accordingly denied Landowner’s request for a mandatory permanent
injunction, holding that it had failed to establish that it would suffer any
irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted.
N.D. Oklahoma
Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. TCI Pacific Commc’ns., Inc., Case No. 11–
CV–0252–CVE–PJC, 2017 WL 2662195 (N.D. Okla. June 20, 2017).
Owner sought to hold Predecessor liable for contribution under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(“CERCLA”), claiming some of the costs related to the release of
hazardous substances from a zinc smelting site were the fault of
Predecessor. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court
found that in order for Owner to hold Predecessor liable under CERCLA, it
must prove that: (1) Predecessor is a “covered person” under CERCLA; (2)
a “release” or “threatened release” of any “hazardous substance” at the site
in question has occurred; (3) the release or threatened release caused Owner
to incur costs; (4) Owner’s costs are “necessary” costs of response; and (5)
Owner’s response action or cleanup was consistent with the National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (“NCP”). The court
denied both motions for summary judgment, finding that: (1) Owner had
produced evidence giving rise to a genuine dispute of material fact as to
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whether Predecessor was a “covered person” under CERCLA; (2)
hazardous substances were released from the disputed facility; (3) a genuine
dispute of material fact exists as to whether air emissions from the plant
caused Owner to incur costs; and (4) Owner produced evidence that at least
some of the response costs incurred were necessary.
United States v. Doe Run Res. Corp., Case No. 15-CV-0663-CVE-JFJ,
2017 WL 4270526 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 26, 2017).
United States and the State of Oklahoma (“State”) submitted a proposed
consent decree that would resolve prior claims against two mining company
Operators under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) for violations occurring in
the Tri-State Mining District (“TSMD”) for most of the 20th century. In
1983, the EPA placed approximately forty square miles of northeastern
Oklahoma on the national priorities list and designated the area as the Tar
Creek Superfund Site. Since then, the United States has resolved most of its
claims with several potentially responsible parties for the damages to Tar
Creek. This decree would protect Operators from contribution claims by
any potentially responsible party. An Operator who previously settled with
the United States for its negative contributions to Tar Creek, objected to the
decree arguing that it has an interest in protecting its right to contribution
against the Operators, and claimed that the United States failed to present
evidence that the settlement was the result of an arms-length negotiation.
The Operator also objected to the proposed decree because it was not
permitted to participate in the settlement negotiations. The district court
disagreed with these assertions. The court held that, from the plain language
of CERCLA, the right of contribution of a settling potentially responsible
party against a non-settling party is subordinate to the interests of the
United States, and CERCLA permits the United State to cut off a settling
party’s right to seek contribution with other such parties. Thus, the court
reasoned, the fact that Operator was not permitted to participate in the
negotiation of the decree does not show a lack of procedural fairness in the
proposed consent decree. The court also found that the negotiations lasted
for years, and that both parties had ample opportunity to weigh the
strengths of their cases, and this was enough to satisfy the “arms length”
requirement of fair negotiating. Accordingly, the court approved the
proposal, thus cutting off Operator’s right to contribution from remaining
Operators.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

1144

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

N.D. New York
Benoit v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 1:16-CV-930, 2017
WL 3316132 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2017).
Citizens sued Manufacturer alleging that it contaminated groundwater by
discharging perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) from its manufacturing
facility that operates within the village. Due to the contamination, Citizens
alleged that they suffered from decrease in property values, and
accumulation of PFOA in their blood serum and bodies. Manufacturer
argued that Citizens cannot allege decreased property values due to
contaminated groundwater because Citizens do not own groundwater in
New York. Therefore, Manufacturer argued Citizens had no standing to
sue. Next, Manufacturer argued that the “vast majority” of Citizens alleged
a risk of increased illness, not a present illness caused by PFOA. Lastly,
Manufacturer argued that Citizens’ nuisance and trespass claims should fail
because the injury was common across thousands – not special to one or a
few. The district court granted Manufacturer’s motion in part, and denied in
part. Citizens that alleged decreased property values, and only rented the
home, had their claims dismissed because Citizens cannot recover for
damage to property they do not own. Next, the court upheld Citizens’
personal injury claims because precedent did not state they needed present
symptoms to ask for medical monitoring. Lastly, Citizens alleged trespass
and nuisance claims. The court dismissed the trespass claims regarding
Citizens that received their water from the city, but did not dismiss the
claims of Citizens that had private water wells. The court found similarly
regarding the nuisance claims. Citizens that had private water wells did not
have their claims dismissed because they had sustained a special loss,
unlike those who received their water from the state.
Donavan v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 1:16-CV-924, 2017
WL 3887904 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017).
Manufacturer was found responsible by the EPA for polluting a town’s
water supply. Landowner, a member of the town, alleged that the water
pollution had caused him both health problems and property damage
because, although his own well was not contaminated, wells near his
property were contaminated and allegedly dropped his property’s value.
Manufacturer moved to dismiss the property damage complaint because
Landowner did not show that the pollution had adversely affected his
property. Landowner argued that the pollution in nearby areas had
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stigmatized his home and reduced its value, so contamination of nearby
properties should be enough. Landowner also alternatively moved to amend
his complaint to allege actual damage to his property. The trial court
granted Manufacturer’s motion to dismiss because Landowner had to show
that contamination affected his property—which he did not—for a
negligence claim, and granted Landowner’s motion to amend because the
amendment would not prejudice Manufacturer and was not in bad faith.
S.D. California
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., Case No. 07-cv01995-BAS-WVG, 16-cv-02026-BAS-KSC, 2017 WL 2655285 (S.D. Cal
June 20, 2017).
Company and Successor leased property in District’s ports, with both
companies using the property to test various designs of boats and
submersible vehicles. Company leased the property from 1954 to 1970, and
Successor leased the property from 1970 to 1983, and again from 1986 until
1991. After concentrations of pollutants in the leased properties were
discovered, District sued Successor to recover costs for the cleanup of the
site. The estimated cost to remove the contaminated sediment at the site
was $3.3 million. After lengthy settlement negotiations, Successor agreed to
be solely responsible for costs related to the cleanup up to $2.5 million.
Company agreed to contribute to $850,000. In exchange, District agreed to
not bring claims for further damages to the land in dispute. All parties
sought approval of the settlement agreement and an order providing them
with contribution protection under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). CERCLA
encourages settlements by preventing participating parties from being later
sued for contributions by other joint tortfeasors. In scrutinizing the
settlement reached by the parties, the court analyzed whether the agreement
was procedurally and substantively “fair, reasonable, and consistent with
CERCLA’s objectives,” which the court concluded it was. Accordingly, the
court approved the settlement.
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S.D. New York
Cytec Indus. Inc. v. Allnex (Luxembourg) & CY S.C.A, 14-cv-1561 (PKC),
2017 WL 2634177 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2017).
Buyer and Seller entered into an Agreement for the purchase of a coating
resins business and several facilities owned by Seller. A disagreement arose
as to which party was responsible for the environmental remediation costs
of a particular facility contemplated in the Agreement. The Agreement
stipulates that Buyer was to assume all liabilities “relating to Environmental
Laws with respect to any facilities.” Seller sought declaratory judgment that
Buyer is responsible for the costs of cleanup, while Buyer contends that the
Agreement limits its liability to contamination caused only by coating
resins (not in dispute). Both parties moved for summary judgment. The
court first noted that because the parties previously agreed that the
provisions of the Agreement were unambiguous, the Agreement must be
interpreted without considering extrinsic or parole evidence. The court then
considered the plain language of the Agreement and held that Buyer had
assumed “any and all” liabilities pertaining to environmental remediation
and as such, were bound by the Agreement to remediate the facility in
question. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from
the higher court as of publication.
S.D. Texas
USOR Site PRP Grp. v. A&M Contractors, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-2441, 2017
WL 3310942 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2017).
Pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act
(“TSWDA”), several Corporations sued City to collect response costs and
expenses related to environmental contamination at one of its treatment
facilities (“Site”) and a recycling facility (“Facility”). Corporations sought
partial summary judgment against City, claiming that t City was subject to
liability for the release of hazardous substances prior to selling the
treatment plant. The court found that City had admitted the genuine facts it
had alleged was in dispute. City admitted to: (1) “using hazardous
substances in its wastewater treatment process; (2) the presence of
hazardous substances and discharges of sludge; and (3) that various spills,
leaks, releases, and overflows from the treatment facility had occurred.”
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The court found that based on those facts, City was subject to liability under
CERLA and TSWDA and granted Corporations motion.
W.D. Virginia
S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. Zinke, Case No. 2:16CV00026, 2017
WL 4171391 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2017).
Two environmental groups (“Groups”) sued pursuant to the judicial review
provision of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”)
alleging that they were aggrieved by and administrative decision of the
Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”). The district court noted that when
Secretary has reason to believe someone is violating a SMCRA requirement
or permit condition, Secretary must notify the state regulatory agency by
issuing what is known as a ten-day notice. If the state does not appropriate
action to correct the violation, then Secretary must “immediately order
Federal inspection of the surface coal mining operation at which the alleged
violation is occurring.” And if a state fails to enforce its federally approved
program, Secretary may provide for federal enforcement. The court
subsequently held that Secretary’s decision that no SMCRA violation
existed failed to address key evidence, and Secretary’s finding that a water
sample showed no violation of Virginia’s water quality standards runs
counter to the record evidence and fails to address an important aspect of
Groups complaint. In contrast to Secretary’s argument, the court held that
Groups do not have to provide samplings from four consecutive days, as it
would be unreasonable and unduly burdensome. What the Groups did
instead, the court concluded, was to appropriately rely upon data provided
by the state. This data showed that a mine was violating SMCRA, and
because the state organization charged with correcting such a violation did
not take the required corrective action, Secretary should have ordered an
immediate federal inspection. Failure to do so, the court concluded, was an
arbitrary and capricious decision and Secretary was thus directed to conduct
a federal inspection to address the allegations made by Groups.
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State
California
Cleveland Nat’l Forest Found. v. San Diego Ass’n of Gov’ts, 397 P.3d 989
(Cal. 2017).
egional Planning Agency (“Agency”) was sued by Environmental
Organizations challenging the adequacy of an environmental impact report
(“EIR”) prepared in preparation of Agency’s regional development plan
meant to plan for transportation infrastructure. The California
Environmental Quality Act (“Act”) requires public agencies to report the
impacts their projects will have on the environment and whether the project
will result in a significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions. A 2005
Governor’s Executive Order (“Order”) set greenhouse gas emission targets
for California and mandated that by the year 2050 emissions be reduced to
eighty percent below 1990 levels. This began a slew of regulatory and
legislative actions by California to address and reduce the effects of climate
change. Agency was accused of inadequately preparing its EIR by not
addressing the potential impact of the regional development plan on
greenhouse gas emissions and the requirements of the Order. Even though
Agency updated its plan to address the Order, the Supreme Court of
California reviewed the case to determine whether a prepared EIR must
analyze the Order’s 2050 greenhouse gas emission requirements to comply
with Act. The court held in favor of Agency that its original EIR was
adequate because the varying analysis and methods used in the report could
adequately inform on the project’s impact to greenhouse gas emissions.
Further, the court noted however that Agency’s report should not be a
template for other planning agencies’ EIRs and they should instead ensure
their Act analysis stays in line with changing scientific updates and
regulatory plan of the state.
Orange Cty. Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
District brought an action against Industrial Site Operators (“Operators”)
under the Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act
(“HSAA”) for allegedly contributing to groundwater contamination.
District also brought common law claims against Operators for negligence,
nuisance, and trespass. Operators argued that summary judgement was
proper because District never incurred any recoverable costs under the
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Orange County Water District Act (“OCWD”), and that District’s incurred
costs were wholly investigatory and not encompassed within recoverable
remediation costs. The trial court entered judgments in favor of Operators
on all of District’s claim, summarily adjudicating each one. District
appealed and the appellate court held that Operators did not demonstrate
their entitlement to summary adjudication of the District’s HSAA claim.
The court reasoned that reasonable costs actually incurred in cleaning up or
containing the contamination or pollution are recoverable under the
OCWD, without regard to whether they could also be characterized as
investigatory. The court also held that Operators failed to adequately
address District’s negligence claim and did not meet their burden to show it
had no merit. Regarding District’s trespass claim, the court held that
District did not have a possessory property right sufficient to support a
claim for trespass, and that the trial court’s summary adjudication of that
claim against District was appropriate. Finally, the court held that because
the District had relevant, appropriate water rights based on its recharge
activities, Operators were not entitled to summary adjudication of District’s
nuisance claim. The court accordingly affirmed in part and reversed in part
the trial court’s decision.
Illinois
County of Will v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 2017 IL App (3d) 150637-U.
Pollution Control Board (“Board”) implemented ‘front-end’ regulations on
construction materials, but rejected provisions calling for groundwater
testing for pollution that may be residual from the construction materials.
County appealed Board’s decision to reject the groundwater testing
regulations. County argued that ‘back-end’ groundwater testing regulations
are a valuable safeguard against operators who fail to comply with the
front-end regulations and a way to monitor contamination from older
materials not covered by the revised front-end regulations. Essentially, the
groundwater testing subpart is a necessary supplement to the front-end
materials regulations and is still extremely cost effective, so greatly benefits
the public. County needed to show that Board regulations are invalid in its
challenge. The court considered three factors for determining whether
decision was arbitrary and capricious. First, the court looked at whether the
consideration of ‘waste’ in evaluating the statute was relevant and not
improper, considering the intent of the legislature. Second, whether Board
considered past occurrences and practices, as well as the subpart’s costs and
their impact on regulations as vital parts of the issue. Lastly, whether the
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explanation for Board’s decision deviates dramatically from the evidence
presented or is implausible and not simply justified by Board’s specialized
expertise. The court found Board met all three factors, therefore its decision
is proper, not arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the decision of the Board
is affirmed. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
D & L Landfill, Inc. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 2017 IL App (5th)
160071.
Applicant sought review of Illinois Environmental Protection Agency’s
(“IEPA”) denial of certification of completion of post-closure care of a
sanitary landfill. Illinois Pollution Control Board (“Board”) granted IEPA’s
motion for summary judgment on the matter and Applicant sought further
review with the state appellate court. Applicant argued that per a state
statute, it was only required to monitor its landfill for fifteen years after
completing the final cover. IEPA counter-argued that Applicant could be
required to monitor its landfill longer if future violation of state law were
possible. The appellate court held that IEPA has the authority to order
Applicant to continue to monitor groundwater exceedance until such a time
as it reaches acceptable levels, even if this period exceeds the fifteen-year
post-closure rule in the statute.
Louisiana
La. Envtl. Action Network v. Welsh, 16-0906 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/14/17); 224
So.3d 383.
Environmental Groups challenged an order from the Louisiana
Commissioner of Conservation (“Commissioner”) that approved an
application for construction of a waste transfer station on four grounds: (1)
Commissioner failed to consider conflicts with the local city’s master plan;
(2) the facility’s storage tanks would not with stand a 100-year flood as
mandated by the Commissioner’s rules; (3) the facility violates local zoning
ordinances; and (4) Commissioner acted arbitrarily by allowing the
company to open a second facility before closing its first one. The trial
court upheld Commissioner’s order. However, on appeal, the appellate
court over turned the trial court’s decision on the basis that the
administrative record provided no rational basis for the decision to allow
the company to operate both transfer stations. Case was remanded to the
trial court.
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Massachusetts
Cave Corp. v. Conservation Comm’n of Attleboro, 79 N.E.3d 1096 (Mass.
App. 2017).
The Conservation Commission of Attleboro (“Commission”), was
established as part of the Wetlands Protection Act (“Act”) “to protect the
wetlands, water resources, and adjoining land areas in Attleboro…”
Corporation filed a notice of intent with Commission, proposing
construction of infrastructure associated with subdivision development in a
land area acknowledged as having the presence of vegetated wetlands.
Commission approved the proposal with certain conditions. Corporation
appealed the conditions to the Department of Environmental Protections
(“DEP”) and was awarded a superseding order. Additionally, Corporation
issued a notice of intent for work on certain lots in the proposed subdivision
that was not approved until after the twenty-one days required for a hearing
under the Act. Corporation sought and was granted another superseding
order of conditions from DEP. However, Commission still considered the
proposed work precluded by its order and Corporation filed with the trial
court, seeking review and declaratory relief. The court concluded that the
conditions issued by Commission remained applicable to the subdivision,
notwithstanding the superseding order of conditions issued by DEP.
Corporation appealed on the grounds that the order by DEP should
supersede any conditions imposed by Commission, that Commission lost
jurisdiction over the work described in the second notice of intent when it
failed to hold a timely hearing, and that the record does not contain
substantial evidence supporting the imposition of the conditions for the first
notice of intent. The court affirmed holding that, by the language of the Act,
Commission may impose more stringent requirements than DEP, and that
Commission did not lose jurisdiction in the second notice of intent because
its conditions for the work in the first notice still covered the work
described in the second.
Michigan
Lowery v. Enbridge Energy Ltd. P’ship, 898 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 2017).
Company was responsible for an oil spill that released 840,000 gallons of
crude oil. This spill eventually made it into the Kalamazoo River and
spread nearly forty miles. Homeowner alleged the oil spill caused him to
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experience illness, and eventually injury. The Supreme Court of Michigan
held for Company, and reversed and remanded because Homeowner
attempted to show “cause in fact” through speculation, by arguing that
Company was responsible for his illness because his symptoms did not
appear until after the spill. While this may be true, the court held that a
temporal relationship is not enough to show “cause in fact.”
Montana
Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2017
MT 222, 388 Mont. 453, 401 P.3d 712.
Environmental Organization petitioned for review of environmental
assessment used by Department of Environmental Quality (“Department”)
in issuance of groundwater pollution control system permit for a
contemplated commercial development. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Environmental Organization finding that Department violated
the Montana Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”) in failing to consider
environmental impacts other than water quality impacts, and that
Department failed to identify the actual contemplated owner and operator of
the facility. Department appealed. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed
the lower court’s summary judgment because Department had violated the
MEPA for failing to consider environmental impacts other than water
quality impacts. The court held that the lower court erroneously concluded
that Department had violated MEPA because the issuance of the permit was
not a legal cause of environmental impacts of the larger construction and
operation of the facility unrelated to water quality or construction of
required wastewater treatment system. The court, however, affirmed the
lower court’s summary judgment that Department must identify the actual
owner or operator of the facility because it is required to do so under the
MEPA.
New Jersey
In re Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. A-2316-10T2, 2017 WL 3225723 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 31, 2017).
Environmental Organizations sued the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (“DEP”) after it accepted a plan by Developer
and released conservations restrictions on the conversion of protected land,
a former landfill, into a solar energy facility. Several state laws placed
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conservation restrictions on the land that prohibited the release of these
restrictions unless DEP approved. DEP partially released the restrictions
based on the idea that the solar project would provide the public with needs
and benefits, have no irreparable impacts on the habitats of plants and
animals, and that there were no feasible alternatives. In reviewing the issue,
the appellate court noted that its ability to review an administrative agency
decisions are severely limited, only reversing if the decision is: (1)
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) in violation of express or implied
legislative policies; (3) in violation of the State or Federal Constitution; or
(4) lacking support from substantial and credible evidence in the record.
The court began by weighing the competing public interests of leaving the
land in its natural state and providing a public interest of renewable energy,
concluding that DEP acted within its authority in determining that the land
use would provide a substantial public benefit. After Environmental
Organizations claimed that DEP violated its own rules which rendered its
decision arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. However, the court held
that due to the DEP’s considerable expertise and experience in making
development and conservation decisions, its decision was not arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, federal court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Oklahoma
City of Bethany v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., CIV-16-1005-D, 2017 WL
3741556 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 30, 2017).
Before the court is Company’s Motion to Dismiss City’s claims for
injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim. Furthermore, Company moved for partial dismissal of the complaint,
challenging a claim under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”), and claims of nuisance and trespass. The district court found
that City’s RCRA claims and its demands for injunctive relief were barred
by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and that City’s action should only
proceed on the tort claims. At issue was the alleged contamination of soil
and groundwater, and a threat to City’s public water supply wells, caused
by Company. Company voluntarily began remediation under the
supervision of the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality
(“DEQ”). The requirements of clean-up would be satisfied when DEQ gave
written notice that Company had demonstrated that all terms of the order
had been completed. Company moved to dismiss City’s RCRA claims for
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction, moved to dismiss City’s tort claims, and
moved to dismiss the RCRA action for failure to state a claim. Furthermore,
Company asserted that City’s claims were moot because there was already
a consent order in place that would serve the same purpose as the
injunction. The court reserved the issue of mootness for decision upon
further factual development. However, the court held that the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction did apply, and that City’s RCRA and tort claims should
be deferred because DEQ is responsible for enforcing environmental
regulations in Oklahoma.
Pennsylvania
Borough of St. Clair v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 1026 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL
2883246 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 7, 2017).
Town petitioned for review of an order of the Environmental Hearing
Board (“Board”) after it upheld the issuance of a solid waste management
permit, in the neighboring town, for the development of a landfill. Town
appealed the decision arguing that the Department of Environmental
Protection (“Department”) interpreted the Harms/Benefit regulation
erroneously, that the contract between Township and consulting group
(“Consultants”) was invalid because it gave Consultants impermissible
powers in operating the facility, and that the permit must be revoked
because a mining permit was not issued in conjunction. A trial was held,
and the matter was remanded for further review. However, Department
reissued the permit for the landfill. Town appealed and another trial was
held. Again, Board upheld the issuance of the permit and Town appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the order of Board. The court found that
Department did not erroneously interpret the Harms/Benefit regulation by
choosing not to consider potential costs or liabilities of the landfill. The
court found that it was not necessary for Department to perform an in-depth
analysis of the finances of a project, and that Department interpreted the
Harms/Benefit regulation reasonably. Next, the court found that the
contract between Township and Consultants was not impermissible because
Consultant’s powers did not override Township’s duty to comply with the
law. Furthermore, the court found that Town had no standing to challenge
the contract because it had not been aggrieved by said contract. Lastly, the
court found that a mining permit did not have to be issued in conjunction
with the waste permit. The rule is that if applicant has a reasonable
likelihood of acquiring one when it comes time to mine, it does not have to
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be issued in conjunction. Testimony showed obtaining such permit when
the time came, would not be an issue.
Consol Pa. Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 112 C.D. 2017, 2017 WL
3271480 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 2, 2017).
Company petitioned for review an order issued by the Environmental
Hearing Board (“EHB”) that prohibited Company from conducting
longwall mining within 100 feet of any portion of the Kent Run Stream. In
2007, Company sought to expand its mining business into the Bailey Mine
Eastern Expansion Area which consisted of five longwall panels. In May
2014, the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) issued Permit
Revision No. 180, which authorized longwall mining in those five longwall
panels, but not under Polen Run or the Kent Run Streams. In February
2016, Company sought a permit to mine beneath these two areas, and DEP
authorized it December 2016, on the condition that Company implements
an approved stream restoration plan. Third parties attempted to halt the
mining when they filed an application for supersedes. EHB granted the
application for supersedes in part preventing Company from mining
beneath and within 100 feet of Kent Run, but since Company had already
completed mining beneath Polen Run before the EHB could hear the
petition for supersedes, that issue was moot. In May 2017, Company filed a
report that effectively stated it would forego longwall mining beneath Kent
Run. Because Company agreed to forego mining in Kent Run, the court
refused to grant Company the relief it requested with respect to the
supersedes order.
Moretran Realty, LLC v. Baldev Patel & Son, LLC, DOCKET NO. A-275315T3, 2017 WL 3611595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 23, 2017).
Realtors purchased commercial real estate (“Property”) in 2009. An
environmental report revealed two environmental issues on the Property.
Both issues involved contamination discovered after two underground
heating oil storage tanks were removed. Following remediation efforts for
both issues, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection issued
a No Further Action letter. In 2012, Developer contracted to purchase
Property from Realtors. Pursuant to a separate agreement, Realtors placed
funds in escrow for environmental issues; the funds were to be released
within six months from the closing date or upon an adjacent facility
(“Facility”) assuming cleanup of the Property, whichever occurred first.
Facility denied responsibility for cleanup, and Realtors refused to take care
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of the cleanup or release the escrowed funds for Developer to use for cleanup costs. Developer sought a declaratory judgment under the Spill
Compensation and Control Act that Realtors were liable for clean-up costs
and indemnification. The trial court granted Developer’s motion for
summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed, holding that, under the
escrow agreement, the funds had to be released no later than six months
after closing, and, furthermore, that the discovery of contamination on the
Property would not have had a bearing on whether the escrow funds had to
be released. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state or
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
Environmental Organization brought declaratory judgment action against
Commonwealth challenging, under the Environmental Rights Amendment,
whether budget-related decisions that resulted in additional oil-and-gas
lease sales was constitutional. The lower court granted summary relief to
Commonwealth and Environmental Organization appealed. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with
six holdings: (1) “laws that unreasonably impair the right to clean air, pure
water, and environmental preservation are unconstitutional;” (2) “proceeds
from the sale of oil and gas from the public trust remain in the corpus of the
trust;” (3) assets of the natural resources trust should only be used for
conservation and maintenance purposes; (4) “the appellate record was not
sufficiently developed to conclude whether all revenues generated by leases
remained in corpus of trust;” (5) “public trust provisions of the
Environmental Rights Amendment are self-executing;” and (6) “statutory
provisions relating to royalties are facially unconstitutional.” The court
looked to the language of the statutes to determine that the intent of the
statutes was to benefit all the people and that it unambiguously and clearly
indicates assets of the trust are to be used for conservation and maintenance
purposes.
Utah
Living Rivers v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2017 UT 64,
No. 20160503, 2017 WL 4172929.
This is a second appeal by an Environmental Organization of State
Department of Environmental Quality decision to grant permits. The court
determined that Environmental Organization failed to adequately address
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the claim that Environmental Organization waived its right to challenge
because a previous, identical claim precluded the new claim. Environmental
Organization challenged the issuance of permits to Operator for tar sands
mining on grounds of potential water pollution caused by the operation. The
court held that through the “permit by rule” process Operator used to obtain
its permit, the operation was deemed to have a “de minimus” impact on the
groundwater. The court held that Environmental Organization repeated its
earlier challenge to the permit by rule process and that was rejected because
it failed to present any independent grounds for the challenge. The court
determined that Environmental Organization had an opportunity to present
a fresh argument with the new challenge, but merely duplicated its prior
argument. Even if explicitly targeted at modifications to the plan rather than
the original plan, this redundant argument failed to illuminate why the prior
decision was improper and should be reversed. Therefore, the challenge is
dismissed.
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